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CHAIRMAN JACK R. FENTON: Today's hearing is on AB 3172.
AB 3172 would make significant changes in the award of attorneys' fees
in certain public interest lawsuits.

•

Existing law provides that a court may award attorneys' fees
to a successful party to any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class
of persons .
AB 3172 would change both the procedures involved in the requesting and granting of such fee awards as well as the formula used
to compute the size of the awards.
Testimony will focus on what the practical effects of the
various provisions of AB 3172 will be. We will try to determine whether the bill is necessary to preclude excessive fee awards as well
as what impact the bill will have on the policy of encouraging competent counsel to bring public interest litigation to enforce important
rights.
Our first witness is Assemblyman Pat Nolan, Author of AB 3172.
ASSEMBLYMAN PATRICK J. NOLAN: The whole issue of public interest attorneys' fees has been one, up to now, which
been handled
merely in the domain of the courts. The Legislature has not spoken in
in this area, and I think it's important that we do.
The Legislature
has said that we want to encourage these lawsuits, but the courts have
taken it from there and have come up with a procedure for awarding fees
which I think is, Ln light of the testimony that the Committee will be
hearing soon, unfortunate. The Legislature, of course,
a much better forum in which to weigh the various interests and decide on a scheme
of compensating attorneys for bringing these lawsuits, and that is the
purpose for which I introduced this bill. To allow us to come up with
a method which will take into account all the interests of society and
the competing parties rather than looking merely at the interest of the
two parties at the bar in a court case.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
law school.

To balance the equities, as we learned in

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Right. The court is not the proper forum
to decide the distribution of the fees.
The Legislature is. That's
why I've introduced this bill.
I'll turn it back to you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. The next witness is Fred A.
Bennett, Deputy Counsel, County of Los Angeles, who's the son of an
old friend of mine, one of our great jurists from Los Angeles County,
retired Superior Court Judge Ray Bennett. I believe Judge Bennett
is here with his wife. He was a predecessor of mine in the Assembly.
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Go ahead, Fred.

MR. FREDERICK A. BENNETT: Last time that we were here,
most of the opposition dealt with the fact that apparently we were
making public entities able to obtain fees under the statute. That
was never our intent. we didn't think that the statute, even as amended, accomplished that goal. But to make sure that it doesn't, and
to convince those who are strongly opposed in that regard, we have
proposed an amendment, some copies of which I will leave with the
committee, which reinstates that portion that prohibits public entities from receiving the fees.
I think we have also filed, already,
a rather detailed memorandum setting forth the points and the reasoning behind those amendments we have made to the bill. I would like
to direct my attention to one aspect of it, which I think is ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
your father speaking.
MR. BENNETT:

Well, if I close my eyes I think I hear

That's the finest compliment I can have.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Right.

That's correct.

MR. BENNETT: The one aspect that I think is the most crucial
is the methodology of calculating the fees. We have indicated
throughout, we're not against the salutary purpose of this legislation
which is to encourage competent attorneys to bring necessary public
interest litigation. We are not against awarding reasonable fees to
them to encourage these awards. What we are against is the award of
unreasonable fees and windfall profits. And I have prepared a couple
of charts just to show how the two methodologies work.
Now, I have taken some hypothetical facts which may not be
too hypothet
We start with your basic $50,000-a-year attorney.
The calculations work just as well if we take a $25,000-a-year attorney
or we take a $100,000-a-year attorney. But I took this figure because
it's convenient. We're assuming that he spends 1000 hours on successful public interest litigation. Now this is roughly six months of work.
The figure that we used, this 2164, is the traditional accounting methodology of dividing into a yearly salary to come up with an hourly rate,
but for those who have been in practice and think in terms of 2000 billable hours or eighteen hundred billable -- the figure is not far off of
what about six months' effort would be. Normal overhead expenses are
generally 50 percent of salaries. This is the average that you will
find in the law office economic books.
It also happens to be the figure, roughly, that was found in the Los Angeles County Bar Association
Survey of salaries and office expenses for the year 1977. I don't have
the more current one,
I don't think that figure has changed a great
deal.
So, $50,000-a-year attorneys, spending roughly six months or
1000 hours on public interest litigation, in which he's successful,
and with overhead expenses of about 50 percent of his salary. We then
take the current methodology of calculating fees, the so-called lodestar or touchstone approach. Now, as you can tell from the materials
and from some of the cases that have dealt with this, in the current
method you have to arrive at what's called the touchstone or the lodestar, which is the number of hours times a reasonable market rate. Now
what court have done on th
market rate is they have looked to other
-2-

so-called complex litigation, antitrust lit
ion and the like,
have taken hourly rates rang
from $100 to $20 and in some cases
more than that. For instance, one of the main fees in the Serrano v.
Priest case, which is somewhat dated even now, was $150
used that
The ca
So,
through on us
other amounts as well with similar
is the
we have the 1000 hours times $150 per hour, or $150,
lodestar or the touchstone.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fred, when the
an hour, does the firm consider that part of

charges $150
overhead?

MR. BENNETT: Certainly. In fact, if you were to start in
reverse what you'd do is you'd say, "I want to earn $50,000-a-year and
in order to earn $50,000-a-year I'm going to
to
11 $75-an-hour."
That's at our 50
overhead, $75,000-a-year d
how every
many billable hours you want to have -- 2,000 would
you your bill
of rate. As we go on
the calculation you wil see that that is
included. Then the courts looking at a number of factors, the quality
of the work, the difficulty of the issues, the cont
nature of the
action, and other factors which were listed in
analysis,
apply what's called a multiplier. And this,
, can be a
number less than one, although it never is, to a number
-- as
high as five in some cases. Two is roughly the f
was used
in Serrano v. Priest.
It's a figure that's often
many agencies seeking fees. And one that is often
ier of
two then results in a total award of $300,000.
Now we go back to see how well this
How much
of an incentive there was for him to bring th
We go back
to the cost of services and we know that one of
costs was his
six months of his salary because that's about
that he put
in, or $25,000. Fifty percent of salaries is the normal
and
that's $12,500. Resul
a total cost of some $37,500 in order to
produce this court award of $300,000, or a net
it or as we call it,
"a windfall" of $262,500 or some 700 percent profit~ Now
's one
heck of an incentive. And
we look at that
an annual basis, I'm
sure all of us would like to be making some $600 00 a
Particularly if we can do so and be held in h
esteem
sion for
doing pro bono work for the benefit of the
ic.
that we
propose ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you a
I
you were to
take an attorney who makes $150 an hour, works all the time he's in his
office, forget the multiplier for the moment, what's wrong with the
first part of the formula? That's what he would earn if he was in the
office whether he makes $50,000 hemself or helps to pay other salaries
of other people. What is wrong with the f
half of the formula?
MR. BENNETT: Our method can arrive at
appropriate methodology which will result in the
reimbursed for his expenses and a reasonable and
, ineluding the recognition that he is not doing work
bring in
this amount of profit to his office. That would be a perfectly appropriate calculation under the methodology that we are
in this
amendment. That could result in an award of $150,000. But here is the
thing, for the fellow who doesn't charge $150 an hour, we say it is
-3-

wrong to pay him at that rate, when the business that he is giving up,
the lost profit for bringing the pro bono work, is a much smaller loss
than that. And using this rate results in him getting a very substantial and unwarranted windfall. And, if I can just briefly give an
analogy to this, you know the public interest law firms say that this
treats them unfairly, makes them a second class citizen. Well, it
doesn't. And this is the very same type of analogy which we have done
in tort and civil rights litigation for years. Here's the example. A
fellow was falsely arrested. One of the measures of the damages for
him being falsely arrested is his lost income while he is in jail. If
we assume he is in jail for one day, one of the measures of his damages
is what he lost in wages for eight hours a day. If he is a factory
worker earning $5 per hour, he lost $40, among other damages that he
must have. And if he happens to be a plumber earning $20 an hour, he
has lost $80.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Have you got a plumber who will work for
$20 an hour? Send h1m around.
MR. BENNETT: Now we don't say that because we award $80 to
the plumber and $40 to the factory worker that one's rights were more
important than the other one's. Or that one was a better person than
the other one. Or that somehow we hold the plumber in more esteem
than we hold the factory worker. What we're saying is that we want
to fully compensate both of them for what they lost. And to do so we
pay $80 to one and $40 to the other. Now we could say, as the public
interest law firms would have us do, that we should establish a rate
to pay everybody. That for that false arrest, we should set a standard cost for the violation of your rights at $100 per hour. And pay
everybody at that rate. That's going to be a windfall for the factory
worker and maybe a
for the guy who earns more than $100 an hour.
But the courts haven't done that and we shouldn't do that here.
Instead, what we propose is a cost-plus methodology which
works within the same framework as the current method but results in
a much more reasonable
We take the same basic $50,000-a-year
attorney. We pay him the cost of that six month effort. We add in
his 50 percent overhead, that's this $37,500, the same figure that we
talked about over here. And we come up with the total cost of those
services. Now the incentive now comes through this reasonable and controllable margin for
it
We have argued in every case in which we
have raised this issue that 50 percent is an appropriate figure to use.
This has been
in all of the jail cases that I've handled and
in others.
If we add that incentive of some $18,750, which is a pretty
good incentive, we come up with an award of $56,000-plus dollars. Now
even if we found that because this was a particularly difficult case,
one in which the fee was contingent, one in which the attorney did an
excellent job, and one in
ich the issues were complex, and we applied
the same multiplier, we come up with an award of almost $113,000.
If
you weigh the cost
still have a 200 percent profit. You know,
this is hardly
your attorney going out and giving up of
his time on these
lie
sues just for the good of society.
You're still
well on this fee. And this is what we
say is a
to attorney's fees.
Now, these same calculations could be worked out at a wide
range of salary ranges and costs, but as long as you still leave into
-4-

the system the ability of the court to put in the incentive throug-h
profit, which our bill contemplates, we can still add as much as we
want to. This bill does not say what the amount of that incentive is.
The court, if it wants to, could make that 100 percent, 200 percent,
or 300 percent, but the key difference is that when it does so, the
court is going to do it knowingly. He is going to know exactly the
profit or windfall that he is giving to that agency, or the firm, for
bringing this business.
It is not all hidden in a calculation where
we talk about some artificial market rate that has no relationship to
necessarily what he charges or earns and the court feels very comfortable in making it an award of 700 percent profit. What we do here is
that we see exactly what we're doing. The public sees, the court sees,
the litigants see. It can result in some similar figures. Why is
this a good way to do it? What is the best measure of what the reasonable value of services are? That's what a willing buyer and a willing
seller are willing to pay and sell for the marketplace. And that's
what we have in salaries. What is this person willing to sell his
services to, to who he is working for? Or, if it is a sole proprietor,
what is he willing to sell it to the public for in billing his services?
We start with what that firm was willing to pay for them and what he
was willing to receive for his services. That is the best measure of
the market value of those services. Not this artificial market rate
that nobody really knows what it means. We don't really know how it
relates to the attorney.
In fact, in cases where we have tried to establish through evidence what that market rate is, it's been most difficult.
You have county bar association surveys. You have published
ordinances of the salaries of Attorney Generals, Public Defenders, but
when you get down to trying to argue what the market rate is, I represent to you that most judges don't really know. They pick a figure out
of a hat.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fred, let's say I'm a sole practitioner and
I take one of these cases. Under either formula, it doesn't make any
difference, I lose. Six months of my time I've devoted to a .case and
I lose.
It's a heck of a gamble I've taken.
MR. BENNETT:

Certainly it is.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I can tell you, it's a heck of a gamble
for a sole pract1t1oner to take these cases. Although I do not
necessarily agree with the percentage of the contingency incentive
that trial lawyers may take~ as you know, it stimulates people to take
these cases even though they may lose.
MR. BENNETT: That's what this is supposed to do under either
formula.
You know, under the lodestar or touchstone formula, our
Supreme Court says that we have to start with this figure, which is
the actual cost of the services, in their view, the number of hours
times the fee.
It is when we get to the multiplier that we start
thinking about the contingency factor. We look at your case as a
private practioner and we say that your case was a sure winner, so
we're not going to give you a multiplier; or, you had a case that was
most difficult, it's unusual that you won, your expectation of winning
was very remote and you took a great risk.
It's in this that the court
contemplates that contingency. In our formula as well, this is where
the court contemplates that contingency. And since we've put no limit
on it, the court can make that as high or as small as they want.
-5-

CHAIRMAN FENTON: They don't have a limit? But, under your
formula, there are a lot of cases that as a single practioner I
couldn't afford to take if I had to use six months to gamble on not
getting any money.
Now, if I knew that for the six months that I
would be working on that case, I could make $150 an hour, if I win
the case, it might be worth it. That's the crux of this situation.
Whether you're in a one-man firm or a large firm, if you can sit in
that off
for six months and bring in $150 an hour, why shouldn't
that be the base, forgetting profit, forgetting anything else. Because if you sit in the office, you bring that in and if you spend
six months on the public interest case, they usually don't bring some
other lawyer in to
you place for those six months. In my firm,
a one-man firm, I'd never he able to and I don't know about the big
ones, but I
ine
have a certain amount and they can only do
so much ...
MR. BENNETT:
over several years.

Six months is a summary.

This may be spread

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Oh, I understand, but it doesn't matter,
however you do it -- all together, or spread over several years.
MR. BENNETT: The court, under our proposed methodology
could do exactly that
you because you are a sole practioner and
your overhead costs are h
, your risks are lower -- I mean your
risks are higher as well in what you can afford to do. They can come
up and pay you $150 per hour. But they do it knowingly. Instead, we
now compare you
another agency that has a lot more attorneys and
a lot more overhead. They would be much better off, even if they were
at the same rate that you get. What we say to that agency is
that we start the same way that we do with you. We look at what those
services cost. Then we add to
, knowingly, so that we know what
takes to j
you for your effort, including the risks and
We are
into consideration that you're a
, or that you're a member of a 10-man law firm, or that
you're a member of a
icly funded organization which doesn't have
to depend on success or failure.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I don't want to belabor this. If you go
into a 10
ess of whether you get the lowest man
on the totem
you so much an hour, don't they? If
you take that
's the lowest or the highest paid is
inmaterial for the moment, you take him out of the realm of that firm
so that he can t do the work for the firm for the six months. Whether
it's over a two year per
or whatever time period, you're losing his
It will take his firm $150 an hour for that individual reof what is
is. Isn't that true?
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:
firm

You are assuming though that that law
point is that a lot of firms don't but
at the highest rate.

m not quarrel
with you. I'm with you
on that
a big firm and they charge me less for
a specific attorney s
s, and he's the one who does the work,
then his or her normal fee is what should be paid. But if they give
me another one, you understand what I'm saying-- that's what I'm
-6-

saying to you.
I'm not saying it should be the same, and I agree Wlth
you. By the same token, if you go into big law f
, I
ine that
they normally charge the same whether they've got the lowest flunky or
their biggest one because I don't imagine the clients know which they're
getting.
But they charge them that. Then that's what it should be.
It's easy in a one-man law firm because you
so much an hour.
That's all I'm saying. Where I would do my work in the bill is in the
multiplier and not let the courts go off half

•

MR. BENNETT: Well, I agree with you if every firm that we
dealth with was honest, and we had the regular going rate of what they
charged given to us in these cases, we might not be here trying to get
these amendments. But what we have is that the "deep pocket" of public
entities, which isn't as deep as it once was, is still an attractive incentive to inflate those rates. We suddenly have a firm or an organization that's never in their life gotten $100-an-hour or $200-an-hour
and suddenly they're a $200-an-hour attorney in
case. And the only
way that you can evaluate those things is to go back and look and start
with the beginning figure that we can have some certainty in. And those
are the costs of those services.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if I come in as a sole practioner in
a firm and request $200, you should be allowed d covery to find out
if that is a good request. That wouldn't bother me at all. But, if in
the discovery it discloses that we charge $200, then that should be the
figure.
MR. BENNETT:

That would certainly be persuasive material

evidence.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If I were sitting as a judge and they took
somebody out of the firm who for that six months would be bringing in
$200 to the firm, then the firm should be allowed to
that $200.
What the multiplier is, that's another ques
But to me, you're
right, you should be able to discover what they're
No question
about that. To me, the multiplier is the important
I'm just
as concerned as you and Pat are that we aren't go
the other way because we've got the two equities. We've got the
interest in
bringing the litigation, and we've got the public taxpayers from whom
we're taking this money. We have to make sure
we don't get way
out of line. Let's
some balance.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Jack, if I can
saying as a solo practioner, you're not sure you
take the case.
On the other hand, as a solo practioner seeing this laid out here, all
of a sudden these cases become not pro bono publ
, but instead pro
bono me. A 700 percent profit is a hell of an incentive for a solo
practioner to invest six months into.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if I were a sole
, I would
want to get what I charge an hour, plus some
ive.
I wouldn't want
them to talk about my salary. I wouldn't want them to talk about my
overhead. When the client comes in, I don't say, "Now based on your
case, this is what I'm going to charge you."
I'm on an hourly rate.
Whatever my hourly rate is. And if my hourly rate brings me in 700
percent profit a year, that's my business.
I'm still a private entrepreneur, and I charge so much.
-7-

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: All I'm saying is, this is a heck of an
incentive. This is no longer encouraging people to do things in the
interest of the public. This is encouraging people to do it in the
interest of themselves,to earn a better profit than they would on most
of their cases. That's what I'm saying.
I think we are going to increasingly see private law firms doing this as a means of profit making,
going into this type oflitigation. Because the profits are so mcuh
greater than they would make under normal circumstances. I think if we
continue with the lodestar method, O'Melveney and Meyers is going to see
this as a very profit-oriented type of litigation.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, by the same token, you might have
O'Melveney and Meyers say, "We're not going to take some youngster out
of here to work on. these if he can earn us $150 or whatever he can earn
if we are going to end up with much smaller awards. It doesn't pay for
us," and so you don't get an O'Melveney and Meyers, you get the little
punk attorney like Fenton, when they could get somebody ...
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

Who is brilliant.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, but they don't know it. Seriously, I
think what you're gettlng at is correct.
I think the other method is
exorbitant.
In my opinion it's in the multiplier that you should have
more guidelines.
MR. BENNETT: If it's possible and there is still time left
at the end of the day I would like to respond to some of the opposition.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. I want to introduce the gentleman who is going to chair the Committee while I'm gone, that's Ass~mbly
man Richard Hayden ~rom Sunnyvale. The next witness is Dennis Myers. ··
MR. DENNIS MYERS: Mr. Chairman, I am Dennis Myers, County
Counsel of Inyo County and I won't take up too much of your time. We
just heard from a member of the County Counsel's office of the county
of the first class. We're a county of the 46th class. We're a very
small county, population wise, very large in land. The awarding of
attorney's fees is a problem that especially hits small counties.
If
Fred's example were used and there were an award of $300,000 in our
county it would be 3 percent of our present budget, and would bankrupt
the county~ There is no provision presently in the law to prevent that
sort of thing other than the discretion of the court.
I believe that
with this bill, under the section that deals with considering whether
the award would be paid by public funds, that would be a consideration
of the court in that case. This has such an impact on small counties
that we consider attorneys fees from the inception of the lawsuit.
That's true especially in environmental cases in our county because
our county is so exposed to them, it's such a large county. One other
thing I would like to touch on about the inequities of this in a small
county is that our county probably is in a unique position of having
been on both sides of this attorneys fees argument.
In Inyo v. Yorty,
Antonio Rossman argued for attorneys fees for our county and we were
denied them. When we ourselves brought public interest litigation
against a larger public entity, the City of Los Angeles, we were denied
attorneys fees.
So I think that's an inequitable situation that discourages counties and entities from pursuing public interest litigation.
If you are going to have something like 1021.5, I think you should
-8-

allow, at least in the situation where entity is the plaintiff in t~e
public interest, to also be awarded attorneys fees, because it costs
us a lot of money to bring litigation. That's about all I have, Mr.
Chairman.
I mainly want to show that it's not just a large county
problem but it can be a very severe problem for small counties and
small public entities.
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD HAYDEN: Other than the merits of the case,
what actual process do you go through in determining whether you're
going to settle a case, in view of the potential attorneys fees? How
do you make that determination as a county counsel?

•

MR. MYERS: First, we do consider the merits of the case.
Other than that, in our county, we have very limited resources to pay
attorneys fees or judgments, so if there's a risk at all, we have to
multiply that risk times the amount of money we have. That's a judgment call in our own minds.
Say you have a 10 percent risk of losing
the case, but the attorneys fees in the case may be $100,000.
If we
could settle the case out, pay the attorney $2,000 or $3,000 for filing
it, we would do it. And the form of settlement~might take say with an
environmental lawsuit where we're requested to prepare an EIR, or backup,
we may go ahead and do that, even though we may think it's unnecessary.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Right, so you're basically speaking in
favor of at least some version of Assemblyman Nolan's bill?
MR. MYERS:
I am speaking in favor of
bill would be very helpful in giving the courts
least consider the ability of the county or the
sider that it is a public entity as long as the
Yes, I am speaking in favor of the bill.

his bill. I think his
some criteria to at
entity to pay. To conentity deals in good faith.

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: To your knowledge are there county
counsels or other attorneys representing the public entities who would
go ahead strictly on the merits of the case regardless of the attorneys
fees and not take into consideration the financial ability of the entity to pay if they lose?
MR. MYERS: When I was in Los Angeles County we never hesitated to go ahead with a case if we thought we had a fair case, and we
thought we had a good shot, but in a rural county you just can't. You
have to consider the attorneys fee because it becomes an important factor.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
It's pinpointed in a small county I suppose whereas in a big county, you really can't see it because it's so
large.
I always knew that Los Angeles County had more money than any
other counties but I'm sure it does not have an unlimited supply.
our county
county.

MR. MYERS:
But lawsuits such as this would nearly bankrupt
if there were such a thing as a $300,000 judgment in our

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
Los Angeles County.
MR. MYERS:

A series of cases could bankrupt

That's true.

-9-

ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You're just simply pinpointing it, making
it very vivid with respect to one rural county.
MR. MYERS: Well, sir, you have to take into consideration
that attorneys fees aren't that much less just because it's a rural
county. The attorney is going to put in just as much work on a lawsuit or more there than he would in Los Angeles. So he might be entitled to the same award, regardless of whether the County can afford
to pay it or not.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: All right, thank you, sir. Mr. John
Klee. Mr. Klee is a Deputy Attorney General of the State of California.
We're glad to have you with us today, John.
MR. JOHN KLEE: Thank you.
I'm here on behalf of the Attorney General. We are also supporting the bill.
I am here not represent~
ing a client, like the last two people who have a county or a client in
a sense who will pay the judgment independent of the state, if an award
is made. I represent, in a sense, the same people that you represent,
namely the people of the State of California. So I'm here as much in
an independent role as I am in a sense as your lawyer telling you what's
happening with the money which you are the steward over, and that is,
namely, the State tax funds.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: John, would you say, though, as Mr.. Myers
testified previously, that the Attorney General's Office does take into
consideration the potential loss, and that it is a major factor as to
whether you determine whether a case should be settled up front?
MR. KLEE: To my knowledge we have not settled a case without
igating 1t on the grounds that we would have to pay more attorneys
fees, because in a sense it doesn't come out of the Attorney General's
budget, it just goes back into the Legislature to pay.
In some ways it
works the other way. In many cases we will think that we are right, and
rather than coming out and making a reasonable solution to the problem,
we will say, "Well in a sense we have to litigate it and win," because
if we settle it, the private Attorney Generals,so called, come in and
ask for attorneys fees anyway on the grounds that they got what they
wanted. We have a case now in Alameda County against the Department of
Agriculture and the State of California in which the Legislature repealed the statute, for reasons which we believe are completely unrelated to the lawsuit, that was filed challenging the particular statute.
The judge said, "Well they got what they wanted. They're entitled to
attorneys fees." And now we have a bill pending, a request for $650,000
attorneys fees.
The case wasn't settled by us. Maybe the legislators
have to start thinking now, "Should we amend this law? If we do somebody is going to ask us for attorneys fees because there is a lawsuit
pending. If we enact a statute which reaches the same goal as what
they want in the lawsuit, we're subjecting ourselves to half a million
dollars worth of attorneys fees." That is the type of thing ...
1

CHAIRMAN FENTON: You said we're subjecting ourselves to
atuorneys fees because we're changing the law?
MR. KLEE:

It's happening right now.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

You mean the attorney is going to say he
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lobbied for the change of the law or the fact that he brought the case
caused the change in the law?
MR. KLEE:
It prompted the Legislature to change the law, yes.
The courts are buying that.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What if we enact a new law that no attorneys fees could be granted because we change the law?
MR. KLEE: That would be interesting to see.
I don't know
what the public interest firms would do. They might say that you don't
have that power, that that's a judicial power.
I just don't know. You
have never done that so I don't know what would happen in that case.
It would be interesting.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If we have the power to say that attorneys
fees can be granted, why don't we have the power to say attorneys fees
cannot be granted?
MR. KLEE:
I would say that you could. Remember Serrano v.
Priest went off on the inherent equitable powers of the court. So
maybe it could be argued that you have no ability to deny.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
In your settlement with the private attorney,
do you ever talk about how much attorneys fees are stipulated to? Do
you do that or is it entirely up to the court?
MR. KLEE: Well, we could try. Of course, we try to avoid
litigation and cut down our costs. Actually you're paying us $50-anhour to litigate these things. We don't have so many lawyers running
around with nothing to do that we look for litigation. When it comes
into us and if there's an entitlement to fees and reasonable requests
are made, normally we just agree to it. The only standard is reasonable. Reasonableness like beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. To
many of us in the Attorney General's Office, who see our office as one
of the largest offices in the state operating at $50-an-hour, that includes salaries, overhead, rent, everything, and we see requests coming
in from law offices that we know operate at less than ours, because
most of our litigation is against the public interest and the private ..•
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

You mean the costs?

MR. KLEE: The costs, right. And cost includes salaries, and
law offices like Ot'rs who don't bill, the legal aid offices, the public
interest law offices who don't, like you, have a billing rate. It's
easy to talk about it for someone in private practice and the examples
you gave.
"Well, what if I gave up my $150-an-hour?" To me, that is
the cost to you.
If you normally bill at $150-an-hour, for every hour
you spend on public interest litigation, that is your cost. That's, in
reality, what you are out of pocket. That doesn't bother me to do that.
What bothers us is when the private law firms, who normally bill at $50an-hour ask $150.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

That bothers me, too.

MR. KLEE: And because they say, "We're not going to look to
our billing but we're going to look to other people's billing rates.
-11-

We're going to look to the major antitrust guy, and we're not going to
look to what we actually do." And the legal aid offices are public
interest firms who don't b
anybody ever, because they're prohibited
by their charters
billing. They don't bill. They operate at from
$25 to $50-an-hour. And they're paid by the government to do that.
And they come in and ask for the $150-an-hour rate. That's what happened
in Serrano, that's what they
. They got $150-an-hour augmented to
$212. I wanted just to let you know with some examples.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN:
I just have one question, Mr. Chairman,
to clarify what's been said. The Legislature from time to time in my
memory has refused to pay a claims bill or portion of a claims bill for
court ordered legal fees. What is the legal status of that in the
courts at the present time?
MR. KLEE: That is before the courts in two cases, Serrano
v. Priest, and Mandel v. Hodges. In Mandel v. Hodges, the court of
appeal following 100 years of case law said that that's the prerogative
of the Legislature. The court said the Legislature holds the power of
the purse and
doesn't have to pay it if in its exercise of discretion it decides not to. Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court granted their
petition for hearing
that case, which forbodes a decision saying that
the Legislature will no longer have control or the power of the purse.
They've ordered it paid out of the operating budget of the state agency
involved, in that case the Department of Health.
In the case of Serrano
they ordered Wilson Riles to pay what would be now over a million dollars out of his
budget. He does have an operating budget, and
they can put him
jail. That's how it would work. So I just wanted
to tell you that as we said, reasonableness lies in the eye of the beholder.
I'd like to say that we support something in the statute which
puts in some
so that people know where they're going. This
bill, in my
, and
the Attorney General's opinion, helps it in
two respects. One, it limits the phrase reasonableness and sort of gets
it into this
of costs that we were looking at, ties it down to
more than what they
ly are doing. Second, it does away with this
idea that people are
fees for fees.
In other words they want
attorneys fees for all the time they spend asking for their own fees
not doing the public
1
gation. Let me
you some examples
on how that real
works and encourages ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
tling for

How much time gets involved with this batIs it extensive?

MR. KLEE:
I can't tell you because the way our computers are
set up on
, we don't break that down. We do say how
much time we spend on each case, but we don't break it down between
issues.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
less. Once
he knows he's going

Of course the private attorney could care
and they're litigating attorneys fees
for that.
Is the lodestar used on that?

MR. KLEE: Of course. All I know is that there is in our
office now many cases in
we have spent more time litigating the
fee issue than we have on ther merits of the case.
-12-

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
So what you're saying is that if they didn't
get paid for litigating the attorneys fees, they would be more prone
to settling those things a lot faster.

•

MR. KLEE:
Or at least making a reasonable request. Let me
give you some examples. We have a case which in a summary judgment was
entered against the state in 1974, a case in which a summary judgment was
from the summary judgment by virtue of an unrelated California Supreme
Court decision that had dome down a few months earlier. The Legal Aid
Society put in a request for over $2 million in attorneys fees. That's
been up to the Court of Appeal and back down. We're fussing over discovery and costs and figuring out what their factors are. They have
now reduced their claim to $517,000, in other words still over half a
million dollars, for a total of 2,000 hours which they claim they spent
on the case. This was San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance.
During that time that they spent that time, the San Francisco Bar
Association put out a little pamphlet to all the lawyers in San Francisco, entitled "Volunteer Legal Services Program," in which they asked
lawyers in San Francisco to do pro bono work and donate at least 50
hours a year out of their time, to doing pro bono work. They recognized
that some attorneys wouldn't be able to do this, so they suggested a
cash contribution to some legal aid office. They said you should know
that it costs $600 to fund and support a .san Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation lawyer to deliver 50 hours of legal services, $12 an hour. This was a couple years ago, which was probably
right, pretty close. But now they're asking you, the state in this
Sacramento action, to return to them as reasonable attorneys fees
$12,500 for that same 50 hours.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Do legal aid offices and other organizations
take this type of case because there's a windfall or do they take them
because no private attorneys will?
MR. KLEE:
Quite frankly, I don't know why they take them.
I assume it's because that's what they're supposed to do. They're being
paid by the federal government to bring this type of case.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Why should they have an incentive for bring-

ing then?
MR. KLEE: We are not objecting to paying them, reimbursing
them their costs, that's a decision that you have made in enacting
1021.5. To us, the key word is reimburse. You're reimbursing them
for their reasonable efforts.
If, in fact, that is true that it costs
the federal government $600 to fund 50 hours of work, we fail to see
why it's reasonable to pay them $12,500 of state money to reimburse
the federal government, in effect, for their $600.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
200 percent profit anyhow?

Under this formula you would give them a

MR. KLEE: Under that formula which allows the multipliers,
if they were asking for 50 hours instead__QL_!:_he l ,_ 000 in his example,
it would come to $600 as their cost. Now if you multiplied that by
two you would get it down to $1,200 and you'd still be giving them a
200 percent profit.
But what they do in a sense, and what we're stuck
with, is that they start with $150. They come in and they say, "We
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don't want to be second class
as the highest paid pr
those same rates." Now,
My answer to that
that
naive and unsophisticated person.

We want to be reimbursed just
we should be reimbursed at
that's to pay them equally.
in the eyes of the most

Let me give you
a simple hypothetical. Supposing you
had a pro bono case
two lawyers which we have quite often.
One will be a legal aid of
, the other w~ll be a private law firm.
We have such a case right now. Supposing the private law firm allows
one of its associates to work on the case and he normally bills his
time at $100 an hour. Suppose the legal aid office operates at a total
cost of say $25 an hour.
don't have a billing rate, so we look at
what it costs the federal government to pay them, the $25-an-hour. Keep
in mind, the cost of that
law firm is $100-an-hour. That's what
they are out of pocket by
their private lawyer to work on it.
The cost to the legal aid
ice s $25-an-hour. If we have a judge
who takes the ph
sophy that we're going to pay everybody equally,
supposing he sets it at $75-an-hour? That is not fair, that is not
equality. That's, in fact, cheating the private law firm by $25-anhour and giving the
office a 300 percent windfall. So, saying that everybody should
the same is not equality. It's only
equality if you close your eyes to the reality, to the real world that
we live in. Another
which you will hear possibly raised to this
cost approach is it's too
icated. Oh my God, we've got to figure
out what everybody's off
, the telephone costs and all that.
I'd say that's not
don't you just take the hourly rate that
have to go through all that other ...
But when
billing rate.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

that's true if
1
aid soc

have a billing rate.
, they don't have a

Then, if it were my bill I would have some

other
MR. KLEE:
don't have to get into this complicated cos
all have public accountants who do their
yearly books.
their yearly budget is. You know how
produce. In other words if you have
many average
a
that funds basically 20 lawyers all
year long, you know that each
works, with overtime and vacation,
about 2,000 hours, that's 40,000. You divide it into the million, it
comes out $25-an-hour. It's very simple and it can be done with rough
justice. You don't have to
to each precise lawyer and say, "This
is a h
rank
awyer in our legal aid office and a lower one."
You could
them and
a reasonable result. But, I wanted
to point out to you that it's a real world. We are spending more time
and, in my
more time on the question of how much you
should get,
o
, and because of the idea that
you get
fees. Because if you have a legal aid office,
for example, that
$2
and they can put in a request
for $150 or $200-an-hour
if you finally beat them down to $100-anhour, they're still
times what it cost them, for every
that they
the $200 is compensated at $100. It's
a heads
situation.
-1

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If you're going to allow them to litigate,
how much they are to get paid and then pay how much, they are going to
get paid, then there is no incentive for shortening the time for litigating.

•

MR. KLEE: That's right, and that's what's happening to us
right now in Serrano.
I was the attorney that lost Serrano v. Priest
on the attorneys fees issue.
In that decision they remanded it to the
trial court to determine how much fees they should get for filing their
briefs in the Supreme Court on the case on the merits and on appeal.
They originally filed a cost bill asking for $275,000 for filing those
briefs. By the time they got to the motion and discovery was made they
reduced it to $219,975. After a lot of discovery and a lot of legal
fussing we have reduced it down to where they were actually awarded
$113,000 for filing the briefs in the Supreme Court. $39,000 of that
related to the fees for getting fees issued. So we don't think that's
right. We have taken an appeal saying they shouldn't have been awarded
$40,000 for arguing over the right to fees. They have appealed saying
that they want more. So that case is going on and on and on. All
we're fussing about is fees for fees and fees for fees for fees because
now when they filed a motion for fees they said they wanted not only the
fees for doing the work in the Supreme Court to get the fees they wanted
fees for the time that they were spending computing the amount that they
should get for getting those fees.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's assume for the sake ot discussion
that the amount being disputed by the attorney isn't rai~ed on ap,J?ealf
does he still get attorneys fees for litigating it7 Or does he only
get attorneys tees if it's raised{
MR. KLEE:

I'm sorry I don't understand.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's say the court awards mr $100,000
attorneys fees on the private attorney general theory and I'm unhappy
so I appeal it.
In the appeal, any of three things may happen:
it
is lowered, it is kept the same or it is raised. Do I get fees in all
three situation~?
MR. KLEE: They asked for them in all three respects.
So
far in Mandel v. Hodges there is some indicatio~ that you do not get
fees for fees, and yet the trial court in Serrano granted them. So
it's not that sure.
It should be to the preva1ling party if fees are
awarded to you and the other side appeals, and you lose, well you
shouldn't get fees for fees.
But in Mandel v. Hodges, they've asked
for feeS for feeS for lOSing. we I re-OaCk in the trial COUrt when they-';re
asking for that. The trouble is this is all a very emerging type thing.
Some legislation now getting these rules clearcut would be a big help
because otherwise we're talking about years of judicial and appellate
decisions getting these things. Those are the basic examples. Another
one that we have is right now in Alameda Superior Court involves public
Advocates, Inc.. They are asking for fees of $650,000 in a case that
never went to trial because the Legislature amended the law while the
case was pending. They're asking for $450-an-hour for their primary
attorney, and $180 for the lady who was one year out of law school who
spent most of her time collating papers.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If I go to the firm and I hire them and
they charge $180-an-hour and the lady who was out of law school one
-15-

year does the work, it doesn't matter whether she's in one year or a
senior partner, that's what they charge.
But
most of the cases against the state, we're
not talk
Ra
Nader type of lawsuit where you're talking
about going against Ford Motor Company or th
kind of stuff. We're
talking about
, the kind we're involved in is where they're challenging someth
that
as a legislator did. Ninety-nine percent
of our cases
legal aid societies and public interest law
firms. We
have the examples that you're talking about.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If I were to go into this law firm that has
this
school one year, and when I hire them
they give me her but
$180 per hour. The fact that she s a
year out of law school
she
involved with th
type of case,
what's the difference
that firm charges anybody $180-an-hour for
services?
gation,
to bring that suit.
Fred Bennett is
bill is disagree
when we have
and asking for

s
you
public interest litithat $180 is what that
ly cost that law firm
with that.
I don't think
or
that's supporting this
What we're disagreeing with is
bill at any rate or bill at $100-an-hour
is what we're talking about.
side.

very much.

Thank you

s here?

Vidor from the Los Angeles ofthe bill because
into in the fedfee case. I was the attorney to handle
the Center applied for over two and a half
million in
s some
thousand in costs and disbursements. I was
a situation where the litigation had
gone on almost
they presented their time records
through means of rea
hearsay affadavit based on the services performed
some half dozen other
, some of whom had
left the f
So the aspect of this bill
ich
adequate
records is essential, because, even under the lodestar approach, there
should be adequate verifiable time records. If these prevailing parare go
to
fees they shouldn't utilize reconstruction;
utilize hearsay;
be able to pinpoint what
performed what services at what time. And also
the court should
to scrutinize
some of that time was
real
1
cases where you had a number of attorneys in
complex lit
over a long period of time, there's bound
to be some
So that's why we are also in favor of this
extended
To
into those details, interrogatories
and depositions
of records, may
1 be necessary. The
other thing, of course, that has been mentioned, and that we would
concur with,
the actual salaries and the
, if it happens to
be a public interest law firm. The Center for Law in the Public Interest in the
case objected to our going into the salaries
of the
, the funding, and all the rest of it.
So, it
realistic basis in award
their fees if we
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knew what their salaries were. And as a matter of fact, in some cases,
with the law clerks -- they had a law extern program -- those law clerks
were receiving law school credit for their work.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
in hearing from them.

Well, we'll hear from them.

I'm interested

MR. VIDOR:
Yes. Well I'm sure there were a great deal of
hours for wh1ch these law clerks were paid nothing, and yet they were
compensated for at the rate of $20 to $25 per hour.
It seems to me
that that is the grossest example of a windfall to such a law firm.
It would appear that the State there was subsidizing their legal extern program.
The other thing that we were precluded from going into
is the degree of success of the Center as a prevailing party.
I think
that this bill is favorable in that it seeks to refine the concept of
prevailing parties.
In effect, if a party prevails on some issues but
not on others, the court should be able to make some apportionment of
the time in relation to those issues. Now the Century Freeway case
was concluded by a consent decree, and that consent decree included
aspects which were unrelated to the claims on which they sued in court.
It included things like an affirmative action program, an expansion of
the housing element, a monitor in connection with relocation benefits.
All of those things were outside the scope of their claims. So this
bill has the merit of focusing and refining on the prevailing parties
to what extent did they prevail, and shaping the reasonable fees to
those issues.
The other element of this bill which we certainly would support and is favorable is the good faith and cooperation of the party
against whom fees are to be awarded. Again, the District Court in the
Century Freeway case considered that immaterial. A large portion of
the fees claimed was for the negotiating process.
It took about two
and a half years. We cooperated with them.
We, through our declaration,
showed that we exhibited good faith in trying to resolve this thing.
In fact, we showed that a good measure of it at the end was due to
political considerations.
But that was all considered irrelevant by
the District Court -- our good faith.
The court just instead focused
on the provocative nature of the lawsuit and how their persistence
helped in arriving at the consent decree. So they got 100 percent of
the credit, we didn't get any of the credit. So,. I think that that
certainly is a tangible and objective factor that should be taken into
account.
Particularly in a great many of these cases which are resolved by a consent decree or by a stipulated judgment.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you.

John Sullivan.

MR. JOHN SULLIVAN:
Good morning.
I'm John Sullivan representing Cal Tax, California Taxpayers Association. We strongly support
this bill.
I think it is obvious that the Legislature is not satisfied with the process of determining attorneys fees in these situations. We've got the Mandel and Serrano cases where the Legislature
has refused to pay on the claims. We 1 ve got budget control language
that calls for a report in January by the Legislative Analyst and Department of Finance on ways to improve oversight over attorneys fees.
And we have this hearing today. Public interest litigation supported
by government definitely has a place, but we believe that there has to
-17-

be much more
disbursing
ic
the state agenc
of disburs
Legislature would
problem immed
The

hind government's
cases wh
would otherwise
and then make
that
lit
ting
that is
formation
process. I
would have
that
bill like
CHAIP-MAN

is
If we
the same system of
poss
under 1021.5 and case law, if
under that
of broad options
would be
shock and the
and
care of that
essential, and that this bill goes
cos method and requirement of definite
that the fact that a firm or an attorney
should go to the quest
of
a 1. The very rationale beto
them to
into
, to represent clients who
fact that you turn around
fees, goes against
the point that they are
increased
instead of represenfunded to represent. One thing
is no real good set of inthat
resulting from this
way to collect this, that we
I think the kind of information
at and press very rapidly for a
Thank you.
Thank you, John.

Rossman.

MR
CHAIRMAN

reasons
governmental
want to
more time it
of the case.
award. Now
troversial sect
that I don't
necessary, for
the
not take

rn
the Legal
Rossman. I'm
and I guess
should reflect the
appear in opposition to the bill.
attorney. I
I'm a
have also been honored to
to the County
when
have had to bring litiSo I have been on both sides of the issue
to say that I have appeared in
which the committee graciously
the cases in
I was the
case and the
case. I deI have
receive into
for that
rk. There are two
case
And, two, when a
case that
deserve to lose, if they
just testified,
can spend
fees than the underlying merits
the
re purpose of a fee
to what I think are the conseveral things in the bill
we just don't think are
there be discovery. That is
can claim that discovery does
ate or
ized.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I thought one of the gentlemen who testified said it's difficult, if not impossible, to get that information
back from the legal aid and the others.
MR. ROSSMAN:
Well, that might be their experience.
I know
if I were claiming fees, I would feel that as the moving party in court
I would have to come forward with the relevant evidence.
I think it's
not so much a dispute over the principle of discovery being available,
but what is relevant and what should be discovered.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That's always the problem.
no problem with that part of the bill?

So, you have

MR. ROSSMAN: No, I think that someone who is seeking fees
has to meet his or her burden of giving the court the adequate data.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

So you have no problems with the discovery

provision?
MR. ROSSMAN:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Okay.

MR. ROSSMAN:
But by the same token, because that is existing
law, I don't think that the Legislature has to enact this bill.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
It depends where you come from.
Sometimes
the trial lawyers say, "It's already existing law. We don't need new
legislation." Other times it's the other side that says, "It's already
the law we don't need legislation." One side never needs the legislation because it's already existing law and the other side needs it
because even though it's existing law you better put it in the statutes.
MR. ROSSMAN:

Yes, sir.

I can appreciate that.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If it is existing, if that's the practice,
why should you be concerned that it's made statutory. What's the difference if we make it statutory?
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, if you make it mandatory or just authorized discovery -- I'm not sure how the bill reads in that respect.
There would be nothing wrong with them enacting a bill that authorizes
discovery to take place in a proceeding like this.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well what they're doing is analogizing this
to discovery in other types of cases. What's wrong with that?
MR. ROSSMAN: There's nothing wrong with it.
It's just not
necessary.
If the bill made discovery mandatory, that would be unfortunate. Why should we foment further litigation? Why should you make
discovery mandatory if the parties don't need it? My basic concern
here is that what this bill is designed to do is, frankly, make it
easier to litigate the issue of entitlement to fees, and that's unfortunate. The approach that I have taken and that I think that most
lawyers who work in this area take, is that once that the substantive
dispute is decided by the court, in the best of all possible worlds
the fee award ought to be negotiated between the parties involved. And
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that's not happening because, for better or for worse, there are some
public agencies or their attorneys who look on the oppoetunity to contest the fee as an opportunity, as a litigation tactic, to wear down
the people who have
the case in the first instance.
CHAIRMAN FENTON

All right, how would you expedite that?

MR. ROSSMAN: The bill should not be justified on the grounds
of existing law, and I would include in that also the notion of findings of fact being required on a fee award. When a fee award is entered as part of the judgment, any party has a statutory right now to require findings of fact. And so there is no need to put that into the
bill and make findings of fact mandatory if the parties between themselves decide that it is not necessary to take the court's time and
their time to articulate findings of fact. The same thing even is
true with respect to time records.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Mr. Nolan says the court doesn't always
grant requests for finding of fact.
MR. NOLAN: They don't say that applies in every case.
Again, some judges, yes.
But others say, "No, I don't have to give a
finding of fact to you
regards to the fee." What do you do then?
It's not in the statute. Why not have it in the statute?
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, you could authorize it, but I don't think
it ought
If I were getting a judgment for fees in my
favor, I think as a cautious measure I would at least want to insure
I had drawn up proposed findings of fact, if that were going to be
challenged on appeal.
If it's not going to be challenged on appeal,
then there's
no reason for findings of fact if both parties
are ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, it can work just the opposite way.
It very
may
wait to get the finding of fact to make the
determination whether they are going on appeal.
MR. ROSSMAN: Well the findings of fact are usually entered
long after the court has entered its intended decision so that they
know what the fees are going to be and they have some idea from at
least the oral
the judge what the grounds of decision
are. My concern is that we will actually spend more time litigating
the fees if we
the tools to the opponents to do that. The Serrano
case is a good
. There is a final judgment from the California
Supreme Court that Public Advocates and the Western Center were entitled
to fees for
the under ing litigation. Now, the underlying
litigation
not have been successful, those entities could not
afford to stay in business if all the time that they spent on that case
did not get compensation. I think that's ...
would you give
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What type of compensat
you use the same
of compensation formthe Western
attorneys?
ula that you use for pr
MR. ROSSMAN:
I would not let their entitlement to fees turn
on the fact that they are publicly funded.
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CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Why?

MR. ROSSMAN: Are you asking if I would preclude them from
getting a fee award at all, because they are publicly funded?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

No.

MR. ROSSMAN: Well all right. Well, there has been testimony
here to the effect that we should change the rules and now preclude
them from a fee award at all.

•

CHAIRMAN FENTON: No. The testimony was that they should be
entitled to the amount of money that they pay. For instance, if they
have a student,whom they pay nothing works on he case, you should give
them nothing for his work.
If you take an attorney who works for them
and you figure out that the cost to them is $20-an-hour, with overhead
and everything, then they should get $20-an-hour, not $150-an-hour.
Basically, there should be no windfall for them. They should get reimbursed for their cost. That was the testimony that I heard.
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, I think there is a sentiment though that
was expressed this morning -- it was expressed by the last witness,
that they shouldn't be entitled to fees at all. And if we are in agreement that that's now an issue, then I would ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Maybe I didn't hear him correctly.
thought what he said was that you couldn't get the records, and
they were trying to get fees comparable to a fee that a private
ney gets. Would you agree or disagree that that type of agency
be reimbursed for their costs and not get any windfall?

I

that
at torshould

MR. ROSSMAN: No, I would agree with what the Supreme Court
wrote in Serrano, which I think is recognition of the rule that has
been followed. As the memorandum prepared for you by the Legal Aid
Project ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Forget what the Supreme Court said. I
don't know why attorneys never answer questions. Let me ask you a
very simple question. Let's say in the Serrano case Western Center's
costs for the attorneys came to $25-an-hour. And let's assume for
sake of discussion that they had 1000 hours of $25 costs. What do you
think would be fair and equitable compensation in that type of case?
For Western Center, not for a private attorney.
MR. ROSSMAN:

Well, since I'm a private attorney ...

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

No, it's a very simple question ...

MR. ROSSMAN: Well, I'll give you my views. My views that
they should be compensated -- the reason I mentioned the Supreme Court
is that every judge in the country who's looked at this has largely
come to the same conclusion -- that it is fair to compensate them at
the value of their services.
decided.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I didn't ask you what the Supreme Court
I asked you what you think ...
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MR. ROSSMAN:

I'm telling you that I agree with the Supreme

Court.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Well, then you agree with them.

MR. ROSSMAN: But the fact that every judge in the country,
whether federal or in California, who's looked at this has come to the
same conclusion, I think. That's something that we should all give a
lot of credence to.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But don't you also feel that they
at the very narrow 1nterest of the two parties in front of them
than --we as a legislative body, who have to look at the total
and the total costs of the taxpayers. The courts are precluded
looking at that. They can't take that into account.

looked
rather
budget
from

MR. ROSSMAN:
I think the Supreme Court of California did
take that 1nto account in Serrano when they ...
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

It was not addressed in their opinion.

MR. ROSSMAN: They did point out that the source of funding
of the agency could be a factor in determining the size of the award.
My experience with judges is that they are extremely deferential, as
indeed they should be, in looking at both the source of the funding of
the plaintiffs and where the money is coming from.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: To me it's illogical to pay a publicly financed agency, such as Western Center, more than their costs when they
sue another public agency. All you've done is force the other entity
to bear the cost.
It doesn't make sense to me.
It's illogical to me,
as a Los Angeles County taxpayer, to pay $100-an-hour to federally
funded agencies whose cost is $25-an-hour.
MR. ROOSMAN: Well, not every case they bring in winds up
earning these types of fees.
I think the hypotheticals that have been
presented to you this morning are most unrealistic. The reason that
we would want to compensate the Western Center, and again I emphasize
I am not speaking for those institutions and I hope that the Committee
will address questions to those representatives when they appear later
this morning.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

I just asked you your opinion.

MR. ROSSMAN:
But the basis of the opinion is that with
Western Center and Public Advocates, unlike private law firms, we want
them to take cases in which there is going to be no conceivable chance
of recovery. That's what they're chartered to do. They are given a
certain grant, either by public foundations or by the government, which
is essentially to meet the front-end costs, to put them into business,
to provide a legal service.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: And if they took all the cases all year
and didn't w1n a one, they would be funded, wouldn't they?
MR. ROSSMAN: They would be funded at a bare bones level. But
if they won some cases, and got compensated, they could then begin to
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do what we want them to do which is ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That depends on what your philosophy is.
It depends what you want them to do, of course.
MR. ROSSMAN:
If you want them to take only cases that are
sure winners, then they are not going to be able to fullfill the function for which they are chartered, which is to take cases where people
just have a human need. They have got to be free, as any other law
firm is free, to make a mix of their practice to meet their basic
charter which is to provide, in their case, a broad range of legal
services to everything from the landlord/tenant person who cannot get
compensated ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Does the federal government give this funding and say, "This is what you are supposed to do. We don't expect to
get our money back." Maybe I don't understand what's going on. I
don't think that the federal government tells these agencies, "Now
we're giving you this money initially but we expect you to take cases
and pay us back. We don't expect to continually fund this thing."
That isn't the way I understood it.
MR. ROSSMAN: No. But the funding that the federal government provides to any of these public interest law firms through the
Legal Services Corporation, does not constitute anywhere near their
entire budget each year. And it's not intended to. But, again, I
think you should ask that question of them because they are more
familiar with that.
I'm pointing out that, even as a private attarnay, even if you compensate me according to the rules that are now in
effect, that there is no way that a private attorney can start out and
be sure that he or she is going to do 1000 hours of "successful public
interest litigation" each year.
I spend virtually all my time in public
interest litigation.
I don't take a case if I don't think it's meritorious. Sometimes the courts happen to disagree with me on that and
that's part of the risk of being in the business. By the same token,
I also don't want to have every case I take be one where I necessarily
see a large fee award coming in.
I really question a lot of the numbers
that have been put forward to you today as hypotheticals or horror
stories.
I have never asked for fees of the order that have been
talked about today and never would expect to get them awarded that way
if I were able to negotiate with the agency and come to a reasonable
agreement as to what the fee ought to be.
ASSEMBLY~mN NOLAN:
Would you then put forth ...

What if you weren't able to negotiate?

MR. ROSSMAN: Well, if I had to go in and litigate, I guess
the first thing I would do as just part of the bargaining process is
to pick the top dollar. Because you know it's going to get whittled
down either in negotiation or litigation. And the problem is that so
often in these cases -- I think what really bothers Mr. Klee, to be
very honest with you, I've seen it happen in many public law offices -they're still trying to litigate the underlying merits of the case that
they lost. They still believe that Serrano v. Priest should have really
come out the other way. The City of Los Angeles st1ll can't accept the
fact that they were wrong in the Woodland Hills case, that they should
have followed the General Plan and carried out the mandate that the
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Legislature dictated. And under these circumstances, just human nature
makes it very hard to reach an agreement.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Well, you don't dispute Mr. Klee's
figures about what was claimed as far as fees.
MR. ROSSMAN:
I would hope that before you finish your deliberations, you would get the other side. For example, I don't know the
young woman to whom he was referring to in the Alameda case, but I
know many people one year out of law school who do the laboring burden
on a case and they probably are worth every bit of that money.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
worth $150-an-hour?
MR. ROSSMAN:

Worth every bit of what?

Might be.

Do you mean

Depends on the result that's

achieved.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

What kind of outfit are they working for?

MR. ROSSMAN: Well, you're getting back to your same question.
I don't think it should really matter.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, to you it doesn't; but to me it does.
If I go to a firm and hire a firm and they charge me less for some person like that, then that's what I consider should be charged.
If I
go to Western Center and they have somebody they don't pay, then that's
another factor.
Because now we're not dealing with private people we're
dealing my money on the other side, another public entity.
MR. ROSSMAN: But I think that if you are going to encourage
firms like the Western Center, if you're going to encourage lawyers
whether private or public to go out and do this work, I think that the
ultimate lodestar that's got to be used is what is the value of the
legal service to society. That's the ultimate purpose for a bill like
1021.5.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But you also have another factor to consider.
You went to law shcool and you know this concept, it is the utility of
the conduct versus the gravity of the harm.
In public interest litigation against a public agency you have two public interests to consider. You have the public interest issue the plaintiff wants to protect and you have the cost to the public. Therefore you have a little
different factor involved.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Plus we're also already paying.
sidizing the law firm itself.
MR. ROSSMAN:

We sub-

To what extent that's subsidy ...

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Antonio, continue on, we'll get to others
on that particular point. Please tell us about the private attorney
perspective, for the moment.
MR. ROSS~~N: The cost-accounting figures that you were given
-- it's interest1ng that the charts were drawn to make it look as if
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the cost-accounting would come out to what really is the fees generally
do come out. I think judges in this state have not really been giving
out outrageously large awards and the cases will show that.
I have not
yet seen a case where a lawyer has claimed $150-an-hour and gotten these
multipliers throughout the litigation. A lot of numbers are being given
to you and being painted with a very broad brush.
I wish that someone
were here from the Center for Law, for example, to explain the Century
Freeway litigation. But having looked at their claim, and knowing how
they handled that, as the litigation proceeded and the risk became less,
they were not charging or claiming a risk factor.
When it was in negotiation, they were saying, "Okay, we're in negotiation on this thing."
But they should still have an accounting for the time that they spent
in negotiation. That's what they are lawyers for.
That was the skill
that they had to bring to that.
If they could do it by negotiation and
get done in two years what would have taken five or six years more in
court, that shouldn't be penalized.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You would increase the fee because they cut
the time in litigation from six to two?
MR. ROSSMAN: No, I would just say that because the time was
spent in negot1at1on rather than in litigation, they should not be disqualified from their fee. And .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

Do you think that's included in the bill?

MR. ROSSMAN: Well, that goes to a basic question.
It was
in testimony g1ven to you this morning as to why this bill was needed.
What I'm saying is that existing practice both by the attorneys and by
the judges takes into account the different risk factors at different
stages of the litigation.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Okay, so you're just saying the multiplier would not be two for all the hours billed, but would be apportioned so many hours at a multiplier of two and some at ..•
MR. ROSSMAN: That's right. And I think that in the many
cases when you have long litigation that's the way it works. Judge
Jefferson, for example, in the Serrano case cut out a lot of time that
he felt was duplicative.
I think the different multiplier factors were
used in different parts of that litigation depending at which stage in
the litigation it was.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Okay, but this bill does not address the
multiplier, this bill instead addresses the costs. We don't affect
the judge's right to apportion the multiplier in any way.
MR. ROSSMAN: But as I understand this bill, this bill would
establish the cost accounting for the private attorney as well as the
public interest attorney.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

Yes.

MR. ROSSMAN:
I think Mr. Fenton has probably already made
the point so I don't have to belabor it, but at least for the private
attorney, he or she is in the marketplace to sell a service, and has
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to set a certain rate on that service in order at the end of the year
to make the balance sheet come out.
How can I carry out my practice
and make my living? It is just sheer efficiency if nothing else and
to be consistent with every other private enterprise that we have to
let those fees be valued by that marketplace value.
I do think there
is a danger, again, of fomenting litigation and a lot of insensitivity
creeping into the system if we get into this notion of not what is your
time worth as an attorney which is a relatively objective figure~. You
can take a private attorney, look at how many years they've been out
there, their standing in the community, and that's a fairly objective
fact for a judge to ascertain, the fair market value of his or her services. But if you do it the other way and start looking at cost accounting you're going to penalize the lawyer who might want to spend more
time taking cases that don't win at all.
I see nothing wrong, for example, with getting high quality law firms to devote parts of their
practice in this area. That's been the complaint for years, that the
pig law firms would not get into these cases. There are a lot of cases
in the public interest area that may need to be brought, that I just
wouldn't begin to touch because it requires a battery of lawyers to do
all the discovery and what not. We ought not to disqualify those. My
final point is on litigation for fees.
I think the law presently in
California is that that's an open question, but I think the law in California also is that there is yet to be an appellate decision affirming
a claim of litigation of fees for fees. The only case that's come down
that has decided the issue on the merits is Mandel v. Lackner, which we
learn now the Supreme Court has taken over, presumably on the other
issue of separation of powers. But in Mandel, the Court of Appeal refused to allow a claim for fees on fees.
That is to say that, even in
that case, in which the court of appeal was basically sympathetic to
the plaintiffs, and to what they had done, the court did not allow it.
I think it should remain that way with the courts able to look at it
in each case upon each set of facts.
Now we learn from Woodland Hills
that that's an open question insofar as the Supreme Court ~s concerned.
I think that's the best way it should remain.
Because there might be
some cases, and if I were the judge, I'd be the first to come down hard
on the lawyer who
trying to make a living off litigating fees on
fees.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you a question.
If an attorney
were to further litigate a fee award but the fee remained the same or
was lowered, would you approve of attorneys fees being granted for that
action?
MR. ROSSMAN:
It would depend on the grounds.
If no fees
were awarded ~n the Superior Court and you had to go up on appeal and
you got an entitlement to fees there might be an award there.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I didn't ask you that. That's more isn't
it? I asked if it was the same or less than was awarded in the trial
court. Let's assume you were awarded a quarter of million in a trial
court and you go up on appeal and they cut it to $200,000, would you
then grant additional attorney fees for the appeal?
MR. ROSSMAN:
Probably not.
You're assuming that someone is
going to take an appeal just on the amount of fees?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Don't they?
-26-

I assume that they do from all

the conversation we have heard.
It would seem to me that one of the
vital things to the attorney in this public interest
of litigation is
the attorneys fees.
If it wasn't important then all attorneys would take
whatever they were awarded and go home.
So, the attorneys fees are
important.
I don't
with that.
MR. ROSSMAN: To answer your question, I think the
Court has made 1t pretty clear that the amount of the fee is
largely in the discretion of the trial court.
So if someone
appeal from an award of fees in the trial court,
're not
take that appeal unless there is some issue of law that goes
neath just the straight amount.

Supreme
pretty
takes an
going to
under-

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's just stipulate it for the sake of
this discussion that some attorney, other than you, appeals solely on
the issue of attorney fees, and if it remains the same or laower do
you think you should be entitled to attorneys fees for seeking more
attorneys fees?
MR. ROSSMAN: And he was going just on the issue of how much
he was awarded. Probably not.
I would put the other case -- suppose
there is a litigation in which perhaps the attorney has claimed $50,000
in fees, and the public entity puts that lawyer through a litigation
almost as long as the underlying litigation in trial court over fees,
and the court says, "Yes, your $50,000 fee claim was meritorious," and
suppose the attorney had to spend on the same basis, $20,000 or $30,000
worth of his or her time getting the court to enter that order.
If
those fees cannot be compensated under those circumstances, what has
the public agency succeeded in doing?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I see you're doing something else. You're
going the other way. You wouldn't answer my question, yet you're saying if he has to further litigate to get his fees, then he should get
additional compensation. I asked you if he litigated to get more fees
was the same or lower, just litigating the amount, you said, "Probably."
You won't give me a definitive answer.
C~ ahead, I understand where
you're coming from.
MR. ROSSMAN: But I think there is a common ground between both
of the points, the hypothetical you posed and the situation that I just
proposed. But, existing law would not preclude the Court of Appeal
from disallowing a claim for fees in the situation you propose. So,
what I'm saying is that this is an open area, and it is subject to
abuse if the Legislature makes it absolutely impossible for a judge to
award fees, to perfect a fee claim award regardless of the inequities
in each situation. But, I would leave the Committee with one thought.
The judges in this state, I think read the popular mind as well as
this Committee, as well as hopefully those of us who practice in this
area, and they are sensitive to the economics of the issue. They are
sensitive to where the money is coming from and I think they are sensitive to, when they see lawyers doing what they ought not to do, they
come down hard on them. And I would say that the best thing to do at
this point is to leave that discretion in the hands of the judges. If
you do more, I think then what you're basically doing is asking the
question of whether Section 1021.5 is good policy overall. And I would
hope that we're not doing that since even the Congress of the United
States, after the Supreme Court decided Alyeska, itself has decided
that there must be this basic authorization to permit this type of
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litigation to come forth which is not being brought by anyone else.
Thank you very much for your time.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you.

Aviva Bobb.

Ms. AVIVA BOBB: I'm Aviva Bobb, Executive Director of the
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
I would like to take a few minutes
only to talk about one aspect of the bill though I'm happy to answer
questions about any other aspect, and that is that portion which would
direct the court to consider in determining the fee what is appropriate
to provide fees to an agency that receives governmental funding, and
to consider the funding in determining the size of the award. Taking
the first issue, I got the impression from your question to Mr. Rossman
that you believe that the bill does not leave open the question of
whether it's appropriate to give awards to publicly funded entities?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
what the intent 1s.

It doesn't matter what it said, I'm asking

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:
It's for the court to take into account
what the funding is and whether it's appropriate to award these.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
So conceivably when legal aid is involved
in one of these they could award nothing.
MS. ROBB: Let me first address that matter.
I'd like to
address the quest1on of whether that should be in the bill, whether
the court ought to consider the fact that the funding comes from a
government source as opposed to some other source.
If one thinks
quickly about the matter, one might well say that if an organization
is being given public funds to do this general kind of litigation, why
should they be paid extra money for doing it, or double money for doing
it again?
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You said you were first going to talk about
whether they should be paid at all, now you're talking about double or
extra money. Why don't you talk about the first point now. I may
agree with you on the second one.
MS. ROBB: On the first one, one could say for example the
legal services program receives federal money to enforce the law on behalf of the poor. When
does that, why should it not only continue
to receive its federal money, but also be recompensed or reimbursed by
the losing party on the other side, that's really the question. The
reality is, government provides funding for attorneys really only on
behalf of two classes of people, to my knowledge, low income people
and elderly people. Low income people through the Legal Services Corporation Act and senior citizens through the Older Americans Act, and
that is really it. The amount of funding provided through those two
vehicles is very small. For poor people, it is less than $8 a poor
person per year.
It doesn't get you very far.
If you have one divorce
in your lifetime that is uncontested perhaps, that has taken care of
your entire allotment.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: What do you think, for middle income
people, the attorneys fees spent during the year would average out to?
Do you think it would be as much as $8 for every middle class person?
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MS. BOBB:
I
ink there is no question that low income
people have much greater needs for lawyers than middle income people
do for a variety of reasons which I can discuss with you. Their own
subsistence is dependent on the government. These are issues about
whether their social security check arrives on time, and sometimes they
need a lawyer to go
it for them. They have a lot of issues that
middle class people don't have.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: My only point is that you made it sound
like a paltry sum, yet I 1 m sure it's much. higher than that which is
spent by the middle class person.

I

MS. BOBB: Let me put it to you another way.
In Los Angeles,
every attorney 1n my program has the potential client population of over 10,000 people. There is no way that one lawyer can even
begin to meet the legal needs of 10,000 people. Admittedly they don't
all have legal problems at the same time, but the ABA I think has said
that one in four poor people, will have legal problems in a given year.
There is just no way that we can serve the numbers of clients that we
have. My point is that the fact that when we do -- most of our funds
are used to deal with small matters, consumer matters, landlord/tenant
matters, divorces, etcetera. When you have to bring a major piece of
litigation to enforce the rights of the poor, there's an opportunity
cost on behalf of the poor. You are not doing something else, which is
also vitally necessary to do, and when you get reimbursement in the
form of attorneys fees, what that does merely is allow you to do something else, something that you should have done anyway.
I will give
you an example.
In Los Angeles County in the last two years there has
been an incredible scandal of what we called equity ripoff and lien
sale foreclosures,, I believe Mr. Fenton is certainly aware of that.
It has taken a lot of our time, and a lot of our attorney time to prosecute those cases to insure that homeowners get their homes back. There
is a cost to doing that.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now when you do that, presumably some people
who need your service don't get it from you. How do they get the
services?
MS. BOBB: We have to take away other services that we would
normally want to provide our clients.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If you get this type of
or case and you
get yo~r so-called windfall profits, what does that do about getting
you more attorneys to handle the cases you weren't able to take? Do
you hire people based on the fact that you're going to get extra money
from these cases, and you're going to be able to have a bigger budget?
Is that what you're saying?
MS. BOBB: Absolutely. If, in fact, you got enough fees that
you could hire one lawyer for a year to provide services for poor
people that's exactly what you would do, and you would let them know
they have a one year job to provide legal services.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I have no quarrel
windfall. My quarrel is that if it costs you
your attorneys, including overhead, then that
which they then compute the lodestar.
I have
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with even getting some
$25-an-hour for one of
should be the basis on
no quarrel with the

windfall for your agency, but I don't see why you should be able to
charge $100 or $150 for that lawyer since that's not your cost. That's
all I'm saying.
MS. BOBB: Let me get to that because I think there are a
variety of reasons why that may make sense even though at first blush
it doesn't, it does sound like an atrocious profit that we're making.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Well it's not atrocious, it's just very

large.
MS. BOBB:
If I may go to the question of whether it's appropriate for legal services programs or government funded entities to
receive attorneys fees, what you, in effect, would be doing is saying
to low income people, "You have a cap on the amount of attorneys time
available to you, and that's what the federal government gives you,
and that cap cannot be taken off through reimbursements for attorneys
fees for litigation where attorneys fees might otherwise be available."
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You lost me. When your agency takes a major
public interest case, what limitation do you have?
MS. BOBB: Our funding is based on what the federal government gives us.
If the legislation passes ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
attorneys don 1 t you?
MS. BOBB:
can provide this.

But you also get volunteer services from

We don't directly, there is an organization that

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yours is strictly funded by the federal
government and nothing else?
MS. BOBB: That's right. My point is that if this piece stays
in the legislation which says that the court ought to consider whether
it's appropriate to give legal services programs attorneys fees what
you are telling the poor is that they, different from other people ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Forget what the legislation says.
I'm trying to learn something. Under our present law, if your agency has represented some people in this type of case, you're now asking for attorneys fees.
Let's say for the sake of discussion you're working 1,000
hours on the case. Under the lodestar method we try to find out what
the cost is.
? What the going rate is for that attorney. Right?
If I were the judge sitting, I'd say, "Mr. Nolan's entitled to $150-anhour or something like that, and you're an agency and your costs are
$20 or $25 so you're entitled to $25-an-hour. 11 Then would I go into
the multiplier? But you don't do that. You go in and you take the
going rate for attorneys, maybe $100-an-hour, don't you? I don't see
the justification. You tell me what the justification is.
MS. BOBB: What we believe is that our services ought to be
valued at their value, not at their cost, and I'll explain why.
If you
use the cost-plus method, which is the method that's being suggested,
you penalize ...
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fo
what he's suggest
Let's consider
, which unless you can convince me otherwise is incorrect, in my
ion. You don't take your cost in that
first lodestar method. You take the market value.
no

for your

so it's
CHAIID1AN FENTON:

You take the average.

MS. BOBB: We take what attorneys of comparable competence
in the private sector would charge.

•

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right, based on
you get your lodestar
which you multiply by a given factor. So in addition to increasing
what the actual costs are, you start with that increase, and you also
get a plus factor based on that increase. I can see the
us factor,
based on your cost, but I can't see the plus factor being based on the
going rate. Because you are a different type
You're specifically set up to provide these types of services
us taxpayers.
So what you're saying is, "You are funding us to represent these peop1e,
and now we want you to give us more money to represent
people.
We want you to give us more money to take away more money from you."
To me, something seems a little wrong.
MS. BOBB: The
is that there is no other rational way,
believe, to handle the problem. It would be
to penalize
the poor because their attorneys have chosen to take lower salaries and
have lower overhead.
I

CHAIRMAN FENTON: How are you penali
the
You're
going to
You don't
them based on the
fact that you think you're going to get a
attorneys fee. You're
going to represent them,
How do you
ize them by the
that instead of -- instead of
getting
00 per hour as the going
rate, you get $30 per
and the plus factor? How are the poor people
penalized
way?
've got your representation
MS. BOBB: But, different from other classes,
have very
limited access
justice system. Their access to the just
system is limited by the $7 a poor person
s. To the
extent that ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's say I'm poor and I come in to you,
and I say,
of case, would you represent me?" You
would take
?
How would I get penalized by the court for
not giving you $100-an-hour when they figure out your attorneys fees
than $30. Don't you give me the representation I'm supposed to get,
regardless of whether I win or whether I lose? How am I as a poor
person you're representing
by the fact that instead of using the
factor of $100-an-hour we use $30-an-hour? How do I
hurt?
MS. BOBB: Well, for one you get hurt because you don't have
equal bargain1ng power
the other side. For example, in settlement
negotiations the defendant will know that, in fact, he's liable for
much less attorneys
because he's dealing with a poor client in
legal services programs, and he's not deal
with somebody else. So
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you are allowing the defendant to escape from full assessment, but
you're also making negotiation on behalf of the poor relatively more
difficult because you don't have the same attorneys fees potential at
stake.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You would
off because they're going to pay less
would be easier to negotiate and give
off $70-an-hour plus the multiplier.
won't pay in attorneys fees and throw
ment. That's all.

think that they would be better
in attorneys fees, therefore, it
a little more if we are knocking
They could take part of what they
it in and give a bigger settle-

Before we go on, I'd like to introduce Mr. Art Torres from
Los Angeles County.
MS. ROBB: Let me talk about the question of how you should
calculate the fees on the assumption that we agree that it's appropriate for legal services and other government funded entities to obtain fees. The cost-plus method penalizes programs that have chosen
to work cheaply on behalf of the poor. Let me give you an example.
The disparity that we're talking about between legal services salaries
now and legal services and private attorneys salaries is the result of
a conscious decision by the legal services programs that they will pay
lawyers less salary and have cheaper overhead in order to maximize
client services. But, what this system would do would be to encourage
waste. It would encourage us to say, "Okay, we're going to triple our
salaries next year. We're going to have fancier space and buy fancier
equipment. We'll make up the deficit, indeed, by reducing our services
to our clients." And now our fees would triple because we'd be three
times as expensive.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

I don't believe that.

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But you don't determine that, Congress
determines what you're going to get.
MS. BOBB: We determine our own budget.
It has to be reasonable, but I can assure you our salaries are half of what public defenders and county counsel, with all due respect, in Los Angeles County are
currently earning. Nobody would criticize a decision on our part to
double our salaries. We could easily do that and get double the fees.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That wouldn't bother me either if you
doubled the salaries but went to what it cost.
That wouldn't bother
me.
MS. ROBB: My point only is that this bill encourages us to
be ineffic1ent and greedy instead of the opposite. It encourages -- if
we wanted to and if we were mindful of this bill, we would increase our
costs and get larger fees. We obviously will not do it, but I'm trying
to point out the illogic of the bill using cost-plus method as opposed to the value of services method.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I don't know what encourages inefficiency,
but we have it throughout the whole system. No reflection on you.
I
think we have it built in inefficiency in government, including the
Legislature.
-32-
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MS. BOBB: I invite you to visit my program. It's an exception.
The second po1nt,I think,is that what has been called windfall is not a
windfall to a
1
s program. What we rea
are providing is
more funds for the
of legal services to poor people or senior
citizens or
not money that's go
into the
of
staff attorneys certa
think the use of the
e "windfall"
is inappropriate in that regard. I just want to make a comment about
some earlier testimony about the fears of people
into the deep
pockets of the county. In the desegregation lawsuit from '76 through
'79, the county
over one million dollars
very expensive legal services in L. A. County to defend it. At the same time
attorneys fees were awarded to the plaintiff at some $167,000. My
point is that I think it is hypocritical for our system to say on one
hand that the county can be defended by the most expens
lawyers in
the city at the
normal rates, but then say that there is no rational
basis for imposing on the public sector the highest standards of legal
reimbursement it applied, when you're paying for prosecut
the county's
violation of the law.
ASSEMBLY~iliN NOLAN:
What actually was
getting the most expens1ve lawyer?

by the county for

MS. BOBB: All I know is they spent
lars in attorneys fees, and the comparable time
imbursed for something like ...

a million dolaintiffs are re-

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

Where'd you get the figure of $1,000,000?

MS. BOBB: Those figures are in a document that's before you
in the Derfner paper that I think if you haven't all read, I would
heartily recommend that you all read it. There is
to the
Derfner memo that you should all have which goes
this entire
piece of legislation.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You know perfec
well that that's illogical
with the sentiment of the people of Los
on
busing issue, they could spend a million dollars and the vast majority of the
people would never
that. All of us have to account to the
public, so if they spent a million dollars to
bus
would
go up in arms. The fact that they spent a million dollars to try to
stop it doesn't get the vast majority upset.
MS. BOBB: We're talking about law enforcement as
to
politics, but there are other examples where the
hired very
expensive law firms.
It currently is doing so in a
regarding
non-emergency medical care
undocumented persons, where they go out
and hire very expensive lawyers, which is fine, but then one can assume
that under this legislation when it comes to paying
the fees of
public interest groups we the people are going to be
them back
at a relatively low rate. My point is that it does not seem consistent.
Finally, I would just 1
to say that it seems to me
providing
for the full reimbursement for value of services in successful litigation is really serving to help assure the continued availability of
legal services to those most in need of assistance in enforcing the
law and is not in any respect to be considered windfall or money grubbing as some people have called it. You ought to consider that a program like mine probably
one-half of one percent of its budget
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from attorneys fees. We're not talking about huge sums of money.
There may be three of four cases in the state where there have been
large awards, but primarily you're not talking about those kinds of
awards. You're talking about small awards that are very useful in
helping extend the ability of legal service programs to increase their
services to the public.
CHAIID1AN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

Richard Pearl.

MR. ROBERT LEIDIGH: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee.
I am Robert Leidigh, attorney with California Rural Legal Assistance.
We have with us this morning, Richard Pearl, who is our Director of
Litigation who will present our testimony on the bill.
MR. RICHARD PEARL: Thank you.
I'm Richard Pearl, Director
of Litigation for California Rural Legal Assistance. As the Director
of Litigation I'm responsible for supervising our 15 offices throughout the State.
In addition, I've spent a substantial amount of time
litigating CRLA's attorneys fees awards cases and in supervising others
that I haven't been directly involved in, I have also participated in
preparing attorneys fees manuals in both federal and state court.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What do you go in as your rate when you go
in on attorneys fees? What do you maintain your hourly rate is for
your group?
MR. PEARL: The last judicial award of attorneys fees that
I was awarded for my work, and I've been out of law school for 11 years,
was $85 an hour. That was for me, for my work.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
hour working for them.
MR. PEARL:

As a

I assume that you get close to that per
sala~,

no I don't get anywhere close to

that.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Does it vary with your group as to the
caliber of attorney that does the work?
MR. PEARL:

With the level of experience, yes.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

It does vary.

What's the range?

MR. PEARL:
I think $84 is probably the largest anyone in
our firm has ever been awarded. We've gone down to as low as $20, but
the rate we ask is anywhere from $55 to $85-an-hour.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
get into the multipliers?
MR. PEARL:

That's the factor that you use before you

Right.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

$85 is what they figured yours was.

MR. PEARL: That's what they figured mine was. That was what
I requested.
If I had requested more, I don't know if I would have gotten more, but that's what I requested. And that's what a Federal judge
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in San Francisco found and also a superior court judge in Santa Cruz
County found was a reasonable value for my services, given the prevailing rates in the community. First of all, I had planned to talk
about some of the legal aspects of the -- the precedential aspects of
some of the revisions that are being proposed in this amendment.
I
know that you've evidenced a concern to talk more about the policy and
so I'll stick to that, but I would urge the Committee to look at the
analysis prepared by Mary Francis Derfner on AB 3172 which is not only
thoroughly documented with the Federal precedents that deal with each
of these issues, but articulates, I think, very well the policy behind
the Federal precedents on these issues.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The Federal government and the Federal
court, they don't care aEout money anyhow, I guess, because they figure that the Federal government can just print it. We in the counties
and cities in the State of California have a little more difficulty.
That's one of the ~roblems we have.
MR. PEARL:
I understand that.
I know that the experience
that the proponents of the bill set forth would sound differently, but
my experience has been that Federal judges and state judges are very
aware of the resources of the defendant when they are making an award
of fees, and that a rate awarded to me of $85-an-hour against a governmental defendant takes into account very much the fact of whether the
governmental defendant is a small rural county or a large county,
whether the resources which have been expended by the plaintiffs were
reasonable and that they are not totally blind to this reality of goverment funding of the defendant or the plaintiff's lawyer.
What I would like to address today is one element of the bill
that I think is particularly pernicious, and that would basically emasculate the entire act, and that is the consideration of the good faith
of the defendant in whether to award a fee at all and the amount of fee
which would be awarded.
I would note that we have to start with the
premise that the purpose of Section 1021.5 is to encourage the vindication of important constitutional and statutory rights that benefit a
large class of persons, that is in the act now, and that's the underlying
purpose.
It is not to punish a guilty or a bad faith defendant. The
courts both Federal and state have been unanimous in recognizing that
the good faith or bad faith of the defendant is simply irrelevant to
this purpose of encouraging the vindication of important rights that
benefit a lot of people. The courts recognize that if you make the act
require a finding of bad faith by the defendant, which essentially you
will if the court is given a direction not to award fees upon a finding
of good faith, you're going to require a finding of bad faith, and if
you require a finding of bad faith by a court aimed at a governmental
defendant, there will not be a civil rights attorneys fees award act
in state or Federal courts, and the courts have recognized that. Even
Justice White in the most recent opinion out of the United States
Supreme Court in the case involving lawyer advertising out of the
Virginia Supreme Court, ~ecognized that, under the Federal attorneys
fees award act, the good faith of the defendant simply cannot be a
factor in determining whether to award fees.
I would submit that there are some circumstances where the
good faith of a defendant might be a factor, but those are already
included in the statute. Under Section 1021.5, the court must find
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that the lawsuit was necessary to vindicate this purpose. The case
law as it has developed has established that if the defenda~t can show
that it would have
its po
of the lawsuit, that
the lawsuit was not a
to changing an unlawful policy, or that
a mere letter or an
ve procedure ~rould have resulted in the
very same change as the
did, then fees cannot be awarded. I
would submit that in those c
tances
faith
already included
in the statute, and there
no need to amend it. Where a lawsuit is
necessary to effect a change in policy, then fees have to be awarded
if we're going to maintain the purpose of encouraging the vindication
of important rights.
With res
to the amount of fees, I think good faith is
also irrelevant as a factor
and of
elf. In reality, however,
good faith plays a substantial
in the amount of attorneys fees
that are awarded,
the
faith of the defendant, and likewise the good fa
of the
ff is a
contributing factor
to how the case
to be litigated, how much attorney resources
are allocated to
case, how much time the attorneys and the court
have to spend to resolve a particular issue. Let me give you an example.
We had a case that arose out of Sonoma
Superior Court where we
challenged the consti
anal
of a Cal
ia statute that allowed
the use of confess
of j
by private persons, but it had not
reached the county level
In fact, the Legislature had passed repealing
lation once and the Governor had vetoed it. We brought
this lawsuit, a canst
challenge to this practice. The county
of Sonoma 1
the case in good faith. They realized that it had
to be resolved through the courts. Although
could have stopped
the practice
their own
, they could not have undone the statute. We tried the case before the Sonoma
Court on a
st
statement of facts. There was no discovery. There was no
trial. We went to the
Court of
1. We went to the California
Court.
the case
Cali
Supreme
Court. We won
took it to the
States Supreme Court
wh
dismissed the appeal we ended up with a dec
that
idated
a statute
affected tens of thousands of p9or people and middle income people as well as s
We performed, I would
, a significant public benef , and we were
le to arr
at an agreement on
attorneys fees that was, I believe, about $16,000 for that lawsuit.
That is not in the realm that we're hearing today of $45
and
that kind of
That s a perfectly
fee for a case of
that magnitude.
any less
to the bill?
would
would have
ur
the trial court that
that the
init
set the rate of fees
is. And because the
tensive discovery to
based on a
that was needed, and

Do you think that that fee would have been
effect? If not, what's your objection
It
could have been a lot less, yes. How
s under this bill? There s two ways this bill
affected that. One, we success
argued in
factors like our costs and the extensive discovery
that it wanted to perform in order to
, which under exist
case law, it
was not able to get into this kind of exand ask the court to set an amount of fee
, we greatly s
ined the amount of work
expedited the
's desire to settle
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the case. In terms of our rate
we ask, we took a substantial cut
in our rate in order to settle the case. Had we started from a rate
that was cos
, tak
into account our low salaries and
low
overhead of our office, we would have been forced to settle the case
for even less.
think the
of this case and the kind of fee
that we have been awarded in this case is much more
ASSEHBLYMAN NOLAN: Would you have settled? If the $16,000
was not reasonable fees for you, would you have settled? In a negotiated settlement that's . .
HR. PEARL: No, we would not have s
would have been one of the more pernicious as

•

, and that I think
of th
amendment.

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: No, what I'm
at
it was obviously worth it to the county to settle with you for that. And so that's
what they would have settled at. This bill wouldn t affect that.
MR. PEARL: Oh, I don't think that's true. To some extent,
we're looking at this thing from two different 1
The county's
willingness to settle for $16,500, which I think was the exact amount,
was based in large
on what
think the court would have awarded
had we gone ahead and lit
the fee issue. It was not
on
what they thought was a reasonable value of our services. It was based
on, like any other
, an assessment of the risk, and an assessment
of what the law
versus what they would have to spend, and the
risk of being assessed at much h
fee had
li
it. Under
this bill, had the r
been far less, then the
not have been
willing to settle. We would have had to litigate it. And we might
have ended up with a
based on a smaller amount s
because we would have had to
so much more
do
it. So, I
think it's important to realize that we're not talk
here about an
abstract setting or market value when we're talk
ing
something but you're negotiat
just like any other
So what I would urge
body to
considering how courts set the amount of a fee,
a factor. It's an impl it factor in the way 1
and a
county that decides that it is going to 1
and
nail, fight every d
, fight
every subpoena
fees than one
who litigates in good
, than
a good
ith
dlspute over a princ
of law. Let's get
court and settle this
in the most pract
efficient way possible." If a county takes that
position, the amount of
fees that they
ll be assessed if
they lose, if they are wrong
the law, would be
less than if they
take the tooth and nail type approach, which we
seen is often
taken here.
I'd like to also address just brief
the
on fees question Mr. Fenton raised earl
, and that is would we ask for fees if
we lost an appeal seeking more fees, or simply had the same amount of
fees affirmed.
CHAIRHAN FENTON:
MR. PEARL:

If you were the one who brought the appeal?

If we were the one that did the appeal, if we
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went up on appeal saying that our fees were too low, we lost that
appeal, we would not ask for further fees, and we would not be entitled
to them under either Federal law or the state law as it has evolved.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
additional fees?

If it's the same or less, you don't get any

MR. PEARL: Right. What is happening though, and what my
experience has been, is that in the last two cases in which we have
been awarded fees by the trial court after a hearing where we presented
substantial documentation of the prevailing market rate or the amount
of hours that we spent, the reasonableness of our expenditure of time,
in both these last two cases is that in one case the state, and in one
case a private defendant have appealed that award. And, in my mind,
and I think to any objective lawyer's mind, these appeals have a very
minimal chance of succeeding, given the present state of the law and
the broad discretion that is afforded a trial court in setting a fee.
Yet by appealing, the state loses nothing.
It is not forced to pay the
award pending appeal.
If we win we may be entitled to interest which
is less than inflation and we're forced ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The same is true of awards against insurance companies 1n personal
ury cases today. They appeal because
they can put the money out to work ...
MR. PEARL: And not only that. We're forced to expend a
great bit of t1me on appeal, briefing the appeal, arguing the appeal,
the time that we should be devoting to other client services.
If we
are not to be awarded fees for that time, then the whole purpose of
the Civil Rights Act in encouraging us and private attorneys to bring
this kind of cases
subs
ly diminished because what started out
as a prevailing market rate and a reasonable fee for services, by the
time you
that by the time spent on appeal defending a successful award, it becomes de minimis, and attorneys are simply not going
to do it anymore. For that reason I would urge you not to adopt an
amendment that would limit fees on fees under those circumstances.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: How about the justification of your fees
originally? You've got all the computation of what time you put in and
everything haven't
MR. PEARL:

Oh, yes.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
part?
in

I'
ly.

Why should you be entitled to fees on that
on the appeal.
I can understand.that.
But

MR. PEARL: The way we claim fees when we have won a decision
is by following the
procedure, although 1021.5 calls for a
motion. Basically, we've done it pretty much like lawyers have always
done cost bills
We
1 submit a statement cost b
asking for a certain amount of fee, attach
declarations that detail the amount of
fees, how we
it, whether we spent it on investigation, motion
work, etcetera, and sets a specific rate and asks for an amount. Now
the time spent in
that, we have billed for just like a lawyer
would bill for a cost bill. But it's de minimis, it's an hour, four
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hours at the most in time.
I don't think there's any problem in getting
fees for that just ike a
would get fees for preparing a judgment or a cost bill in a private contract case. The time that comes in
and the thing that's real
at issue here is when a defendant opposes
it, and here, in these cases,
has real
taken up the time have
been defendants like the state and like various
of governments
and even private defendants raising all these factors that they are
asking this body to
in the bill, but which are not part of the case
law. I must have briefed the issue of cost accounting five or six
times, and there is not a single court that has validated the issue of
cost accounting. But we've had to litigate over and over again why
cost accounting is not the appropriate formula under Federal law and
under state law. The same is true of the other factors that are being
considered here: the good
of the~defendant, the extent to which we
prevail, the fact that we are legal services programs. Despite the
fact that perhaps 25 courts, both state and Federal, have said that
that should be irrelevant to whether we are entitled to a fee we are
met with that defense in every case we file. We have to prepare a
brief in response. We have to argue them. That's what runs up the
fees on fees.
It is not the fact that we're claiming excessive fees.
Now I admit if someone puts in a bill for $450-an-hour, and the County
has to defend against that, and the bill is cut back to a more reasonable fee then perhaps they shouldn't get gees for all that time, but
that has not been our experience, and that's not what we're talking
about here today.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

MR. LEIDIGH: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
Robert Leidigh again, and I'd like to just point up a
of things
that were made by the proponents in their test
and bring them to
the attention of the Committee.
I believe it was Mr. Klee
the
Attorney General's office that made the remark that the vast proportion
of these kinds of cases that they're facing are brought by public interest and legal aid programs.
I think he used a
of 90 percent
or 95 percent and yet the opening witness
to this incredible
profit that is supposed to be the incentive to private
to take
these cases. I think there's a real incons
If the profits
that can be made are so great, why aren't private lawyers taking these
cases?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Probably there are a lot of risks in a lot

of cases.
MR. LEIDIGH: That's
A tremendous amount of risk.
Legal aid programs 1n the first place can't take fee generating cases
unless the private bar has turned them down. That's the only time we
take those cases so the private bar is sitting there and they're looking at these figures, and they're saying, "Well, we don t think we can
make any money off of this," and so they aren't taking those cases.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If a person, an elderly person, comes into
your office with a case, one of these cases, and you can't handle it,
who do you send them to?
MR. LEIDIGH: We send them out to the lawyer referral service.
We're required to do that because otherwise we could channel to one
firm or another. They're sent out, the private bar has a shot at
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taking those cases, and the fact is in the instances where we're
representing someone, they're not taking those cases. My own experience
in a rural county, and I have found in my experience rural counties are
often less likely to settle than more likely to settle, but in my experience with a rural county, we sued the county, no private lawyer in
that county would take that case. They wouldn't touch it.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If you take all the cases that private
attorneys won 1 t cover, the private attorneys take the ones that they
think there's a good chance for them to succeed. Why should they get
all this windfall since you get the bad stuff?
Why should they get
all of that windfall since they have now culled the good ones out and
given you the junk?
MR. LEIDIGH: First of all, we are not operating in all communities so not all private lawyers have legal services programs to
put the junk onto.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why should we give them such a great windfall since they now have said, "The cases that we have maybe it's a
two to one shot that we'll win." Why do we give them that big windfall?
MR. LEIDIGH:
I think perhaps the next witness from the Trial
Lawyers can speak to their need on that too. But I think the essence
of the existing section, and the essence of the Federal law and the
case law on this subject generally is that it is the benefit that is
conferred upon the public.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

I'm asking you for your opinion.

MR. LEIDIGH: That's my opinion as well, that the benefit
that is conferred on the public, you only get this not only if you
succeed, there may be a longshot at winning the case, but then you've
got to go back in and convince the court that you're entitled to fees
because it conferred a significant benefit on the public, and it met
all these other standards. So it's not just winning the case.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: A private attorney considers those two
factors,
ve never handled one.
I wouldn't know how so I
don't get involved. I'm sure if someone came into my office with
that, the first thing I would want to know is, one, what are my chances
of success, and two, what are my chances to make sure that it's of
public benefit so that I'll get attorneys fees.
Now let me ask you a
question. If you take those particular cases of private attorneys,
take it on the bas
that the court is going to award attorneys fees
-- can they take it on the basis that if the court finds that it was
the public that benefited-- never mind, I'll ask Mr. Werchick my
question. Arne, so you'll be prepared, my question is, can you provide in your contract with a client a provision that says, "If the
court doesn't award attorneys fees, I'll get a certain percentage of
the judgment?" We'll let you answer that, Arne.
MR. LEIDIGH: To go back to your question about why don't
they just skim off the cream of the crop and send the rest up to us.
First of all though, the only cases that we're involved in are those
involving poor people. There are other cases that confer a benefit
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on the public where the plaintiff or the
intiff
that starts
out is not impoverished. So those folks are not go
to be able to
have their cases come back and be handled
us
get handled.
One of the factors that you were address
to Mr.
, which is
already in the law is the fact that
the interest
, the
attorneys fees ought not to come out of the recovery, and oftentimes
there is no recovery. In the cases that create
most benefit to the
public, there is no monetary recovery to the
ff.
Let's look at
the Mandel case. They wanted to save the taxpayers' money. They're
not go1ng to get any benefit.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
In your
there is a public benefit
although there 1s no monetary award. In that case you are not going to
get attorneys fees. We understand that. Mine was just the opposite.
MR. LEIDIGH: The one other point is when
services and
other publ1c 1nterest firms are involved, private
will look at
the awards that are received by entities such as ours in determining
whether this is the kind of case that they want to get into. They're
going to look at what kinds of recoveries are made.
If we're assigned
a lower value and get lower awards they're go
to be less likely to
take those cases.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. LEIDIGH:

fees.

You mean get

That's right.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

They're liable to what?

MR. LEIDIGH: They'll be less 1
they're going to look at what kind of awards
for attorneys fees
these kinds of cases.

take it, because
judges are making

CHAIRMAN FENTON: That has nothing to do with your award.
Are you talking about based on your cost factor?
MR. LEIDIGH: No, I'm
about if we
on our cost factor rather than on the value of the
we provided, then that gets reported ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: They won't look at
very unhappy with that anyhow, regardless what you
not enough for the -- I understand that.

an award based
services that
at all, they'll be
because that's

MR. LEIDIGH: And I think that's an
factor in determining what amount of award should be granted to us because they
will look to what we get in determining what they're likely to get.
That's the experience I had in doing these kinds of cases. When you
start doing those cases, private lawyers are standing back from them,
and if you win one and get a good attorneys fee, then the next one,
they'll take. But until we blaze the
won't take them.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You mean you get $85-an-hour and a high
powered attorney 1s go1ng to look at you because you get $85-an-hour
with the windfall factor in there? They are going to come
because
they give you $85, is that what you mean?
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MR. LEIDIGH: Yes. Maybe not in San Francisco at $85, but
certainly in rural communities.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

Arne Werchick.

MR. ARNE WERCHICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Arne Werchick, President of California Trial Lawyers' Association. Even though
a very tiny percentage of our members are affected by this proposed
legislation because only a very small number of lawyers in private practice in California engage in this type of litigation, CTLA is particularly concerned about this measure because it seeks to use the principle
of regulating the contingency fee as a way of increasing the disincentive for certain lawyers to take on certain types of cases. This isn't
just a regulation statute. In fact the statute would have the effect
of deterring private lawyers from handling this kind of a case. Not
every lawyer who is working for $20-an-hour now desires to work for $20an-hour because they're young attorneys who are dedicated and determined.
They're willing to work for poor people, or low-middle income people.
They're willing to put in many hours of work that isn't very well compensated, partly out of the necessity of finding work in an overcrowded
legal community, and partly out of a desire that someday it will lead
to something and produce something.
If they have an opportunity and
are invited under the existing statute to perform as a great public service the most speculative type contingency fee litigation and the longest term type of contingency fee litigation, with the largest volume
of years involved before you see a nickel.
If there are young private
practice attorneys who are willing to take these risks to fulfill the
mission that this statute supposedly created for them when it was passed some three years ago, they should not be discouraged by being told
that at the end of the long road some court will subpoena all of their
records, find that they only made $20-an-hour for the past three years,
and award them the fee of $20 per hour for what may be the most valuable
public service that an attorney has rendered in California during that
period of time.
By contrast, if O'Melveney and Meyers has been hired by the
City of Los Angeles to defend the case, to cite one of the examples
that has been given, the court would not be inclined to take into consideration the fact that the award to the plaintiff attorney should
certainly be equal if not greater than the amount of fees paid to the
defense attorney in such a case when it was the defense counsel that
lost, and the plaintiff's counsel that won. So, our first concern is
real
right to the po
that your Committee has been considering,
Mr. Chairman, and that is whether the premise of the first speaker this
morning should be given any credence at all, and we say, "no." This
business about what did the lawyer make per hour and therefore we
should determine the fee in a public interest lawsuit on that basis, is
exactly the opposite of the way that fees in such cases are to be calculated because all
does is rather arrogantly give the highest fees
to the richest law firms in California and seeks to exclude everybody
else from this type of work.
If you want to pass this statute and enact a code section that tells the court what to do, the court should be
instructed to determine what fair and reasonable fees for comparable
services are. And the court should specifically be instructed not to
consider that some law firms get $250-an-hour for trivial work, and
that all other law f
$20-an-hour for very substantial work because that's not the value in any way of the services that have been
rendered.
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Now, as to whether a publicly funded or quasi-publicly funded
agency -- and I should say here when I address myself to their problems, these generally are not our members. There are many attorneys,
and I received a dozen letters this year from people saying that they
would like to participate in our functions but they cannot afford to
pay our dues at $120 a year -- and $50 for lawyers practicing under
three years has even troubled a few people. But I still will speak on
behalf of these agencies receiving the very same fees that a private
attorney would receive for comparable work for the very simple reason
that the philosophy of the law is that we want to expand and increase
the availability of these services. We do not for a minute believe
that all of the people who need these services are receiving them.
And we know as a practical matter that we cannot go back to the Federal
government or to municipal governments and ask for greater funding for
these agencies to secure their services for all of the people who need
them.
So one of the ways to make a small expansion in the availability
of publicly and quasi-publicly funded services is to allow them to collect a reasonable attorney fee for the services which they render which,
had that same litigant gone into a major private pro bono firm which
gives maybe two or three or five percent of its annual services for
cases that would be highly speculative of this sort, that that private
firm would certainly get paid and at a very high rate, then the public
and quasi-public law should also be paid at the same rate. Because
when you pay the money to the public and quasi-public firm, you know
at least the money is going into expanded services, whereas if you pay
it to the private law firm, you can suspect a good part of it goes into
partnership profits. And although I may be speaking against the interest of many of my members who as private law firms would rather have
the business, I still feel that it is urgent that the Legislature continue to recognize the service of the public law firm.
I think fundamentally here what's been missed up to this
point is an understanding of the fundamental nature of lawyers who work
on contingency fees. We don't have an hourly value to our service.
The value of our service is whatever the value of our existing inventory
is. If we've got a dozen cases that are worth $100,000, then the value
of our hour spent that year is worth the fees we collect on the dozen
cases worth $100,000.
If we have twenty cases worth $10,000 then the
value of our services for that year is going to be the value of twenty
cases worth $10,000. It's going to go up some years and down other
years. That's the fundamental risk that contingency fee lawyers are
willing to undertake. We try to average it out over the years by maintaining inventory, controlling the size of staff, being very attentive
to overhead and such. But it's a very different kind of operation than
people who do a fixed commercial or corporate practice where they know
as long as they have a certain number of clients, they will have what
are called billable hours. we don't have what are called billable
hours.
Incidentally, on that point, I was amused at the first presentation at the indication that there are 2164 billable hours for an
average attorney's average work year, because if it's an eleven month
work year allowing the lawyer a month off, that's fifty billable hours
a week. That's a lot of good billable hours for some very big commercial firms. But I don't know that all of my colleagues do indeed work
fifty hours a week. There's a joke told about the oldest lawyer in
the world who went to heaven and they knew that he was the oldest lawyer in the world because they checked his billing record. As a plaintiff's attorney it wouldn't be fair for me to address the billing hab-43-

its of defense counsel or corporate counsel. But the point is that I
think you mispreceive what we're talking about here. This is a contingency fee statute you're addressing yourself to. Not how to fix a
proper billable hour rate for the work done. Now, in fact, the courts
have addressed it and many of the pro bono firms that have become involved in the problem are used to dealing with the so-called billable
hour concept and that's why the law has looked at it that way. But I
don't think you should codify the billable hour concept as the way the
fee here should be determined.
Instead you'd have to look upon this
riskiest type of litigation. And to say that in a given case you're
going to award somebody with a 25 percent or 50 percent surcharge factor because of the quality of the work -- and I think, my God, the
medical malpractice cases that I've worked on, if I could only increase
my hourly productivity by 25 percent or 50 percent and I had to charge
by the hour for that type of litigation, I quickly would have gone out
of that type of work and I would have gone broke a long time ago.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:
practice of that type ...

But you also aren't subsidized in the

MR. WERCHICK: That's true. But consider, Mr. Nolan, that
I have to make 500 percent or a 1,000 percent surcharge on an hour of
medical malpractice work or that type of litigation can't be afforded.
And that's two and three years worth of litigation where I can be
highly selective in the cases.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But you also don't have your overhead
paid for and your attorneys paid for already by the public, which these
public interest firms do.
MR. WERCHICK: Now you're talking about public interest law
firms where the pUblic
very generously giving them $12 to $15-anhour for attorney time. And I understand they pay secretaries $500
and $600 a month in those firms.
I'm being facetious, of course. But
what I'm suggesting to you is that those firms are already badly underfunded. Now, we may disagree. From a conservative standpoint, it may
be the view of many legislators that we shouldn't have public agency
law firms at all, and that might be their legitimate expression of the
political viewpoint of the community. But let's not confuse whether or
not we ought to have them with whether we're being generous in the way
we pay them. I think that everybody concedes that these are low budget
operations consider
what we do with them, and that any additional
funds that they could get from these lawsuits would allow them to expand service. You personally may not want them to expand service, and
I can respect your viewpoint even though I would disagree with it. But
that's a different issue than what this statute supposedly addresses.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

This bill doesn't address that at all?

MR. WERCHICK: That's right. Except for the fact that it
would have the impact of causing a reduction in services to the extent
you reduce their fees.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Not if you assume that the Legislature
or the Congress funds them to the extent that they want them to be
funded already.
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MR. WERCHICK: Well, then we have the statute here that then
says, "In add1t1on to how you're funded, you ought to go ahead and
handle public interest litigation because there will be a fee in it."
But that's kind of a false promise if we're now going to say, "There
really won't be much of a fee, it's a fee based upon what your usual
hourly is and you should therefore abandon those services." The young
woman, for example, who spoke on behalf of the Los Angeles Project
pointed out that there are a limited number of attorneys available and
they cannot possibly service all of their clients. If you are going to
say to them, "We won't increase the fees that can be generated from
some fee generating cases," then you are going to say to them, "You'd better just address yourself only to those areas for which you have received the government funding and not follow the invitation of the California Legislature in this statute and never take on public interest
cases because that's far too speculative in terms of how many years
you may have to work and you still might not get a fee."
I will address myself, since many people have been somewhat reluctant to, to
the question of whether attorneys should be compensated for time spent
litigating over their fees, I will say yes they should be. They should
have a right to ask for it, Mr. Fenton, even if they are being foolish
about it. Even if they took a frivolous appeal and lost. If they want
to be frivolous enough to ask for it. I feel quite confident in the
judiciary of California that they will be told in short order that they
will not receive fees and that they may be unwelcome in that same court
again. On the other hand, if you tell them they can't ask for it in
the frivolous situation you are also telling them they can't ask for
it where, as many speakers have observed today, they've been forced in to
litigating fees. Where they've been forced to ask for a fee that was
higher than the reasonable fee simply because they knew they were going
to have to spend two years defending it and they would get half of what
they asked for. And what we're doing in a sense, in this type of litigation frequently, is turning the determination of fees into a kind of
real estate market where you have to price the product very high because you know that it's expected that you will go through several
tiers and layers of bargaining and compromise and trial court and
appellate court litigation before the final fee is set.
Now if you want to address yourself to that and give the
Superior Court greater authority to determine fees so that it reduces
the opportunity for defendants, both public and private, to harass
plaintiffs' attorneys by appealing the fees, that might make some sense.
You would then discourage the appeal of fees and then when an attorney
was factoring his fees he wouldn't have to say to himself, "I better
allow myself plenty of latitude because of the amount of fighting that
I know is going to go on over the fee." Because he still has to put
that number of hours into the lawsuit for him before it's finished.
And one way or another, whether you say he's going to be paid additionally for the time spent on fees, or you simply ask him to kind of deceive himself and the world by increasing his hourly fee to allow 20
percent of the time to be spent on fees -- which I'm not in favor of,
I would rather see it be done openly -- you've got to permit him to
ask the court to give him an award when it's appropriate for the time
that he spent on fees -- on the theory that the court should be told
don't give him anything if you don't think it's appropriate. But if
you feel he had to do a lot of work on fees and the work was merited
to be done on the case, it should be paid for.
He shouldn't be asked
to contribute those services any more than any of the basic underlying
services.
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I want to add my voice to the people who protest the inclusion of a good faith standard in this statute. As I see the way the
words are being put in this statute, Mr. Nolan, and I don't know if you
intend it to be this broad, the good faith of a public or private defendant in violating the law, would be a defense against the payment
of attorney's fees to the people who brought that violation of the law
to the attention of the courts and rectified it. That is, the school
district which didn't intend to segregate but in fact did segregate,
would be able to set that up as a defense against the payment of attorney's fees, even if it litigated for five years whether or not it should
intergrate, whether or not it should pay attorney's fees. The good
faith of the telephone company that doesn't promote women, and hasn't
done so for twenty years, unless it could be proven that it was a deliberate and intentional policy as opposed to an inadvertant or careless
policy or not necessarily a high level corporate policy, not only would
that be a defense through three years of litigation but it would again
become a defense now through three years of litigation over attorney
fees, because the company would say, "Well we weren't really bad people
and so the attorney for the other side shouldn't be paid."
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:
I recall your argument for inclusion of
good faith in .the bill that just passed in the last month of session
involving pursuit of cases wrongfully against governmental entities,
where you insisted the
faith be included in it.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, Pat, inconsistency isn't just characteristic of the Legislature.
MR. WERCHICK:

Mr. Chair, I don't think I ...

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Where in spite of knowingly proceeding
against a governmental entity -- knowing that they were not involved
in the case, that you still would have to show bad faith.
MR. WERCHICK:
The test there was whether a court could summarily impose sanct1ons or penalties, if I recall the statute correctly, ...
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

No, just attorney's fees.

MR. ~'JERCHICK:
Including attorney 1 s fees.
There was also all
costs, expenses, expert witness fees and attorney's fees ...
attorney

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: The change in the law was that this added
Tees to the fees that they could already ...

MR. WERCHICK: No, it also greatly increased the exposure to
costs as well as fees, and the .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN:

Anyway, I just wanted to point out ...

MR. WERCHICK:
I don't think I'm being inconsistent.
I don't
think I'm be1ng 1nconsistent because it is one thing for a court to
judge the good faith of the attorneys in their asking for the fees and
in their participation in the courtroom, but your statute here seems to
say we should judge the good faith of the defendant's conduct over the
past five or ten or twenty years in deciding whether the attorney on
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the opposing side should be paid. Now that's not a penalty that we•re
imposing upon the defendant. Your bill sought to impose a penalty on
a lawyer who -- originally, whether or not he acted in good faith, sued
a public entity and he lost. We ask you at least to ameliorate that
standard by judging whether or not that attorney was acting fairly and
reasonably in bringing the public entity into the lawsuit.
I don't see
that at all as inconsistent in asking you not to put a good faith standard in when you're saying should the opposing counsel get paid at all -one dollar -- for his services. Part of the standard is going to be -is the person that he sued and defeated is going to be able to setup as
an excuse; "I was breaking the law inadvertantly, not intentionally and
maliciously." And I am simply saying that since that's not the purpose
of these public interest lawsuits -- to ascertain whether the defendant
was breaking the law maliciously as opposed to innocently. We're willing to concede in most of this type of litigation the breaking of the
law may have been taking place for political reasons.
It may have been
taking place out of ignorance.
It may have been taking place out of
bureaucratic lassitude.
There could be a thousand explanations short
of willful and malicious type of conduct. And that should never be the
test of whether it was a good faith effort by the opposing side to rectify a deficiency in public or private performance.
I've noticed everybody to this point has addressed themselves
only to the issue of the public entity that has to pay the judgment.
Once again, as we have noticed many times in litigation that was drafted to solve a problem, supposedly the public entities -- I caution
the Legislature not to paint with such a broad brush, that it gives
undeserved immunities and privileges to the private sector whether or
not it needs it out of some concern, whether it be a real or an exaggerated concern over the welfare of government during a time of limited tax resouces.
I do not know of any instance, though, where a public entity, let alone a private defendant, has been bankrupted or
brought to its knees because of any award of attorneys fees for any
such public interest litigation. And I don't know too many sitting
Superior Court judges in too many counties in California, knowing that
they are going to have to run for reelection every six years, that want
to go down in flames as the judge that bankrupted his own county. Especially if he's asking for a new court house or courtroom to be built
in that county.
In any event we recognize that this is a problem that
may legitimately concern the Legislature because it is a new area and
a somewhat expanding area. But we urge that you not act out of haste
or overly broadly, in an effort to address yourselves to this problem.
I think you for your attention.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you.

Our last witness is Robert

Harris.
MR. ROBERT HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the
Committee, I'm Robert Harris, the immediate past-President of the
National Bar Association. Today I'm speaking on behalf of the California Association of Black Lawyers.
I note that the time is close to
noon. The testimony has been exhaustive. I don't think that I can
add anything significantly new.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Is that something you want to put into the

record?
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MR. HARRIS: No.
But I will make simply a two minute statement on behalf of the California Association of Black Lawyers. We
think that it is very important that the private bar be encouraged to
bring actions that will bring about an enforcement of significant rights
in the State. From the perspective, especially of black people, this
statute is important because historically the rights of black people
have been ignored and aren't enforced. Whether we are talking about
breaking down the legal walls of segregation or enforcing other civil
rights acts or civil rights in behalf of black people, blacks have had
for the most part to rely on the volunteer efforts of the private bar.
The existence of 1021.5 certainly provides at least some encouragement
for the private bar to enter, especially from members of the white bar,
to enter the arena.
I need not give you the long history of what the
black lawyers had to struggle through to get rid of Plessy v. Ferguson
-- to bring it to Brown v. Board of Education. Certainly they were not
compensated for the many, many cases and hours that they had to litigate, but we think that they must now, in 1980, be joined by white lawyers who are litigating in this area.
I can understnad the desire to
enact the proposed amendment to 1021.5, but I think it would be a serious mistake to do so, especially when we in the legal profession are
debating the issue of the effective delivery of legal services to the
poor. A statutory change of 1021 would have an effect that would be
adverse to that interest. And for those reasons, especially for
many of the reasons I've heard this morning, I think it would be ill
advised at this time to change this particular statute. I think that
the courts have acted reasonably and I'm not aware of and I'm certain
that the proponents cannot point to any wide spread, systematic abuse
of this particular section. So, the California Association of Black
Lawyers urges you not to change Section 1021.5. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you.

# # # # # #
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Thank you all for testifying.
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TO:

Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee
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RE:

Hearing on AB 3172, Attorneys'
Interest Litigation

Fe~s

in Public

On September 29, 1980, the Assembly Judiciary Committee
will hold an interim hearing on AB 3172 (Nolan) relating
to the awarding of attorneys' fees in public interest litigation. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. in
the Health Department Conference Room, 1200 Aquajito Road,
Monterey.
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide background
information that may be of interest to you in preparation
for the hearing.
AB 3172
AB 3172 was heard by the Committee on April 30, 1980 and
was referred to interim study at that time. The bill would
amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 which provides
for the awarding of attorneys' fees in certain public interest litigation, commonly referred to as "private attorney
general" actions.
CCP Section 1021.5 was enacted in 1977 (AB 1310, Berman,
Ch. 1197, Statutes of 1977) in order to encourage the
bringing of suits for the enforcement of important legal
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rights.
Section 1021.5 codifies criteria similar to those
which had historically been used by federal courts in
awarding "private attorney general" fees.
It provides that
"upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important
right affecting the public interest if:
(a) a significant
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b)
the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of
the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving
public entities, this section applies to allowances against,
but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be
filed therefor."
AB 3172 is sponsored by the Los Angeles County Counsel,who
contends that, although the existing legislation's purpose
of attracting competent counsel to bring public interest
litigation "may be salutary, the lack of specific criteria
and procedures for dealing with such awards has resulted in
large numbers of unreasonably large and unwarranted awards
that are
acing increasing demands on scarce public resources." The County Counsel's office further states that
the measure would establish appropriate criteria and procedures for the mak
of such awards, consistent with the
goal of encouraging competent lawyers to bring necessary
public interest litigation but also precluding "unwarranted
windfalls" to attorneys.
AB 3172 is opposed by various public interest law firms
and legal services programs as well as the California Trial
Lawyers Association and the State Bar. Generally, the bill's
opponents argue that the practical effect of AB 3172 would
be far greater than ils proponents outline.
It is contended
that enactment of AB 3172 "would destroy the original goals
of the'private attorney general' statute to encourage the
representation of people who otherwise cannot afford lawyers
and to vindicate
rtant rights that would otherwise remain unenforced.
The bill would make it difficult to impossible for legal aid programs and public interest law firms
to recover attorneys' fees and would reduce the amount of
fee recoveries so severely that they would no longer serve
their original purpose."
Please see the enclosed bill digest for an analysis of AB 3172.
History of the Public Interest Attorneys' Fee Awards
The traditional "American Rule" has been that litigants must normal
bear their own a
' fees costs
l
ion. Consistent with that rule, the United States
Court held in
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Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Society, 41 U.S. 240
(1975) that, in the absence of statutory authorization,
federal courts under federal law could not properly award
attorneys' fees on a private attorney general theory.
In
1974, in the case of D'amico v Board of Medical Examiners,
ll Cal. 3d 1 (1974), the Califoin1a Supreme Court had
expressly declined to consider the "private attorney general"
doctrine's possible application in this state "pending an
announcement by the (United States Supreme Court) concerning its limits and contours on the federal level."
In Serrano v Priest,20 Cal. 3d 25, (1977), (Serrano III),
the California Supreme Court concluded that California
courts, exercising their inherent equitable authority, may
award attorney fees under a "private attorney general"
rationale to litigants who successfully pursue "public
interest" litigation vindicating important constitutional
rights. The court expressly left open the question "whether
courts may award attorney fees under the 'private attorney
general' theory, where the litigation at hand has a statutory
basis."
At almost the same time as the Serrano III opinion, the
Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5,
thereby providing explicit statutory authority for courtawarded attorneys' fees under a "private attorney general" theory.
Section 1021.5 goes beyond Serrano III by explicitly authorizing "private attorney general" attorneys' fee awards when other
statutory criteria are satisfied, "in any action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting
the public interest" regardless of its source,whether constitutional, statutory or other.
The leading California Supreme Court case which interprets
CCP Section 1021.5 is Woodland Hills Residents Association,
Inc. v City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, (1979).
In its Woodland Hills opinion, the court found that "the
Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the
'private attorney general' attorney fee doctrine that had
been developed in numerous prior judicial decisions."
Quoting from Serrano III, the court stated that the fundamental objective of the "private attorney general" doctrine
is "to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public] policy
by awarding substantial attorneys' fees ... to those who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits
to a broad class of citizens." The court further stated
that " .•. without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney
fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible."
23 Cal. 3d at 933
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The court also pointed out that "in significant measure
[CCP 1021.5) was an explicit reaction to the •.. Alyeska
decision .•. (which) reflected a legislative declaration that,
in California, courts do enjoy the authority .•. to award
attorney fees on a private attorney general theory."

In order to focus the inquiry of the hearing, the following
considerations should provide a useful frame of reference:
The bill's source states that enactment of AB 3172
would preclude excessive fee awards. Would the bill's
various provisions, either individually or taken as a
whole, serve that function? Would the policy of encouraging competent counsel to bring public interest
litigation to enforce important rights be adequately
preserved?
One of the most significant aspects of AB 3172 is its.
proposed change in the method of computing fee awards.
The traditional "lodestar" approach which is based on
providing just compensation for the attorney's services
in terms of time expended on the case would be replaced
by the "cost-plus" method (i.e., basing the award on
the reasonable cost of providing legal services, including, where appropriate, a reasonable and controllable profit margin.)
Would the "cost-plus" method of
computation result in awards which will provide attorneys
with sufficient incentive to initiate "private attorney
general" suits?

Copies of memoranda prepared by supporters and opponents of
AB 3172 as well as copies of the leading relevant cases will
be available at the hearing.

Please note that the bill's source has indicated that it does
not intend to pursue enactment of the section of the bill
that would repeal the existing prohibition against fee awards
to public entities. Therefore, that aspect of AB 3172 is not
included in the enclosed bill analysis.
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EXHIBIT B
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 3172

Introduced by Assemblyman Nolan

•

March 10, 1980

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

An act to amend Section 102US of the Code of Civil
Procedure, relating to attorneys' fees.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSJtl:S DIGEST

AB 3172, as introduced, Nolan Qud.). Attorneys' fees.
Under existing law, a court may award, attorneys' fees to a
successful party in an action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the .· public
interest. Such provisions do not permit an award in favor of
public entities.
This bill would permit such an award only upon motion
made upon at least 60 days' notice, and subject to discovery
provisions. It would specify that rea,sonable attorneys' fees
could be awarded to a prevailing party. It would permit such
awards to public entities.
The bill would specify that the motion for attorneys' fees
must be made upon adequate time records. It would require
the court to make findings, if requested. It would require the
court to consider the good faith and cooperation of the. party
against whom it is awarded, the relief granted, the success of
the respective parties, whether fees could be paid from any
recovery, the funding of the person to whom fees are
awarded, and whether the award will be paid by public funds.
It would not permit attorneys' fees to be awarded for
litigation regarding the award of attorneys' fees. The bill
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AB 3172
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would make related changes.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-m~ndated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
SECTION 1. Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil
2 Procedure is amended to read:
3
1021.5. Upon motion made upon at least 60 days
4 notice, and subject to the provisions of this code relating
5 to discovery, a court may award reasonable attorneys'
6 fees to a st~eeessful prevailing party against one or more
7 opposing parties in a11;y action which has resulted in the
8 enforcement of an important right affecting the public
9 interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or
10 nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public
11 or a large class of persons, and (b) the necessity and
12 financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
13 make the award appropriate ; ttfttl: -fet Stte.ft fees shot~ld
14 ~ ffi ~ iaterer?t ef jt;tstiee ae .~at* ef ~recovery,
15 if~ W#ft respect t.e aetioas ia·toh·iag f'mblie eatities,
16 ~ seetiofl applies·~ ano...vaaees agaiast, ~ ~ ffi ~
17 ef; tmalie eatities, ttfttl: a:e eleiffl sftel.l ae reqt~ired t.e ae
18 filed tkerefor.
·
19
Such a motion for §lttorneys' fees must be made upon
20 adequate time records. Findings shall be made, if
21 requested, on all material issues of fact. The award shall
22 be based upon the reasonable cost ofproviding the legal
23 se,rvices, including,. where appropriate, a reasonable and
24. con(rollable marglZJ for profit. In making an award of
25' fees, lhe court may''apportion the: award between the
26 par~ies OJ) the. safl1e pr adverse sides, and in determining
27 the appropriate.nes$ qfthe award or its size, shall consider
28 ·'the good faith aild cq~peration ofthe party against whom
29. it is a warded, .the reliefgranted, the degree ofsuccess of
30 the respective parties; the extent to which attorneys' fees
31. can be paid /Tom the' recovery, if any, the public or
32 privat(J.funding of the person or organization to whom
33 fees are awarded, BI)d whether the award wlll ultimately
34 be paid by public funds.
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1
No attorneys' fees shall' be awarded for litigating the
2 right to or the amount of an award.

•
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EXHIBIT C
BILL DIGEST

BILL:

AB 3172

AUTHOR:

Nolan

SUBJECT:

Attorneys' fees:

public interest litigation

OBJECTIVE:
This bill is intended to establish criteria and procedures
for awarding attorneys' fees in certain public interest
litigation.
BILL DESCRIPTION:
Existing law provides that, upon motion, a court may award
attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest if:
(a)

a significant benefit has been conferred on the
general public or a large class of persons;

(b)

the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement make the award appropriate; and

(c)

such fees should not in the interest of justice
be paid out of the recovery.

This bill would make the following changes relating to
awards of attorneys' fees in such cases:
I

PROCEDURAL CHANGES
A.

The motion would have to be made upon at least
60 days notice, would be subject to the discovery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and would have to be supported by adequate time
records.
(CONTINUED)
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COMMENT:
CCP 1021.5 provides that a court may make an
award "upon motion" but does not provide for
a time limit on such motion. The bill's source
contends that the lack of a time limit can preclude a public entity from adequately opposing
the motion.
Proponents state that since the existing statute
does not require time records, many courts have
either not required such records or have based
awards on inadequate records.
It is argued that
"unless such records are used as a constant check
on applications for attorneys' fees, there is
a grave danger that the bar and bench will be
brought in disrepute," and that discovery is essential in verifying the truthfulness and accuracy
of the time records which are submitted.
Opponents of AB 3172 argue that adoption of the
bill's "cost-plus" system of computation (see II,
A., below) would make such discovery burdensome
and oppressive, requiring a detailed accounting
of a firm's entire operation, and making arguably
"relevant" much privileged information. Opponents
also point out that since the bill also provides
that no attorneys' fees may be awarded for litigating the right to or the amount of an award,
defendants' counsel would have an incentive to
use abusive discovery in order to lengthen or
complicate the fee proceedings.
B.

Findings would be made, if requested, on all
material issues of fact.
COMMENT:
CCP 1021.5 makes no provision for findings of
fact regarding an award of attorneys' fees.
Proponents state that findings are needed to ensure that (1) there is an adequate factual basis
upon which an award is made and (2) that the
court explain clearly the effect of each factor
used in determining the amount of the award.
The bill's opponents point out that this provision would lengthen fee proceedings for which
plaintiffs' counsel would not be, and defense
counsel would be, paid.
(CONTINUED)
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CHANGES IN METHOD OF COMPUTING THE FEE AWARD
In determining the award, the court would be:
A.

Requ;i;red to base the award on the reasonable
cost of providing the legal services, including,
where appropriate, a reasonable and controllable
profit margin
COMMENT:
The existing statute does not prescribe any
specific method for determining the amount of
an attorneys' fee award.
Generally, courts in
CalTiorrda -and in other jur1s2f:Lctlons use the ~
"lodestar" or "touchstone" approach.
The California Supreme Court adopted that approach in the leading case of Serrano v Priest,
20 Cal. 3d 25, (1977), citing a Un~ted States
Court of Appeal holding to the effect that "the
starting point of every fee award, once it is
recognized that the court's role ... is to provide
just compensation for the attorney's services in
terms of the time he has expended on the case •.••
(Using) this concept is the only way of approaching
the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim
which is obviously vital to the prestige of the
bar and the courts." The Supreme Court said that
a "touchstone" should be calculated based on a
compilation of time spent and a reasonable hourly
compensation. The "touchstone" is then to be
adjusted according to the consideration of various
factors, some of which "militate in favor of
augmentation and some in favor of diminution."
The Supreme Court found that the trial court in
Serrano properly considered the following factors:
(1)

the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them;

(2)

the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
attorneys;

(3)

the contingent nature of the fee award, both
from the point of view of eventual victory
on the merits and the point of view of
establishing eligibility for an award;
(CONTINUED)
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(4)

the fact that an award against the state
would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers;

(5)

the fact that the attorneys in question
received public and charitable funding for
the purpose of bringing law -suits
the
character here involved;

of

(6)

the fact that the monies awarded would inure
not to the individual benefit of the attorneys involved but the organizations by which
they are employed; and

(7)

the fact that in the court's view the two
law firms involved had approximately an
equal share in the success of the litigation.

The bill's supporters argue that the "lodestar"
approach results in awards far in excess of the
costs of providing legal services, including
reasonable profit, and far in excess of fees
that the attorneys ought expect to earn in other
litigation. They contend that the "cost-plus"
method of AB 3172 would result in attorneys involved in public interest litigation being fully
compensated for their time and services with a
reasonable profit and an incentive while precluding unjust "windfalls."
Opponents of the "cost-plus" method state that
if counsel are not compensated for the true
value of their public interest services, those
services then cannot "compete" with other services, and undertaking public interest cases
would become too great a sacrifice. It is
argued that adoption of "cost-plus" would thwart
the purposes of attorneys' fee legislation by
making such cases "second class" litigation.
Opponents further state that the current system
relies on the discretion of the judiciary which
has been excercised with care and that judges
should maintain the flexibility to suit the fee
to the particular case with a view toward fairness and effecting the purposes of the fee provision.
B.

Permitted to apportion the award between parties
on the same or adverse sides

c.

Required to consider:
1.

the good faith and cooperation of the party
against whom it is awarded
(CONTINUED)
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COMMENT:
The bill's source states that such a requirement would serve as a further incentive
for public officials to comply with the law.
The source argues that when the law is unclear, "the only hope (a public official) has
of defeating an (attorney fee) award is to
litigate the issues to their fullest extent •.. in hopes that he will be the prevailing party .... If he knew the court
would consider his good faith •.. he would be
motivated to work cooperatively toward compromise ... "
Opponents state that the purpose of Section
1021.5 ("to encourage enforcement of important rights") would be thwarted if a
defendant could raise a defense of good
faith, which would be impossible to disprove.
2.

the relief granted

3.

the degree of success of the respective
parties
COMMENT:
Proponents contend that a party should not
be permitted to stack issues in one action
in order to enhance the fee award and that
therefore the court should be required to
take into account the extent to which the
party has prevailed.
This provision is opposed because of the
practical burden it would impose on the
court and the prevailing party in separating
successful and unsuccessful claims. Also,
it is pointed out that the denial of fees
for unsuccessful claims would encourage
attorneys to bring "the narrowest case
imaginable" thereby preventing proper examination and clarification of the law.

4.

the extent to which attorneys' fees can be
paid from the recovery

5.

the public or private funding of the persons or organization to whom fees are
awarded
(CONTINUED)
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COMMENT:
The source contends that this factor is
merely a recognition that the public has
already taken steps to fund and encourage
a particular organization to bring litigation of the type in which the fee award is
sought and that, therefore, the purposes of
the act have already been accomplished.
Opponents point out that the California
Supreme Court has held that while the fact
or public or foundational support may properly be considered in determining the size
of the award, it "should not have any relevance to the question of eligibility •.. "
Opponents cite the federal case of Palmer
v Columbia Gas of Ohio, 375 F. Supp. 634,
(1973):
"Those seeking to vindicate their
constitutional rights should not be forced
to rely upon the political vagaries of
governmental benevolence or private
philanthropy."
6.
D.

whether the award will ultimately be paid
by public funds

Prohibited from awarding attorneys' fees for litigating the right to or the amount of an award
COMMENT:
Proponents state that fee awards are permitted
to the prevailing party in public interest litigation in recognition of the benefit conferred
on the public but that litigation concerning the
right to or the amount of a fee award accrues only
to the private benefit of the attorneys.
Opponents say that time spent on the fee issue
should be compensated because the fee itself is
an integral part of the remedies necessary to
obtain compliance with the law. The allowance
of a public interest fee promotes public interest
litigation, and therefore the fee itself benefits
the public. Further, a disallowance would permit
parties to dilute the value of a fee award by
forcing prevailing attorneys into extensive,
uncompensated litigation in order to gain any
fees.
(CONTINUED)
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SOURCE:
County of Los Angeles
SUPPORT:
League of California Cities
Counties of Fresno, Humboldt, Kings, Inyo, Lake, San Diego,
San Bernardino, Santa Cruz, Solano and Trinity
American Insurance Association
Department of Justice, State of California
California Taxpayers' Association
County Supervisors Association of California
OPPOSITION:
California Association of Black Lawyers
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles
State Bar of California
American Civil Liberties Union
California Rural Legal Assistance
California Trial Lawyers Association
Western Center on Law and Poverty
Community Action for the Urbanized American Indian, Inc.
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
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1.

Introduetion.

Although
tr.rJdition.:ll American Rule has been that ,
litig:::nts must normally
r their o'tm attorneys' fee costs
in litigation (/1lyes
rv
Co. v. t-lilderness 1
Society (1975) ·q:tru.s-.
·ur;u:any court's Tn-recent years
fiave--ac..ve loped theor
upon 't-lhich
can B\vard attorneys •
fees to the preva
rties,
rt
rly in public
interest litig:c.Jt
•
te
toi-ney General Theory:
Serrano v. Priest 197 ) 20 Cal 3d 35, 44-1+7 ;· Count:z::. of I.nyo
v. City of Los Ange
(1978) 78 Cal .App 3d 8:r;-1f6. Substant.J~nef:Li·-~.rfieory:
Serrano v
:i.est supra, at 86;
Handel v. Hodgc·s,
C.:: 1
,
v. Indus tries,
Inc., T66 Cal App 2d 3 •
Func:r"£l1e-o-ry: County of-~YS' ':· Cit_y____9_~ L~ Anr,cl~ supra, ~t 86; .~~tate--of-
StanT:cer, "53 ca1:o:c1IV-t, ljL.. Vex£lt~ous Lu::cgant Tneory:
Scr:rDno v.
at 42; County of lf!YO v. City_ of
i..os
t.nr~eles,
-87.
-_....l..l.--

Pir::

Court's
ity to a·Hard
ence of
e Services

The Fcdere~l Government enacted the Civil Rights
Attm.·ncys' Pees
of 1976 (42 u.s.c. § 1988).
The Federal
that in Civil Rights Actions
11
m9y allou the prev<:l ilinft
• • • the court
party ••• a reasonnb
ns pa
of the costs.'
was to encourage attorneys to bring
The purpose of
encourage public officials to
such litigat
comply Hith
enate Report No. 94-1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess
7 ) , U.S. Code Cong ... & Admin. Ne\·7S ,
p. 5913).
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While the ca liforni.a Supreme Court was still cons ider:f.ng
the question in California, the State Le!j:islature 1enacted
.
s i_rnilnr legh; la tion (Code of Civil Procedure, Section
1021.5) to permit av1ards of such fees in certain public
interest litig<1tion. The apparent purpose of such
·legislation as with the comJ3rativc Federal Statute, was
to attract con.petent counsel to bring such litigation.

•

Neither the Federal nor the Galifornin statutes
prescribe either procedures for d2termining such a"t·mrds
nor criteria for deterr";l:ining the appropri<Jte arr:aunts of
such 8\vEirds. As a result, t·he courts have developed
methodologies on their ow~ ~1ich generally result j~
very large l!wards many times in excess. of the .costs of
p:cov id ing the services.
Almost everything th8t govcrnrr:ents do affects the
public broCJdly-and that is the fund.smcnt ~tpon v:rhich mast
8\~·ards are m~~de.
Rapidly cb.:::mging lm·Y, pnrticularly in
the arcn of civil rights, mnlccs it difficult for public
offlcialr. to knoH \-.7hat is requb:cd of them, m3king it
difficult: to avoid such litigatio:·1 and_ mnn:-cls of fees
a ga inB t them, cve.n tllou,gb they m:J ke good faith und diligent
efforts to try and stay current on the low and do all the
lm·? ·r~quircs. of them. Volunta1.-y comnliance and !:ettlcments
· ff.cct.l.Ve
~ ·
· avo:tal.n£;
· ·, ·
r·-ec B\·'::lrl•S,
~
nre 1aJ.:-r;e 1 y :J.ne:.
J_n
as E•!:'iny
decisions favor otvards of attorneys' fees C-:!ven when the
ccsc ls settled.
. Class actiono makh1g b~oad challenges to ~irtually
all a'spects of an agency's opera::ion almost ensures some
affirm<? tivc _rglief on S(Jl;}9 issues, cntitUJ1g the prev.!l iling
party to nn B\\'.:tJ:c'l of fec.s, generally-for all effort: ·0-xpeli(k:!d,
even· on i.ssues for 'Nhich no affixrnBtive relief 'qas granted.
Al thom:,h . cia j or lit i.ga tion ·resulting in ia rge at·Ul rds
of attorneys 1 fees have L"1 the p~s t generally been
brought ar;ainst larger mctropolitE!n count:tes, perhaps
because of the concentration of legal service agencies
there, htcreas i113ly such acti.ons Ltre be:i.ng brought in the
£mnller, more rural areas as t·:ell. Precedent successfully
created in one area, large or sm.Jll, m:1kc.s similar suite
in other areas easier. In increasing numbers such
litigation l-7:tth 1,·esul ting large aHards of a ttorneyr. fees
are brour,ht agah1st the state itself, tho creator of the
leg:i.sl:.1tion.
The so-called "ueep pocket" of publ:i.c entitles, which
is not so deep anyi';1ore, is an llttractive incentive to
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a ttorncys and
in
tc a ttorncy fee .~nvards.
Although the a ppiJrent purpo!;e of attorneys 1 fees legisla t:Lon may be so
, the lack of s
ific criteria
and procedures
ling \'lith such .3\·;.irds has resulted
in lorge nur:tbers
1.Jnl e.:::; one: bly laq:c nnd um1arrantcd
a'I.·Wrds tba t are plncing :Lncrcas ing cc~m:1nds on scarce
public resources,

A.B. 3172 has been drafted to esta ish appropriate
criteria and procedures
the m:1ldng of such <H-iards,
consistent with the
1 of encourag g cornpctent lawyers
to bring necessary
ic :Lnt8rest litigntion, and, at the
same time preclude tL'l'l.var1·nntcd 't·:indf.nlls to attorneys and
provide the jud
ry w
specific criter
to guide
it in making reasonable m..rards of atto1:neys 1 fees in
proper cases.

• <

No apec ic procedure
the question of an award

required for dealing with
fees.

_a t.tol'ncys'

. Although Code
il Procedure Section
102 L 5
t a court mFiy m:J ke an IH1ard
"upon mot
cou.1~ts b~V8 i)c.rmi ttcd the
reque:s t
m-:de as
rt of
cost bill o1.·
~
mcnns •. ~~c Plum~ir)&.t Ht~.
and 1'1:.£ in g
etc -L~-~}:. ::::..?12. , {19, b 64 Cal
App-:ra--zrs;e ·.:..:ot.u:t d(:;CLlen "irrelevant
the procedure a party uses to nssc.rt D claim of
11
attorneys 1
.
'l:'.:..f.·.l:?..· __r:i.r~_r.. Co_. v.
•
Walter E. Hcl
& Co.
1'91~) 3""8 Caf7~pp-3(f""""5"0;
· Hen.e1ic~St.nilCiariT"fironcrtics. Inc. v. Sch::Jr~
4

•

(TST/7)Gtc;a-f7\pp-3o-Z2-</.

"""

-

B.
are not specified by the statute.
havt! sometil.1:::s entctta ined such
t notice tvhich effectivcdy
motions on
entity from adequately
precludes
motion. This occurs when,
meeting
st for
s
m3dc as part
for exmnp ,
is occurs, the cost
of the cost
dn
of the judgment,
bill must
fi
co3t bill must be
Elnd any motlon
\·l<i
Code of Civil
m·JUC Hi thin 10
Time

As a result
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Procedure f;cction 1033. -l:n other ci.rcurr..stances
\
Courts have permitted requests for fees to be made
many month~ nnd even ye;1rs cfter the litigation (Cf.
Rah~cy _v. Jncl~on _S~1tc f2911~ge (5th Cir. 1977} .S~"T F. 2d
'b/T), \-Jhc:n toe cviclence ~s stnTc or the public entJ_ty
reason<.1bly assumes that no reserve need be established
to cover such an award.

I

Requ :i.1~ lng that rcqucs ts for attorneys 1 fees be
nnd:-~ on 60 d.:.1yG not:i.cc is not onerous; ancl provides a rcasonnble period of tim3 for the public ent:Lty to respond
to the Hot:i.on and the records upon which it is based.

c.

Pro_P-os~d Requir~ment that the
l~ecords.

Motion be Based

up011Mequa te Time

As the existir.g state does not require time records,
II"..Sny courts have either not required such. records or have
based a-vn:n1s on inadeqna tc records.

HoPever, it is generally recognized that a principal
ingn:-dient neccssnry to a reasonable fee B't·lard is the
tira~ gpent on the action, and any nccurc.te computation
of tim? necessarily dcm9nds accurate tim3 records conter,-,r,nr::~ne<'u;:-.J.y kept.
Cf. Attorn(!ys' FGcs : Pr:~ c tic a 1,
f.E-c:.~:-.tl~~}~:]., l)ncl ~;th:i:£~:..!;:-cons idu:.:-1 t ions; C. E. B7(~rcu-the,
Cw.lcJN~, 11<111 & H:.t.lsori J976) p. 68; Su::nt1nnls for .Judic:i.al
!li?l~?~.ov£__~ of ~tt_g_,12:J. £,Y~--'-._Fecs in . C!J·l sp/>~c~Fir-;~nd ~t)I~lc~x
-L:.t.t).~G<.ltJ.trn, J. Clay bmJ.. 8.00 hm·1. J..... J. 1..0, ::;6 (19!1).
The reasons underlying the need for detailed,
complete, ac.curate, timely prepat~ed, and understandable
record!; of tirre spent are of the utm..Jst importance
~;here an mw.'illing J?Crty is required to pny the
successful attorneys' bill. Unlc~s such records are
used as a const~nt check on applications for attorneys'
fees "there is a grave danger thnt the bnr and bench
\·:ill be brcn~llt in d:i.sn:pute ••• " Chernel~ v. TranB itm)
E).:..c:ct;·on i~~--9.s:Tr... (D. Hass. 1963} 2T11~:-Supp-:-:55;--bC
See, ror cxampieJ the attached declaration of an
auditor \·:ho rcvic-;·n~d the time records submitted by
the:. A. C. L. U. for an 3\·lA r.d of attorneys 1 fees a z:;a ins t
the County. The auditor indica ted that ,-;htle the
incomplcten'.~~;s of the records Dnd l.:tck of supporting
data prcclu~ed a meaningful nudit, the records did not
"ppe<.tr accu1:.1Le,. contc:tiw.::d requests for reimbursement
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for days on 'tvhich the nttorncy wns on vacatic;m,
contained claims for reimbursement of exce~,s:z..ve numbers
of hours tbat '>v~re b~yond rcasonnble belief, and ·1,
\vere such that he could express little confidence in
them.
D.

The Proponed Provis}on for Discovery Procedures ..

As the statute currently makes no provision for
d iscoveJ-:-y procedures, courts hr.we bt~en in cons is tent
in permitting necessary discovery.
As indicated in the attached declar:Jtion of the
County Auditor Hho audited the A.C.L.U. 1 s time
recorCJs submitted in support of a motion for attorneys 1
fees, discovery is an essential and ~nportant means
of meeting and verifying the truthfulness c;nd accuracy
of 'tvhat tin1e records are submitted.
The atto't·ncy:::> 1 fees in ronny cases are quite
lnr~e) often \·Jell in excess of $100,000.
In n damage
action for a judgmc:nt in that cH'1ount, discovGry \·lould
be availahle as a mntte~ of course and right. Cf. Code
of Civil I'roccdure Sect
2 OlG -2 037. Th2re is
little, if any, reason why the sEme pro
1 safegu::n.·ds should not: be av.::iih>ble in e:n <:~ppl ation for
attorneys 1 fees
a s
r amc;un t. Concerns about
oppressive discovery, or brc~ches of confid~ntiality
can be a·1equa tC" ly dealt Hi th in the normal \-:ay through
protc.:_ctivc orders and objections.
E.

Tbe ProEo3ed Provision for _FindjJ1gs.

· · The current s ta t:ute rr:a kes no provision for findings
of fact or ccmclun:Lons of l<::\·7 regc:rding an mm1~d of
attorneys' fees. Find :ings Drc, hrn:cvcr, an important safeguard
to cnoure that there is Dn adequAte facttml basis upon which
an mv<;rd is rna • The '>·Jide range of d cretio11 a llo~:<~cd a
court in determining the size of .::m attorneys 1 fee m·wrd rnakes
it important thnt the court e>:pl:i.catc clearly the effect of
each factor us~d in de
ing the ar.1ount ·of the auard.
As o11': Court has pointed out:
" ••• a court in sett:fng nttorneys 1· fees in
public intere.st litigotion n1'J3t do more than
1
prcservP decoru:n, turn the
1 nnd \vh~n it
stops redeem the winners chi.ps at
posted
rates.'" C_£yeJnnd v. Hnrsh.:t1l (D.C. Ch· 1978)
59!• F. 2d 2tt4.
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F.

E~:__is_!:il~L}ie·p1~c~oh!.(~1 ___fgr Determining the
S"1:::e 01.: t[i(! 7lttorncy Fee 1\.\HJriJ.
·
---------- -

J
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\

The existing stntute does not prescribe any
Sp?cifi.c methodology for de:terr.1ining the amount
of an attorney f~c award. As a result courts have . .
developed their mm m~thodology '1•1hich normally results
in very large Dwards.

...

The m0st accepted sppronch to calculnting an
Attorney fcc <n·!ard, beth by california Courts and courts
of other jtn: i~;d ictionn io the 11 lodcs tar" or "touchstone" approach. Under this approach a court
· llSccrta ins the numher of hours \·lorked on the case
and Dscert::::d.ns a so-called ''market rate" for the
services, usually looking to the highest rate charged
in othc~r ec:-::plex or anti-trust litigation. These
t\W figurc~s, the number of hours and the so-called
"'marl;._et rate'' per hom~, arc multiplied to arrive
at the ''lodc~st:<1!." 11 or "toueh3tone". This "lodestar"
c:mount i::.>. then multiplied by n \·Je:i.ghted f.;;ctor of
woi:,2. or less than one (us1:.a lly more than one),
c1E:T',!nd ing upon tll€ prc:->ence o1· <1 bsence of add itiona 1
notc~·10rthy fuctors such as the c;:ce llcncc of the vJOrli:,
the difficulty of the c~r;.e, etc., to arrive nt the
nn1:::1t:nt of the ultir,~.::: tf\ f•lv~rd.
Linuy J)rotlK:rs, Inc., of l'hiladelph:i.D v·. f.m'.?:r:Lcan

-2cr

Rn c1 i.:.:-;_:o:;:;-;:;i·Rr }~T!i-r·a;i7~,- c mJ) : {:, l:cr-crr:r--r~i73J---z}.ff';-F·-.
·16T;--rs--cw·-rc~r~d).Il-i~-JdecGron

using this approach
(on l:'cmnl!d, the trit:~l conrt tn Lindy Bro~:bers used a
\·Jcigbt·~d f:c.~ctor cf 2 to accoUJlt-rDr co11Cingency and
. quality f;: ct:ors (382 F. Supp 999, 1024), there by
<lh'Grd ing $L l mill im1 in fees, or $2 99 per hour
for nll huv~s claimed). Cf. Serrano v. Priest
(1977) 20 Cfll 3d 25, 1+8 n-.-3 -("'l.ocicstar•r--oT:$225, 625 c.:'!lcula ted ll t a varying rate of $150 to
$35 per bou:c, incrc.:H:cd to $400,000 by using a \veighted
factor of neorly 2).
This approQch generAlly results in very large
a ttorncy~' fee. a\·:a rcls far in .e>~cess of the costs
of: providing tbr?.se set"Vices, includL'lg reasonable
profit, and far in excess of fees that the attorneys
mir;ht expect to cnrn i11 other litigation.
Thl~ec cDses jnvoJving the County of Los Angeles
Dre worthy of: furtbc::r dir.cussion.
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' fees

on

madcet rates for nttorTJcys ond that the actual costs
of the service provided, including overhead and
prc,fit lWS much lou.:.~r than the amount cl\:arded, the
Cot1rt a\~·arclcd nttorncys' fees in excess of $100,000.
The matter is on a ppcal.
.
(iii) J3J:·o•vn v. Pitchess, J...A.S.C. No. 3 24464.
This case ·rs--anoTilei-~fciTf"class acti.on case. In
this case, even though the County convinced the Court
to reduce the B\·Jard substantially because of the inadequacy of the supporting time records and that the
County \>;ras the prev<:< ili.ng party on tr.3ny of the issues,
and thot the cost of the attorneys'· services, including
overhead end profit;. was less than $20,000, the County
H<1S only able to have the B\·JBrd reduced ·to $90,000
from the $200,000 prayed for.
·
Although the Co1.mty has achieved some apparent
·measure of success :i.n baviug the auards rcduc<:-.d,
the 8\·:ards rn.-;de, a lthm1gh cons is tent '·lith the
pJ::b1c:i.ples of a v~c-::1 J.th of: case·~, wou1 d still a ppc:-~r
t.u.,ret~~onablc, um.;-nr1:c:mted, anc;i excessive.
In e<::c.h
cef;e, the laek of spe::clfied proceduru3 and critcric
for dcterm:in:i.ng
Bppropric:;tc f.:\\Tard lK;S been the
m.njor c.::Jnr::C'. In each case, the .::lppnrent deep-pocket
of the· Cct.m!~y bns been an Dttr.:~ctive incentive.
for the a tt(n:n(:ys and the courts to inflate the
a1·:<1rdr> th~co·Jgh cxAggr..;.,~Gtcd clr:ims of hours spent,
· tlxe usc of tmn..::Jlictic and r;rti.fic:Lal rr.~irtk:ct-r.:tes,
and the un:inhibited use of 1!1UJ.U.plers in the
··lode.~ star approach.
.

an

The propo~;ed .::nn~ndmcmt to Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1021.5 abandons the tr~ditional approach to
de termin :i.113 the amount of th~ fee c:!\·7D:nl iil fEivor
. ·of a pt·incip~ll of reirnburscmc.!nt to a .firm for its
costs, plus a rcnso:.1al>J.e and c-.ontrollnble m~rgin
for profit. The. nc1·1 .3ppronch should yield a far
more cquit;:~bJ.e and supportable result.
Inflated
hourly fees would be avoided as a basis fcir awards
of n ttorneys' fees, nnd, :i.t~s tcad, compllttt tic·n -v;ould
begin \oJitb consideration of f>unJ.S required for reimh::..lrscmc:nt of a tto:n·lCys for their i11ves tm~mt of time
nud facilities, plu~ a reas6nable profit as nn
incentive to them cmd others to bring s iinilar litigation
in the public interest.

-8-73-

The trndlt
1 m~thod of: ctllculatinz an hourly
r.n tc by look g at
e preva lU.ng nJ.Drb:t rn te charted
in comn~rcinl <md ant.:L-u:ust ·litigation creates
purely artificial measures of a reasonable fee. The
high fees often chart;od to pnrties ln the \.:orld of
private business a1·c surely higher thDn tl10sc
requ:b:ed to provide an inN:n tive to rr:::.:'cJLers of
the private bar to pursue pnblic
crest: litig..1tion
with vigor. There is no ration3l
sis for paying
attol~eys, on an unadjusted bos
•
highest fcc
rates charge~ by
iling attorncy3 to other
cli.ents for sen:
xr.nttc•rs unrclntcd to public
interest lit
·
Attm:ncys involved in puhl:tc interc.st litigc;tion
should be fully compensated for
invcstn:ent of
time and services, and a reason2b
profit as an
incentive, but
t
all. Such publie service should
not be a money grubbin[; profccs ion, and \·7indfe~lls
should not b2 given.

Such an a pp1:o.s
would avoid.the imposition on
~ c-'hr·c-<c-t~
.;_u..,
__,,. of 1(•'·"1
)1 .J....
the public sector of
·t:.•···.
0 t;.·:,~~.. "" .-.n
.

re~~nerntion

app

which are out of 1
sc::rv:tce \d_
j
in public inte:rl:St
risk turn g
c

:t.vc tc sector - s tui!dt::rds
c
of: public
·

such

H.

[c'::S •

.n· t D:L~" cY c· t: ion

In ~-:.1any public il!tcrcst ca~;cs, there are a
·wealth of issues.
part
rly tr~e in
jail condit
r 2ct:Lons
\<Jbere a v;ide. ran
nlntcntol action is ch~llc.nged.
·In nDny cncc:s,
tiffs pn::.vn
on some, but not
all of the
ted; :Ln sor:1e ccses, the
· plaint:Lff
on only n
of a J.nq~c number
of issues.
Yet, when a party obta s at least
som~ <Jffirnt3t
rel f, he
cons cr.:~d the p!.:evailing
party for the
scs cf an award
attorneys' fees~
In such case;,
courts
s c the: am(nmt of the
llHard on all ef
·cxp2nded :In
cnsc, i.nchu~i11g
effort expend
sues on
did not prevail.

ir not appropriate.
would give the court
b::J sed np;1n th~ degree
tEl kt:n

Such an D
The proposed sta
discretion to :'l
of success.

the courts

L:.S
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costs i.n equit.:Jl•le. Dctions. Cf. Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1032 (c), g·ivinr, the court
the discretion to apportion costs L~twecn the parties,
or even to disallow them in appropriate c0scs, Cf •.
9>·1en ~:!-r:-£01wn_ (19LJ?-) 19 C.:'d. 2d 11:.7; !::=-sl~t-n "~-J!.frna~
(f971J) _ll) Cal /~r)P 2d 235; Cf-n:-tc>r v. CnotJ.l!t>.r (1~:.0)
210 c'~1 288; A.n.c. Ep:p; r~...,n-C:i11Dc~--v.A&clc-;-'•nout·
(1963) 233 ea if.pp-7cf-IZ·;

.

•

Nany fcdcrnl courts have follo'd-~d a slmil<'~r
appronch. C[._. £>teele _Q~::·~.tru~_t::i-.:E~__C_o •.. v. _ _J.:'ou:i.si~_:.:O:
Hic·Jn·Y2.V COP'8l.SGion {£:1). lf-J. rt.dl})). Gu:t:r:-sui)P• loJ,
I9T-3~~li(;):e the co,1rt taxed 90% of the costs againr.t
a prev<J iling p2rty '\vho proved only one of tv~cnty-six
itet.'lS for 't·ihicb proof uc::s attempted. See also,
S\·;ceny v. Boord of Trnstcer. of Kcr-m::! State College
Tf8tcT:.~-r9·/7")5'6·n-;·-zcr1u·0-, ;_;:"lc::~i:ea-on 6B~e1~

grounds,

58 L. J:d. 2d 21G> 'ivhc~rc a successful plaintiff in a
Civil l~:i.gbts Action 't·ms <.,·mrclcd co!:;\.:S and wttorncys'
fees ,.;ith a 20% reduction.
Co~:1pnre, tlnitcd St<:Jtcs
~- Ke J.).: '( (D • C, A ln r; lr..a lSi C) 1 ) 192 F. Su.pi_.1. 1''/4;-IT~f-;
where tha court conclud~d that both parties prevailed
in p.<:J~t, <md ordu.rod tl.:.:1 t: neith8r uouJ.d receive
a ttorn(~ys' fcc:->.

In r.:ult:i-:l~~suc act5.o:1.s J each i.::su2 could be: the
subject a separate: suit, and) if lo::t, Hould not
· warr;cn: t <'.! fc:e au;::rd. • A p<lrt:y shonld not be:-!. permittEd
to stndt i!lsuca :in one Dction to enhance the fee
. awa 1.·d.

One of tho purposes bohL'1d a stntute permitting

B'i\·nrt~s

of n~:torne.ys' fees in public intm:cst tmd
. civil r:i t;hts l:i.tig.:1tion is to encourage pul.JJ.ic entitieB
and off:l.c:Lals to cumply ·oith the lD'tv, Cf. Senate Itcpc;rt
No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Session (19/t)), u.s. Code
CcJiig, & Ad:nin. N8\vS, p. 5913 rct;;rd:i.ng the C5.vil
Rights /d.:lorneys' fees .11-v:nrd Act of 1976. · 'fhe thrcnt
of an 3Hard of n tton1cya 1 fc-eu is, no doubt~ an
effective motivation in tL":my cases,
· Hov~c'v~r, in tnany c::HH?~;, the lfro;,_, concerning the
public officinl is unclear, even though he is
highly r.totiva ted to colliply Hith it.
In li.tit.ntion
c.ouccrn:i,;1g hi~ duties, he tc-:!y even bo motivoted to
do ns the liti~_;ot:i.ng pnrt:ics dir<:ct, but feel
pl·ct:ludcd frov1 doJ.ng [iO by the ilpparcnt stt:tc of tbe
l41H.
ln such circttmstr~nccr., the r1v<.dlnbili.ty of nn
-75-

BHard of attorn2ys' fees tn-1Y work nt cross purposes
to the intended purpose of the li.ti.g.:ttion.
In such
a cnsc, th2. public official knm:s that evc:n i.f his
Dctioi1S nrc in r,ood faith, nnd ev:::::n if he ..:Jttempts
to 't·:orl: out often intr~ct<: ble soluticms with tbe cou:rt •
he rnay st:i.ll be ch't;::-gcd \·lith a subst~:ntial CJH.nrd of
nttorn2ys' fees. The on1.y hope he lws of ck:fcatinr;
such en f\Hard is to litir;:Jte the issues to tlteir
fullest extent, .:rvoid:i.ur; co:qn~oud.!·:i:, i11 the hopes
that ht! 'tvi.ll be~ the l'\rc\'<1 lU.n[; p.:-n~ty. On th.; otbc~·
hnnd, if he:: knc=~., the cou,.:t \·Joul<.l c:o;1~, ider b
good
faith \~ith rcgonl td_ l'ln m·;<n·c1 of D ttorneys 1 fees,
he \·Jould be moti\'2 tc~d to l.'orl:: eor.pcrn tively to~-;ards
compronise or othsr solutions.
'Dw c/=<nnples involving the County of I..os Angeles
illustrate tbis point. Bcfth 'tverc cl<'!SS actions
conce-rn i.:ng j;:• i.l cund:Ltions c.lur ing a tiue in 1-:hich
the L"n·? \'!<Ls rDp ly changing.
In both cDscs the
Court q.:ec:Lf
lly found tl1<d..: tl12 ~~ilcriff could not
hnve fors c:::n the ch-.::nr,rcs in the l."1u, thn t the sheriff
hEld vol1::1tBTily m~,c}c c1!~nges :Ln L
p:cacticcs ns the
chrmr;c::-: :;_n the lr>H bz::c;;::r;:~:: .''lpp:_'rC!l~:, <:-nd cor::f'.C:r,dcd the
s b;:.ri:f:T fo:::: h ic i~c.od :f<i :Lth ~; ttc::'tpt[; to 't·:ork. out
renson::hl c sohtt:l.odr: to th~.: cl ficult
su:~G Loforc
·tl·lr,~-

('O,tl"''·
..
_J~t...•

N~>·rr,...
. _ \ t..l~

fc;es <:q,in.·o::1ch

g

"'"
\.,._.,;:.)

$

·in
bo'-}1
"''"''"'''
attc:t:'')r>'>S
·-4
L.
'-·~'~..-~~.,- ... ~
J ~ ... ~·.Y"'"

)OOU v7e:re

a>;;a

ar;::;

I

st the

~l1c~r·iff c

Tht?. ob·v:totlG tnr:~s2
to tl1o cllc.J_·j~f:f i11 eacl1 cnse,
· \Jas th9t little \·?.28 to be ~~::lined Ly his good faith
and co::)p8rative s t:.:mcc tm~.J::cds the
sues
fore the
court.
At: leeist sc:ne courts h:::vco recor',n
th3 bc:nefits
of deny i'ug nn B\·;:;-;_·d o£ n ttorncys 1 f(:::~s bssed upon a
sho':·7ing o[ good fa th.
Abo v. Cl<: ,:k (9th Cir. 197 8)
608
F. 2d 365 • f1oj~eo\;e:;?;-ti1is is cons:i.stcnt .
·\'lith the good
ith defcn£;e 'l:vh:Lch
feats a d:.1p1age
act:ion :J:n Civ11 r:.iehts Actions.
In Civil IU.r;hts
Actions s a pubJ.:ic officinl m:1y defc;st a c!r:r.nr;e nwr.;rd
c11t:i.reJ.y even :if he is fotJdd to b:"vc violat,.:d the civil
r:i.ghts of the lit:i.gont, if he hns found to h:..~ve acted
:in the good fa
reP. ~:rm~~ hlc bo l icf tbJ t his
actions \Jere l0 l. 0 1 Cc:,mnr v. llonoldson (1975) /f22
u.s .• 563; Ho
StrTcTJ::.=:i!(l--(Tirr!.>)--fi'LO-ir-.-s. 308;
]~·ocun
..- - 8) /:)/1. U.S. 555, 560-61.
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..........

J.

This f.::ctor i.s me:rely a ·recor;nition that the
public has al:;:<..:.:'!Jy tc1lc·:.m steps t:a fund and encourage
th~ particnl;n~ orf,<l in::-::1tion to bring litit,t::tion of
th2 type. the fee 8't-:'DJ;d is sought i.n.
In such c<1ses,
.the pu:::pc::>e:s of tb.:; act h:>vc nlrcady been accomplished.I

•

The inclusion of this factor in the propo~ed
amcndr.:211t ta Sectio~ 1 02l. 5 ref lee ts the s iiail3r
holc1:b;g of our Euprem.~ Court in Sf.::rrono :v. Priest
(1977) 2 0 Cal 3d 25, l7here th~ court sa1.C1 at n-:---24:
''l\lhilc .... the fact of public or founc1cticmal
any relevance to the
qut!S tJ.on o£ ell.gl.bJ..Ll.ty for an cn,:<!rd, "t-JC
believe th<lt it may properly be consi.d2red in
dctei:minin[; th2 si~~c of the e\·~nrd." [emphasis
auoco. ]
.
suppo~t sh0uld.n~t.~~ve

...

--
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'l'hr:~ re:1son h::hhld this provu;l.on is !>:ur;ple Rnd
consistent witb
put·p,1::;e: of a! tcn·nt!y::> 1 .:Cees <cHv.J:r.d
s t.:J tutcs. A fl.·C' ~~:an! i~:. p(>nnittcd to th2 pj:~v~ iling
p2rty in public intu:c.st lit
tion :in rccopnt1.ou of:
the be>.ncfit: co~: ::reel ur-;o'n the public. Hm;;::ver, litir,a tion
concc.rnin~. the rigLt to <:
c: av.':"J n1 o!: tl12 0r:·:Junt th~reof
cl ccrucs only tel th:! pr iv::1te bc:n(;f it of t: J{.! n ttorncys
for vlhich tbc:t·c i~; no sir:.il<Jl~ justif:i.cat:i.on.
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ANALYSIS:
I.

AB 3172

INTRODUCTION
Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure currently

provides:
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees
to a successful party against one or more opposing
parties in any action \olhich has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the pub] ic intl·rest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has heen conferred
on the general pub 1 i.e or a large r] ass of persons,
(b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate; and (c) such fees should not in the interest
of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
Uith respect to actions involving public entities,
this section <:lpplies to allowances against, but
not in favor of, public entities, and no claim
shall be required to be filed therefor.
This provision is paralleled by federal legislation passed at about
the same time, permitting the allowance of attorneys' fees to parties who prevail in actions under a variety of federal civil rights
statutes.

ll

The obvious purpose of both of these provisions is to

benefit the public by i.ncreasing law enforcement.

Such provisions

enable priv<>L(' r·it.izens to correct violations of the law, by foreinb the violator to pay the costs of litigation which establishes
2/
the violation.

ll
:?:_/

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, amending 42
U.S.C. § 1983 [hereinafter "the 1976 Act"].
"The violation of an important public policy
may involve little by way of actual damages, so
far as a single individual is concerned, or little
[Footnote Continued]
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- 2 AB 3172 is an amendment which, if accepted, would stand the
California attorney's fpe provision on its head, ;mel

d_o_~c_I_

the pri-

vate enforce1;1ent of public rLghts which S<·cliuu 102!.') w;.>s initially passed to promote.

It is unprecedented and unnecessary legisla-

tion that runs counter to principles which have evolved over more
than a century of careful federal judicial and legislative scrutiny.
This paper will discuss hmv federal law and the commonsense
notions on which it is based are in accord with Section 1021.5 and
the manner in which it is currently being applied, and in conflict
with most of the provisions of AB 3172.

It is important to remem-

ber that the federal legislation which will be discussed

the 1976

Act -- was passed at the same time, under similar circumstances,
and for the same purposes as the California provision involved here.

3/
The County of Los Angeles, which urges its adoption,

concedes as

[Footnote Continued]
in comparison with the cost of vindication . • .•
If a defendant may feel that the c.ost of litigation,
and, particular , that the financial circumstances
of an injured party may mean that the chances of
suit being brought or continued :in the f [\CC of opposition, will be· small, there w1 11 be little hrake
upon delibc>rate wrongdoing. In such instances public rolicv may suggvHt an award of costs that wi11
remove the burden from the shoulders of the plaintiff
to vindicate the public right."
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972).

1/

The amendment was proposed by the County of Los Angeles, and
authored by Assembl)rman Patrick J'. Nolan.

-82-

- 3 much.

The legJsl<et ive history and judicial interpretation of the

1976 Act are therefore right on point.
Contrary to the assertions of the County of Los Angeles,
the leeislative history of the 1976 Act deals extensively with methods of

co~puting

attorneys' fees and standards for determining when

&_I
an award is appropriate.

Congress, relying on tre evolution of

proper standards through the courts and through prior fee legislation, could not have made computation and eligibility standards un-

Jj
der the 1976 Act nore clear.
The County of Los 1\ngeles tells us that All 3172
"has been drafted to establish appropriate criteria and procedures for the making of [fee] awards,
consistent with the goal of encouraging competent
lawyers to bring necessary public interest litigation, and, at the same time preclude unwarranted

41

Background Information and Analysis, A.B. 3172, prepared by
Frederick R. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, County of Los
Angeles [hereinafter "Background and Analysis"], at 1-2.

_2_/

Id., at 2.

61 The legislative history of the 1976 Act is more complete than
that of any fee authorizing act ever passed. The Act was accompanied by a seven-page Senate Report, a 24-page House Report,
and legislative debates which. took the better part of seven days
in the Senate, and extensive debate in the House.

II

Similarly, the State of California was precise in spelling out
the standards for eligibility, within the language of the statute itself. While the California statute does not prescribe a
method for computing fees, the County of Los Angeles informs us,
Background and Analysis, at 6, that the California courts have been
guided by the traditional "lodestar" ?pproach approved by Congress
under the 1976 Act. Thus the criteria which have evolved on the
federal level are, quite appropriately, being applied by the state
courts in California.
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- 4 windfalls to attorneys and provide the judiciary
with specific criteria to guide it in making reasonable awards of attorneys' fees in proper cases."

§j

I t is not the lack of specific criteria which prompts this legisla-

tion, however, but

r~ther

the County of Los Angeles'

ment with the criteria which already exist.

disagree-

AB 3172 rejects these

time-tested and appropriate standards and adopts contrary standards
-- standards most of which have been considered and largely or completely rejected under federal attorneys' fee provisions.

II.

ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROVISIONS
A.

Adoption of a "Cost-Plus" Hethod of Fee Computation
When Congress passed the 1976 Act, it specified:
"It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be soverned by the same standards
which prevail in other types of Pqua11y complex
Federal lit
ion, such as antitrust cases and
not be reduced because the rlghts lnvoJ vecl may be
nonpecuntary in nature. The nppropriatt• Htalldards,
see Johnson v. Geoq~ia Highway Express, L,88 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1974), are correctly applied in such
cases as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
8 E.P.D. ~~ 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v.
Charlotte-Hecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D.
483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). These cases have resulted in
fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys." 9

~/

Background and Analysis, at 3.

S. Rep. :in. 911-lOll, CJ/1th Cong., 2d Sc,ss. (197())I!JC'n'inaftcr
s~nat~ R•.>portl, at G.
1\c.cord ll.R. R~:·p. No. CJL•-1558, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976)[hereinafter !louse Rep.ort], at 9. All three of the
cases listed by Congress as having correctly applied the relevant
factors used the "lodestar" approach, add
a "bonus" or increasing a rate-times-hours touchstone.

9/
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This is a clear statement of the standards which an obviously informed Congress intended courts to follow to further the aims of
public interest fee legislation.

A court need only turn .to the

cases cited to obtain a very specific blueprint for computing fees.
A court is instructed to multiply a reasonable number of hours
10/
11/
by a reasonable hourly rate,
and arrive
spent on litigation
at a "lodestar."

The lodestar is then either accepted, or, in the
12/
presence of well--known "f:wtors,"- adjustt'd, e·ither np or down,

10/

TltC' cPurt. is itl~;tt:uclcd not merely to accept the hours claimed, but to ascertain how many hours were reasonable in a particular case, and to award fees for that number of hours. See, e.
~··King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert:-denied,
438 u.s. 916 (1978).
11/

Once again, a court need not accept an attorr.ey's normal hourly rate as "reasonable," but is instructed to ascertain what
is reasonable by weighing requested rate's in light of a petitioner's experience and reputation, normal rates for comparable work
within the community, and a variety of other guideposts. See, e.
£·• Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
12/

The "factors" listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway I:xpress,
supra, and approved by Congress for use under the 1976 Act,

are:
"(1) The time and labor required . • . (2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions • • • (3) The
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly • • . (4) The preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case • . •
(5) The customary fee • • • (6) Whether the fee is
fixed or contingent • • • (7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances . . • (8)
The amount involved and the results obtained • • •
(9) The expPri CTWI', reputation ;md ability of the
attorneys • . . (1) The 'undesirability' of the
case • . • (11) The nature and. length of the professional relationship with the client ~ •• [and] • • •
(12) Awards in similar cases." 488 F.2d at 717-19.
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to reflect the true value of an attorney's services.

All eleven

circuits have espoused the traditional lodestar approach, with the
use of Johnson-type factors, for use in civil rights cases.

]dl

AB 3172 would abandon the traditional approach found appropriate under the 1976 Act, and adopt a "cost-plus" method of computati.on, basing a fee upon "the reasonable cost of providing the legal services, including, where appropriate, a reasonable and control14/
lable margin for profit,"- rather than upon the value of the services.

While the cost-plus method of bi

has been found suitable

for contractors, often accruing to their benefit, it has yet to be
adopted by any commercial lawfirm, and has been rejected for use
in cases under the 1976 Act by every federal court to which defend15/

ants have proposed it, save one.

The reason for the federal

See,~~- King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Prate v. Freedman, 17 E.P.D.
" 8535 (2d Cir. 197 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill,
573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978), ~ 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Walston v. School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir.
1977); Knighton v. 1-Jatkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. :Sd. of Ed. of the City of Hemphis, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980); Konczak v. Tyrrell,
603 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1979); Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275
(8th Cir. 197 ; FounULJ v. Carter, 571 F.2d !187 (9th Cir. 1978);
Frz.ncia v. Hldtc, 591, .2ll 7/8 (lOth Cir. l!J7<J); Evans v. Sheraton
Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

13/

lil

AB 3172, lines 22-24.

121 Only Federal District Judge Hanson, from the Southern District
of Iowa, has computed fees under the 1976 Act in this manner.
,\lsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 6,!+7 F. Supp. 572
(S.D. Iowa 1977); Page v. Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
[Footnote Continued]
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- 7 rejection of cost-plus computation is obvious:

if counsel are not

compensated for the true value of their public interest services,
those services cannot "compete" with other services, and undertaking public interest cases must become a sacrifice.
"Focussing on the fair market V<Jlue of the attorney's services will best fulfill the purposes of the
Fees Awards Act, by providing adequate compensation
to attract qualifjed and competent attorneys without
<1ffording any windfall to those who undertake such
representation. The entire purpose of the statutes
was to ensure that the representation of important
national concerns would not depend upon the charitable instincts of a few generous attorneys." 16/
Hence Congress specified that 1976 Act fees be computed using "the
same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Fed17/
era 1 1 itigation, suc1
l as ant1' t rust cases • . • , I I - and t h at II civ1'1
rights plaintiffs should not be singled out for different and less
18/
favorable treatment" than antitrust plaintiffs.Application of

[Footnote Continued]
The cost-plus method of fee canputation has just been resoundingly rejected in an exhaustive opinion by the D.C. Circuit sitting en
bane in the Title VII case of Copeland v. Marshall,
F.2d
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 1980). That opinion deals with every one of the
arguments proffered for this portion of AB 3172, and more, and graphically shows the fallacies in the cost-plus approach.

1!!_/

Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d
624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980).

1]_/

Senate Report, at 6.

18/

House Report, at 9.
"Tht' r<1t ionale of awarding reasonnhlc <~ttorll<:ys fees,
after all, springs from the need for placing the
[Footnote Continued)
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the less remunerative cos

lus method of computation to public in-

terest cases would thwart the purposes of attorneys 1 fee legislation
19/
by making such cases "second class" litigation.
AB 3172 leads to many practical prohlcms in addition to
the above

one.

Most obviously, counsel working in pub-

lie interest cases could not
onable value of hours

to be compensated for the reason the plaintiff's side,

they would,
20
if hired by the County of Los Angeles to defend such a case,
bill
at the regular commercial rate for such work.
"cost-plus" neth0d to

1

incentive for prosecut

interest lit

ig~1t

Application of the
ion t1m

creates

:1

ells-

no disincentive for defending against,
21

public interest claims.
(Footnote Continued]
legal defense of
tain constitutional principles
and some congres ional policies on an
footing with the
of
interests."
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd,
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547
(1978).

12_/

least
in passing
torneys be "more li
way Express, Inc.
J., dissent
).
i\t

Court Justice bus concludvd that Congress,
slat ion, lntended that puh1 i c interest ntto be well
tl1an other lawyers." Roadper, 48 U.S.L.W. l;S36, 4841 (1980)(Stevens,

20/

Los
les
bodies frequently
hire outside counsel
ion, and have no hesitation in paying them
Appendix A. See also HcPherson v. School Dist. No. 186,
, Ill., 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.
D. Ill. 1978), where use of the lodestar approach, including a contingency increment, resulted in
rates to laintiffs' counsel
below those
by the defendants.
21/

It is also true that,

public interest litigation, plaintiffs'
(Footnote Contlnued]
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- 9 A further disincentive for private attorneys is created by
the intrusion into confidential financial information which will
be necessary to justify a cost-plus fee.

The cost-plus method

]dl
would require a time-consuming,

•

intrusive inquiry into the fin-

ancial details of a firm's entire practice.

Many firms would be

unwilling to disclose their financial condition, or to be subjected to an audit in an adversary proceeding.

This, combined with an

unwillingness to accept lower rates of compensation compared with
fees charged to private clients, especially where the fee is contingent upon success, h; a most serious Jeterrent to private lawfinns wishing to undertake public interest representation.
The cost-plus method sets up an irrational system whereby
fees are determined by the type of law practice that happens to be
carried on by plaintiffs' attorneys, and not by the nature, quality
[Footnote Continued]
counsel receive fees only when they win, while defense counsel are
paid whether they '"in or lose. To compensate for this fact, and
thereby reduce a potential disincentive to taking public interest
cases, many courts have increased plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates
to <lCcount f(1r contingency. See, ~·..8.·, Aumiiler v. University of
Delaware, /155 F. Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 854
(3d Cir. 1979); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp.
700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978); Rheuark
v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Such an increment would
be impossible under a cost-plus method, thus doubling the disincentive.

111

Because no firm bills on a cost-plus basis, it is impossible
to determine how much additional time would be required under
the cost-plus method, but it is apt tp be substantial, and a bur-·
den which falls not only upon the counsel, but the already overtaxed
courts as well. The onus of thi~ additional time is greatly exacerbated under AB 3172 by the fact that the bill precludes compensation
[Footnote Continued]
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- 10 or value of the legal work done.

1:1..1

ThuH a largt' finn, with high

overhead, sa.larics, and profit margins,

:il

it <'uuld

:;om<'how bl' per-

suaded to take on a public interest case despite the disincentives
spelled out above, would receive large fees in relation to others.
Sole practitioners and smaller firms often have smaller overhead
and profit margins, so that fees awarded them, regardless of their
24/
A sole
expertise and the value of their work, would be smaller.
practitioner or small-firm practitioner can rarely afford to undertake public interest litigation, which is often against public bodies with substantial economic resources and personnel, Hhen to do
so would reduce the amount of time available for cases which are
less complex, and compensated at a much greater rate and with more
certainty.

Even a Criminal Justice Act appointment is apt to result

[Footnote Continued]
for time spent seeking and computing fee1->.

_:'>l'_{C

I'·

2P.,

;!._~L!_":·

23/

The irrationality of permitting this type of distinction to affect fee computation is perhaps best illustrat<'d .in thP case
where a defendant ·urged a reduction in private counsel's rates because the case could have been handled for less by a salaried, £.!:.£
bono attorney. Levin v. Parkhouse, 484 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

1:.!!.1

Only one federal cou rl has been pn'sented an argument that a
substantial fee to a sole practitioner in a case under the
1976 Act should be reduced because plaintiff 1 s counsel's low overhead would not justify such a large fee. The court disagreed, stating: "The central focus of a reasonable hourly rate is the attorney's legal reputation and status as well as the quality of his
work in the case." Foster v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 465 F. Supp. 293, 299 (D.N.J. 1978). All other defense attempts to adopt cost-plus computation in cases under the 1976 Act
have been in lawsuits where plaintiffs were represented by privately or publicly funded legal organizations.
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in larger hourly rates to a sole practitioner than a cost-plus fee
in a public interest case, and the CJA fee is guaranteed, win, lose
or draw.
Adoption of the cost-plus method of computation would have
]21
Many
the most deleterious effect on public interest legal groups.
defendants have argued that fee awards to salaried employees of publie interest groups, either privately or publicly funded, should
26/
be based upon the salaries paid those lawyers.

All courts but one
2:1_1
have rejected that argument under the 1976 Act,
for a variety of
28/
reasons.

]2/

AD 3172 calls for fees based upon cost, plus, "where appropriate," a reasonable profit. Because most public interest
litigating organizations are nonprofit, it is unlikely that a court
would consider a profit "appropriate." The cost-plus fee to a salaried employee of a public interest group would therefore be based
upon salary alan<:' -- and a salary which is often significantly below that paid private attorneys. See note 30, and accompanying
text, infra; Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 447
F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa 1977)(cost-plus fees of less than $6.00
per hour to salaried ACLU staffer).
26/

See note 15,

2:1_/

See,~·..&·,

supra.

Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla.
1978); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 {N.D. Ill. 1979);
Hid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D.R.I.
1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980); Becker v. Blum, 487
F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Urbina v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ill.
1930); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 4!36 F. Supp. 1195
(N.D. Ga. 1980).
28/

Some of these reasons are spelled out at pp. 46-52, infra.
Host of ther.J. turn on the fact that a fee award to a public interest group promotes the public interest just as an award to a
private counsel does.
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"By comparing, for purposes of discussing the amount
of fees, civil rights cases to other 'complex federal liUgation, such as antitrust cases, 1 Congress .implicitly placed a value on the services performed by attorneys in civil rights cases .1nd instructed us to credit that value.2/ Moreover, Congress enacted § 1988 to reduce civil rights plaintiffs'
litigation costs, and litigation costs would be measured in terms of the value of the services to the
plaintiff and the cost of those services in the marketplace.
"There is no basis for concluding that the value of services provided by [the Legal Services Corporation] is less than that of services that private
attorneys provide. . . • Because the value to the
client and to societal interests is substantial, we
cannot hold that (Legal Services] attorneys' time is
less va luahlc· than the time of at turneys in private
practice. Thus to recognize ~his equivalent value,
we should award plaintiffs' counsel the market rate."

5/

It is significant that the quoted statement
from the Senate Report is the only reference in
the legislative history to the amount of fees." 31/

The County of Los Angeles argues that public interest fee
awards computed according to the traditional approach have been too
large -- "far in excess of fees that the attorneys might expect to
32/
earn in other litigation,"- and "unreasonable, unwarranted and

t~uern,

2:!:_/

Custom v.

]1/

Backgr_~!EA

482 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980).

and Analysis, at 6. This is hardly true. 1Jhile the
legislative l1Jstory of the 1976 Act specifies that public interest fees and antitrust fees should be comparable, Senate Report at 6,
average rates in antitrust cases are four and a half times larger
than average rates in public interest cases. Palmigiano v. Garrahy,
466 F. Supp. 732, 738 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.
1980). Only seven of the more-than 80 reported cases under the
1976 Act for which. hou!"ly rates e.ra P.scertainable during the Act's
first tLree ye.nrs resultt>d in fPel'l ~)f $100 or more per hour. Dy
[Footnote Continued]
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ifornia and the United States, by passing public interest fee provisions, have attempted to place human rights and commercial rights
on the same footing.

AB 3172 attempts to devalue human rights, by

devaluing the efforts of attorneys to promote them.

•

The current system relies upon the equitable discretion of
the judiciary, which, even according to the examples cited by the
]]_/
Defendants
County of Los Angeles, has been exercised with care.
are entHlod to offer proof of lower r:tU•!; than those claimed; to
challenge as unreasonable or duplicatiV(' any number of hours claimcd; and to att:vmpt
ways.

Lo

reduce awardable fees in a variety of other

A judge is aware of local rates of compensation, and, hav-

ing presided over trial or settlement, is aware of the nature of
the controversy, the benefits produced, and the quality of the representation.

He or she is in a much better position to judge the

value of an attorney's efforts than is either the attorney seeking
the fcc or the party oppo::;ing the fee.

Thl! flexibility vested in

the judge enables him or her to suit the fee to the particular case
with a view toward fairness and effectuating the purposes of the
fee provision; the result is a far more equitable one than would
occur under an inflexible mathematical formula.

]2/

In each of the three cases cited by the County as having 'resulted in excessive fees, Background and Analysis, at 7-8, the
amounts granted were far less than those sought: in one of the
cases, the amount awarded was one-fif.th the amount sought, and in
the others it was less thnn half of the request. It is unlikely
that counsel rec~iving these awards were totally satisfied with them
either.
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versally rejected this notion for cases under the 1976 Act,
have held

tl~t

and

where a statute authorizes an attorney's fee to a

prevailing party, to be paid by an opposing party, time spent on
the fee issue should be compensated because the statutory fee itself is, like an injunction, "an integral part of the remedies nec41/
essary .to obtain • • • compliance [with the law]."The allowance of a public interest fee promotes public interest litigation,
42/
and therefore the fee itself benefits the public.
Hany courts which have awarded fees for time spent pursuing fees in public interest litigation have also noted that a dis-

~/

See, ~·£·• Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978); Gagne
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4891
(1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979); Bills v. Hodges,
F.2d
(4th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools,
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.H. 3803 (1980);
Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978);
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd,
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547
(1978); Love v. Hayor, City of Cheyenne, 620 F,2d 235 {lOth Cir.
1980). While a few early cases disallowed fees for time spent purStJing a 1976 Act fee, in each instance the particulnr circuit court
has since rejected these holdings by ruling that time spent on fees
should be compensated.
41/

Senate Report, at 5.

42/

!·K·•

Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979); Gagne v.
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.lv. 4891
(1980); Jo~1son v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979);
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979); ~1cPherson v.
School District No. 186, Springfield, Illinois, 465 F. Supp. 749
(S.D. Ill. 1978); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla.
1978); Mental Patients Civil Libertief Project v. Hospital Staff
Civil Rights Committee, 444 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Smith v.
Fussenich, 487 P. Supp. 628 (D. Conn. '1980) (three-judge court).
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- 19 46/
l'<'lvl'r

to re>fuse such an :1pportion:ment in the interests of justice,

a provision perr.litting the apportionment of fees between opposing
parties reflects a raisunderstandinb of the concept of "successful"
!:!]_/
or "prevailing" party.
As one court has explained:
"The qnt'Ht ion as to whether plaintiffs have prevailed is a preliminary determination, necessary before the statute comes into play at all. Once .that
issue is determined in the plaintiffs' favor, they
are entitled to recover fees for 'all time reasonably spent on a matter. 1 The fact that some of that
time was spent in pursuing issues on [sic] research
which w:~s ultimately unproductive, rejected by the
court, or mooted by intervening events is wholly irrelevant. So long as the party has prevailed on
the case as a whole the district courts are to allow compensation for hours expended on unsuccessful
research or litigation, unless the positions asserted are frivolous or in bad faith. 11 L•BI

•

A party must "prevail" or "succeed" in litigation before he is entitled to any fees at all.

An apportionment approach would result

in an award of partial fees to an unsuccessful party, which is a
result not contemplated by either Section 1021.5 or the 1976 Act.

See, !:.·£·, Swicker v. i.Jilliam Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F.
Supp. 7o2 (E.D. Pa. 1980), where the court held co-defenchmts
jointly :md Rl'Vl'r;JUy liable for fees, refusing to apportion them
because apportionment might result in a reduction of allowable fees.

46/

!i!_/

Sect ion 1021.5 allows fees to a "successful" party; the 1976
Act allows fees to a "prevailing" party. The two terms a""e
synonymous. See note 92, infra.
48/

Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Nemphis City Schools, 611 F.
2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803
(1980). Accord, !:.·£·• Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978);
Greminger v. Seaborne, 581; F.2d 275 (.8th Cir. 1978).
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of this
s fees not

- 21 compliance, but promotes the settlement of controversies at the conference table or in thf' .q<Jninistrative office rather thnn the courts. No similar
points, l t is thought, can be made for imposing on
an unsuccessful plaintiff the costs of the Jefendant's
lawyer. The defendant's vindicntion in a larger
sense serves the interests of justice, but no more
so than the successful defense of any suit. Ther.efore, the public is not more interested in aiding him
than any other successful defendant. Horeover, to
allow him to recover his out-of-pocket expenses
would deter suits by the plaintiffs who • • • are assumed, often correctly, to be necessitous persons requiring the protective hand of the legislature." 50/

I

In following this reasoning, most federal attorneys' fee provisions

51/
have not permitted defendants to recover attorneys' fees at all.-Under the modern public interest attorneys' fee provisions, Congress has penni.ttcd defendants to recover attorneys' fees, but only
if a plaintiff has brought a suit which is "frivolous, unreasonable,

or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad

Hutchinson v. Hilliam c. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D.
1943)(discussing the Fair Labor Standards Act fee provision). See also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 43lf U.S. 412,
418-19 (1978):
50/

~lass.

"[T]he plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.' • • • [~]hen a • • •
court awards counsel .fees to a prevailing plaintiff,
it is awarding them against a violator of federal
law. [Thus] 'policy considerations which support
the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not
present in the case of a prevailing defendant.'" (Citation omitted).

211

Congress, in 1976, noted that two-thirds of the fifty fee provisions which then existed allo~ed fees to plaintiffs only.
House Report, at 6.
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. v. EEOC,
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390
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, and cases cited therein; Sencited therein; Chr~stiansburg
7
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55/

ilt in to the Callwho nccppts a frivofurv noc be paiJ.

Of

lous case is

1

- 23 56/
only to a private attorney general.
If the apportionment approach is understood to incorporate
the prerequisites to an award of fees which Section 1021.5 already
contains -- that is, if partial fees are allowed defendants only
where their success on an issue enforces a public right and benefits a large class, and only where fees are appropriate in view of
the expense and necessity of private enforcement -- then its greatest harmful impact might be prevented.
be extremely rare, and they do not

se~1

But such situations will
to be what the amendment

is aimed at.
The County of Los Angeles argues that apportionment between

opposing parties is historical in types of litigation other than
public interest cases, and cites several federal cases and California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032(c) in support of an ap-

2!_/
portionment approach.

None of the federal cases cited supports
58/
an apportionment of attorneys' fees, however,
and Section 1032(c)

56/

This is the course that the Department of Justice would have
preferred Congress to take in the 1976 Act. House Report, at
6. Congress, however, felt that judicial standards developed in
the federal courts would significantly lessen any deterrence of potential plaintiffs, by providing fees to defendants on1y in rare

ciJ·cumsLJnccs.

2ZI

Id.

Background and

Ana~sis,

at 9-10.

58/

The one case which the County cites as approving apportionment
of attorneys' fees, Sweeny v. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State
College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1977),, involved not an apportionment of fees, but the reduction of a fee to reflect partial success.
See pp. 42-46, infra, for a discussion of this issue. The County
[Footnote Continued]
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62/
awarded fees, but denied costs, in cases under the 1976 Act.
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- 25 unlike a costs provision, must be liberally construed to further
63/
its substantive purpose.

An award of costs, while sometimes denied a prevailing litigant for reasons of equity, is very rarely apportioned. An appor64/
tionment of fees, on the other hand, is unheard of.
The apportionment of fees is illogical, impracticaJ, time-consuming and
tqtally unprecedented in public interest litigation, or litigation of any sort.

III.

AUALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

All 3172 contains several procedural provisions, most of
which are both unnecessary and of a minor natu:r:e and importance,:
except insofar as they are made major by other features of AB 3172.
A.

Provision Requiring 60 Days' Notice

In federal cases, the courts generally allow plaintiff
from 15 to 20 days to file a fee petition and accompanying docu65/
mentation, and defendants from 10 to 15 days to respond.
This

fill

!·£·,Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1980).

64/

There have been a few cases under the 1976 Act where a party
has prevailed against only one of two or more defendants, and
the successful defendant or defendants have sought fees. In none
of these cases has a defendant both been taxed and awarded fees.
_S_e_e., e..g., Hughes v. Repko. 429 F. Supp. Q28 (W.n. Pa. 1977), aff'~
ln part, rev'd it_~£trl & r,~manded, 578 F.::d L18} (3d Cir. 1978).
65/

See,~·£·,

Parks v. Goff, 483 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Ark. 1980);
Commonwealth of PennsylVania v. Porter, 480 F. Supp. 691 (W.
D. Pa. 1979).

-105-

- 26 procedur~

often gives the defendant more than 60 days before a de-

cision on the fee application, because the defendant's initial response to the fee application need not be the final response.

The

time for filing the response can be, and often is, extended, and
where there are material facts in dispute, discovery is allowed,
and an evidentiary hearing may be required.

A 60-day requirement

is not necessary in order to allow an informed opposition to a fee
petition.
Provision Requiring Adequate Tir1e Records

B.

The acceptability of this fea.turc depends largely on the
definition of "adequate," which is not given in the bill.

Because

courts require adequate time records now, this provision is not
necessary.

Furthermore, the provision of i\B 3172 which permits

apportionment of fees between opposing sides might be read to require maintenance of extremely detailed time records, yet an attorney in a public interest case ought not be required to maintain
time records in any more dC'tilil than an

;11

tornvy i1. ,• •·ommvrcLil.

66/

or any more deta Ll than the salar led government attorney
67/
on the opposite side.

case,

66

See note 115, infra.

~/

Because the time spent by defense counsel is pertinent and discoverable by a fee petitioner, see note 63, infra, defense
counsel, whether private or in-house,,would he required to keep
time records in the same detail as would the pet.itioner.

-106-

- 27 C.

Provision Requiring Findings on All Haterial Issues of
Fact
This provision is unobjectionable, except insofar as it

lengthens fee proceedings for which, pursuant to AB 3172, plaintiffs' counsel would not be, and defense counsel would be, paid •

•
Discovery is already regularly allowed where there are rnaterial facts in dispute, so that this provision is unnecessary.
The discovery current

allowed is generally not overly burdensome,

because discovery is limited to relevant lssues, and is thus permitted on customary hourly rates and time spent, and allowed, but
68/
Should the cost-plus
rarely taken, on the other Johnson factors.
system of computation required by AB 3172 be adopted, however, discovery could become unduly burdensome and oppressive, requiring a

68/

It should be noted that federal courts have frequently used
the amount paid defense counsel to help determine the "customary fee for similar work in the community," 488 F.2d 71Lf, 718 (5th
Cir. 197L;), one of the Johnson factors. See,~·..&·, HcPherson v.
School Dist. No. 186, Springfield, Ill., 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill.
1978). For this reason, the courts have permitted a fee applicant
to take discovery of defense counsel on such information as the number of hours spent, the rate charged or deemed appropriate, the total fee, and, in the case of governmental bodies, what rate they pay
when they hire outside counsel, and the expenses incurred by the
body and its staff in supporting the work of such private counsel.
See, ~·£·• Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 662
(l.J.D.N.C. 1978), vacated on other grounds, __ F.2d _ _ (4th Cir.
1930). The County of Los Angeles should be aware that ,1 provision
subjecting fee applications to discovery is a two-way street, which
might rcquirC:' it ttl produce certain ihfotlil<tli.nn it would r;1Lhvr keep
confidential. St>e Appendix A.
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~·

detailed account

of a firm's entire operation, and making argu-

ably "relevant" much

information.

In addition, discov-

ery under a cost-plus system would make fee proceedings extremely
lengthy and complex.

1\ec::mse AB 3172 provides that prevailing

parties' counsel could not recover fees for time spent pursuing
fees, any provision which lengthens or complicates the fee proceedings has an adverse impact upon plaintiffs' attorneys.
not have such an adverse

It does

t upon defendants' counsel, however,

as they are paid for time spent opposing fee petitions, including
time spent on

This fact could lead to abusive discov-

ery, the prevention of which, "through protective orders and ob-

69/
jections,"- would not be compensated either.

IV

IS
.i\B

OF PROPOSED

3172 attemp

substitute for the

<l~tors

tradit:ion-

0

ion

applicable in fee

the following:

"[I]n determining the app
of the award or its size, [the court] shall consider the
good faith and cooperation of the party
t
whom it is awarded the relief granted, the degree of success of the respective parties, the
extent to which attorneys' fees can be paid from
the recovery, if any, the public or private funding of the person or organization to whom fees
are awarded, and whether the award will ultimately
be
by pub lie funds."
~/

Backbround and Analysis, at 5.

2Q/

See note 12,

211

AB 3172, lines 26-34.

for a list of the traditional factors.

-108-

- 29 Host of these proposed factors have been considered and found inapplicable under the 1976 Act.

Those which have been applied have

generally been found pertinent only to conputation of fees, and
not to appropriateness.

In combining appropriateness and computa-

tion, AB 3172 misapplies even those factors which might otherwise

]J:_/
be proper.
A.

Proviston Requiring A Court to Consider the Good Faith and
Cooperation of the Party Against Whom a Fee is Awarded
(1) Entitlement

The good faith of the party against whom a fee is to be
awarded has never been considered relevant in establishing entitlenent to attorneys' fees.

721

Ill

The Ninth Circuit is alone in permit-

The rclcv;mcc of these factors to computation is also diminished \vhcn fee awards are based on cost, rather than value.

fll

The first public interest attorneys' fee case to reach the
Supreme Court was Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400 (1968), in which the Court found that fees should be
awarded absent "special circumstances," and that defendants' good
faith did not constitute a "special circumstance" meriting the denial of fees. The Court has consistently reiterated this holding.
Its most recent holding on this topic was in Supreme Court of Virg1nl.a v. Consumers Union, l18 U.S.L.\-1. 4620 (1980). There, a threejudge court had denied fees against the State Bar of Virginia because that body had no power to alter its disciplinary rules, but
. had urged those who did h:we' that power to act. The Supreme Court
stated:
"\.Je nt:'' twl convi11ced that it would be unfair to
award fees against the State B~r, which by statute is designated as an administrative a)',L'ncy to
help enforce the State Bar Co,de. Fee <1w;1rds ngainst enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill
occurrences, even though, on occasion, had a state

[Footnote Continued]
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seek judicial relief . •

"-

The plaintiff who, for example,

forces the Los Angeles County schools to desegregate, has accomplished through suit what Los Angeles County should itself have ac-

complished.

Such a plaintiff is an agent of the public, in much

the same way as the members and officials of the Los Angeles County

I

School Board are agents of the public, and attorneys' fee provisions
give hira the tools, at public expense, which the County Board already enjoys at public expense.
This being the case, fees are permissible, even in rapidly
changing areas of the law, where defendants find i t difficult
"to know what is required of them, making it difficult to avoid such litigation and awards of fees
:1gainst thct,t, even though they make good f:lith and
diligent efforts to try and stay current on the
law and do all the law requires of them."]_]_/
In fact, fees :1re often deemed more, not less, necessary in such
cases:
"If the law is unsettled, the need for court action to clarify the law and to protect the interests of the plaintiff may be greater, not less,
than when the rights and duties of the parties
are clear. The purpose of the Act is to ensure
the enforcement of plaintiffs' rights, not to punish recalcitrant defendants. This purpose is served if fees are awarded to successful litigants in
litigation which defines or redefines the law." J.!./

12_/

390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Accord t-:ndeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d
275, 280 (lst Cir. 1978): "The key issue is the provocative role
of the plaintiff's lawsuit, not the motivations of the defendant."

ZZI

Background and Analysis, at 2.

]J}_/

ACORN v. Arkausas State Board of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254,
[Footnote Continued]
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Congressional instructions, have ruled that

where it can be shown

that a lawsuit was a form of catalyst, for

defencant officials
81/
to act in a lawful manner, fees are required.
This consistent

holding is simply another reflection of the fact that fees are not

•

punitive, but a means of enforcing the law •
Such attorneys' fee awards certainly do not, however, instruct defendant officials that good faith and cooperation gain them
nothing.

A defendant official's compliance with the law as soon as

it is made clear does reduce, often substantially, the number of
hours spent by pl;lintiffs' counsel, and therefore the ;.:mounl of the
82/
fee to be assessed.
By the same token, should defendant officials
behave as Los Angeles County suggests they might, and litigate ev83/
ery issue in order to avoid a fee assessment,
their bad faith
81/

See,~·~·,

~/

ACORN v. Arkansas State Bd. of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254
(E.D. Ark. 1979)(three-judge court).

83/

Background and

robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1980);
Criterion Club of Albany v. Bd. of Commissioners of Dougherty
County, 594 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1979); Nadeau v. IIelgemoe, 581 F.2d
275 (1st Cir. 1978); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 48 U.S.L.H. 4891 (1980); Ross v. Horn, 594 F.2d 1312 (3d
Cir. 1979); International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Anderson, 569 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1978); Westfall v. Bd. of Cornr:lissioners of Clayton
, 477 F.
. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Lackey
v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1979); H.C.I. Concord Advisory Board v. Jlall, 457 F. Supp. 911 (D. Nass. 1978); NMCP v.
Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other gounds sub.
nom. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (1980); Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp.
809 (D. Hinn. 1977).

Ana.Iy_5>_~~.

at 11. ,
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to officials only in their individual capacities; there is no good

!}]_/
faith immunity for officials in their official capacities.

Thus

attorneys' fees, which are generally awarded against an official

•

acting in his official capacity, are comparable to damages:

an

of~

ficial cannot avoid either in his official capacity on the basis
of good faith.

Attorneys' fees pursuant to the 1976 Act are asses-

sed against officials in their individual capacities only where
88/
\~here an official exhibthe official has exhibited bad faith.
its bad faith adequate to subject

hL~

to attorneys' fees in his

individual capad ty, he is likewise str i ppcd of good faith immunity, and is liable for damages in his individual capacity.
(2) Computation

ed

irrelev~at.

~tLorneys'

1

fees, it is

§2_/
generally not considered one of the factors in computing fees.
§II

Owen v. City of Independence, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980).

88/

Senate Report, at 5, n.7.

!}11

The Lawyers' Committee has found but one. case which might remotely support the idea that good faith on the part of defendants might affect plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates under the 1976
Act. In Criterion Club of Albany v. Commissioners Court of Dougherty County, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit stated
that the fact a suit was mooted by defendants' actions shortly after it had been instituted had relevance only as to the amounts to
be awarded, not as to plaintiffs' entitlement. Without further
clarification, this statement tends tp support the good faith/fewer hours argument more than an argument that defendants' good faith
should reduce plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rate, particularly in
view of other Fifth Clrcu:lt opinions. See, ~·.&· • Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 271, (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Hississippi, 606 F.2d
635 (5th Cir. 1979).
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37 results in "the enforcement of

him as a
an important
"con£ erred on the

the public interest"; and which has
or a large class of persons" a

"significant benefit, '"'hether pecuniary or nonpecuniary. 11

•

Addi-

tionally, if a

monetary recovery is part of the relief grant93/
ed, the court must determine that, "in the interest of justice,"the fee should not be taken from the recovery rather than from

the current wordin~ of Section
"prevailing" party. So long as
indicates an adoption of the fedit is understood that
standard such a change is unobjectionable.
eral "prevailing
However, great care must be taken les·t the change in statutory
a more stringent standard. Under curlanguage be taken to
and "successful" are interchangeable
rent case law,
terms.

21.1

Similarly, AB 3172 inserts the word "reasonable" to qualify
the type of fee to be allowed. This merely conforms the California
provision to the
of similar federal provisions, and is
thus unobjectionable so long as care is taken to point out that
the change is not intended to imply more stringent standards of
reasonableness.

221 Section 1021.5, as

written, permits the denial of
fees altogether where fees should, "in the interest of justice
be paid out of the recovery i f any." The 1976 Act permits no such
denial:
"Of course, it should be noted that the mere recovery of
should not preclude the awarding
of counsel fees. Under the antitrust laws, for example, a plaintiff may recover treble damages and
still the court is required to award attorney fees.
The same principle should apply here as civil rights
plaintiffs should not be singled out for different
and less favorable treatment." House Report, at 8-9.

AB 3172 changes this component of 1021.5 by deleting the phrase "in
the interest of justice," and by requiring a court to consider "the
extent to which" fees
be paid out of a recovery. By removing
[Footnote Continued]
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21_/
not a significant, but an inconsequential, benefit;

or the suit

was private in nature, and may have resulted in an award of damages adequate to pay counsel.

~/

These four reasons are the only

relevant ones, and the California fee provision already requires

•

an examination of them before a decision on entitlement.

The "re-

lief granted" factor is thus redundant on questions of entitlement.
(2) Computation
This is not to say, however, that the relief granted is irrelevant in the computation of attorneys' fees.
is one of the twelve factors mentionecl in

"Results obtained"

~CJ_hns(m

v. Georgia High-

99/

way Express 2 supra,

and is therefore one of the computation fac-

tors approved by Congress under the 1976 Act.

The vagueness of this

factor makes it of little use, however, except where the results of
a lawsuit are either remarkably good or remarkably bad.

Hhere a

plaintiff has received results adequate to establish him as a "prevailing party," most courts have simply listed one or two benefits
of the litigation, and treated the factor as essentially neutral.

22.1

See, e.g., Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.
D.N.Y. 1977); Huntley v. Community School Board of Brooklyn,
New York, District No. 14, 579 F.2d 733 (2cl Cir. 1978).
98/

~. ~·.8..·•

99/

See note 12, supra.

Zarcone v. Perry, 433 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978); Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13 (7th
Cir. 1979); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1979); Fox v. Parker, _ _ F.2d _ _ (4th Cir. 1980); International
Oceanic Enterprises, Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980).
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- 41 103/
awarded fees which exceeded the damages a.varded.
Where damages are not sought, Congress has instructed that
fees "not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuni104/
ary in nature."-The federal courts have by and large complied.
In those cases which do not result in a pecuniary recovery, the
"relief granted" factor, when considered at all, has generally re105/
sulted in an upward, rather than a downward, fee adjustment.
Again, those few federal courts which have reduced a fee
award to account for the nature of the relief granted have done so
.for reasons which, pursuant to California Code Section 1021.5, must
be decided in plaintiff's favor before a fee in any amount can be
106/
awarded.
This being the case, the inclusion of a "relief granted" computation factor is unobjectionable, and, in fact, desirable:
it will increase the anounts awarded successful private attorneys
general under Section 1021.5, and further the purposes of the provision.

See, ~·£·• Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1977); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 455 F. Supp.
676 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1979); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp •. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978); Peeler v. Longv'iew Ind. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Phillips
v. •~ore, 441 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.c. 1977); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F.
Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
103/

104/

Senate Report, at 6.

105/

See,~·~··

106/

Courts have reduced fee allowances to reflect the fact that suit

Atcherson v. Seibenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa
1978); Imprisoned Citizens Unio~ v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp. 1017
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Vecchione v. \lohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776 (E.n. Pa.
1979).

-121-

[Footnote Continued]

..

- 42

c.

to Consider the Extent to

The

s success is irrelevant in cletermin-

ing the

of

"prevailing par
poses of Sect
public

f

102L

fee, so

as the plaintiff is a

es of the 197
addit

an

and conferred substant

The question
ed or

that

pass

ortant

its.

a

arises

less than

on issues which were

and, for pur-

who has succeed-

is entitled to fees for time spent

unsuccessful

vJh:Ue i t is obvious

1976 Act

compensate pre-

[Footnote Cont
resulted in benefits
Swicker v. William
Pa. 1980); McManama
aff'd, 616 F.2d 727
and resulted in
Bishop, 84 F. R.
result in vindicat
ter v. Gloucester
293 (D.N .J

tial

(~·£·,

1978

Furt
419 {E.D. Pa.

small,
uncertain, class (~·£·•
Sons, Inc.,
. 762 (E. D.
46

.D. Va. 1978),

was
Furtado v.
did not
(~·.&·, FosChosen Freeholders, 465 F. Supp.
benef
achieved was inconsequenMeisel . Kremens, 80 F.R.D.
text,

v.

Cir.

48

594 F.2d 336

u.s.

Nadeau
v. Maher,

...;;_;_...;__.::.;..;c;....::....:...

,

4891 (1980); Burt

v. Abel, 585

Unidas v. Briscoe,

619 F.2d 391

Ed. of the Mem48
• 1979);

Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163
County Water Dis
ct, 602 F.2d 894
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- 43 vailing parties for time spent on all nonfrivolous issues -- even
108/
the federal courts
those which were eventually unsuccessful
109/
Those courts which have denied
are split on this question.
fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims have done so largely
110/
but those which have allowed such fees have,
without explanation,
in addition to examining the 1976 Act 1 s legislative history, relied
on conttnonsense principles which make such a result not only logical, but almost mandatory.
First, both those courts which have disallowed fees for unsuccessful claims and those which have allowed them have recognized that separation of a unified lawsuit into successful claims and
108/

"In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties
should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys comnensated by a fee-naving client, 'for all time reasonau __ y

c:.-: ..:t .-.. ~.__. . ._,

.,.,_,__ .__

,..__..,,;'
__

..,_~--·--·

'

:Ja::..lv v. ?, )~: ~~~~~~~5
-197 4) , II Sendr.t-:

--«·----

).t~ .. ~-·

63G, ar 6G4
at 6.

In Davis, the court compensated time spent on unsuccessful claims because an attorney in a private case would have billed for that time.
In Stanford Dailv, the court allowed fees for time spent on an unsuccessful motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that "courts
should not require attorneys (often working in new or changing areas
of the law) to divine the exact parameters of the courts' willingness
to grant relief." 64 F.R.D 680, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
Compare, ..':.·£.·, Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City
Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.
1.\v. 3803 (1980), Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978),
and Barham v. Welch, 478 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Ark. 1979), with Nadeau
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) and Hughes v. Repko, 578
F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
109/

110/

See, e.g., Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Ross
v=--iiorn-; 598 F. 2d lJ12 (3d Cir. 1979); Familias Unidas v.
Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980)~
-123-

- 44 unsuccessful claims is difficult at best,

where, as

is most often the case, work on successful issues also contributes
to unsuccessful issues.

A percentage reduction has been found

inappropriate, because the same emount of time is not spent on all
113/
claims,
and all claims are not of equal
in the litiga114/
tion.
Furthermore,
do not generally
time records
which permit a division into successful and unsuccessful claims,
115/
nor should they be forced to.

An additional

with an

which denies fees

for time spent on unsuccessful claims is that it is an attorney's
See, ~·.&.·, Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hemphis City Schools,
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803
(1980); Brownv. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1195
.D. Ga. 1980); Gary vJ.
v. State of Louisiana, 429 F. Supp. 711
.D. La. 1977) aff'd, 622
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980
ler v. Gatter,
.--so2(E.D.
Pa. 1978); HcPherson v. School District No. 186, Spr
ield, Illinois. 465 F.
749
.D. Ill. 1978). See also Parker v. Hatthews,
1
411 F. Supp. 1049
.D.C. 1976).
d
nom. Parker v. Califano,
561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 19
,
v.
, 10 E.P.D. ~
10,499 (D.D.C.
(suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
111/

112/

All courts have found that time spent on unsuccessful issues
is compensable if it also contributes to successful issues.
See,~·.&·,
v.
, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Hardy v.
Porter, 613 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1980).
v.

114/
115/

~·&·•

, 578 F.2d 433

3d Cir. 1978).

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979).

party's athas mandated that a
torney should be compensated 'as is traditional with
client, for
attorneys compensated by a f
on a matter. 1 Ue know
all time reasonab
[Footnote Continued]

-124-

- 45 -

duty to challenge as many actions or procedures as have injured his
116/
The denial
client, and to seek the broadest relief possible.
of fees for unsuccessful claims prevents examination and clarifi117 I

cation of the law, and the pursuit of novel theories.

•

It

urges an attorney to bring the narrowest case imaginable •
The County of Los Angeles argues that all claims in a single
case could be raised individually, in separate suits, and gives this
118/
But courts
as a reason for denying fees on unsuccessful claims.
have always urged, and the rules often require, the joinder of as
many claims as possible arising from a single fact situation, to
[Footnote Continued]
of no 'traditional' method of billing whereby an
attorney offers a discount based upon his or her
failure to prevail on 'issues or parts of issues.'"
Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hemphis City
Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980).
-See also, ~·£·• Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F. Supp.
1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
116/

Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,,64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
436 U.S. 547 (1978); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City
Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (65th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3803 (1980); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co •• Inc., 486 F. Supp.
1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Busche v. Burkee, 483 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Wis. 1980).
117/

Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d
624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980).

118/

Background and Analysis, at 10. Defendants have, at other
tiues, also argued that two sep..arate suits should not result
in fees where all claims could have been disposed of in one action.
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
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- 47 121/
prior "private attorney general" fee cases

so specified.

No

court faced with this question pursuant to the 1976 Act has found
122/
The California Supreme Court'has, as Los Angeles
otherwise.
County itself notes, held that "the fact of public or foundational support should not have any relevance to the question of eligi123/
bility for an award."-(2) Computation
While sor.<e courts, including the California Supreme Court,

121/

"[A] prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees
even if represented by an org.anization or if the
party is itself an organization. Incarcerated
Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th
Cir. 1974); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976);
Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 59D (5th Cir. 1974)."
House Report, at 8, n.7.

122/

See,..'::.·£·, Pe::-E:z v.
Bou, 575 F.2d Zl (lst Cir. 1978);
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 63S (2d Cir. 1979); Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem.,
573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978); Bills v. Hodges,
F.2d
(4th
Cir. 1980); Northcross . Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools,
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980);
Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 122l; (7th Cir. 1980); Oldham v. Ehrlich,
617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th
Cir. 1980); Love v. Mayor, City of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235 (lOth Cir.
1980); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.\~. 3820 (1980).

123/

Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, at n.24 (1977), quoted in
Background and Analysis, at 12. Accord New York Gaslight
Club v. Carey, 48 U.S.L.W. 4645 (1980)(Supreme Court holding that
salaried employees of public interest groups are entitled to fees
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
124/

"While • • • the fact of public or foundational
support should not have any relevance to the question of eligibility for an award, we believe that
[Footnote Continued]
-127

have cons

a fee,

the great

ice

fact,

two

In

1976 Act have re-

sulted in reduced

counsels' public fund-

and

funded

public interest

source of plain-

tiffs' couneels'

the amount to

be awarded

(hold-

from defend1980); Beckrcy, '•81

v.
Supp. 942
Neill,
(3d Cir.

57 3 F. 2d 130 1
. D. Ill. 1980);

Donaldson

78); Johnson

v.

Continued]

2

- 49 -

Defendants in most of these cases have sought, like the
County of Los Angeles,
"a recosnition that the public has already taken
steps to fund and encourage the particular organization to bring lit
ion of the type the fee
award is sought in. In such cases, the purposes
of the act have already been accomplished." 127/
Where representation is offered by

funded public interest

groups, however, the public's "steps" to assure representation are
tax advantages shared by public defendants and, to a certain degree,
commercial defendants.

Even a group which operates wholly or largely

[yootnote Continued]
476 F. Supp. 1111 {N.D. Ill. 1979); Meisel v. Kremens, 80 F.R.D. 419
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 465
F. Supp. 261 (S.D.tl.Y. 1978); Mdlanama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38
(W.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 616 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1980); Sharrock v.
Harris, 489 F. Supp-:-913 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Urbina v. Quern, 482 F.
C:upp. '0"3 ~~'.n T11. lCfRO)~ Vanguard Jl!st cc Society, Inc. v.
Hughes, 41.~.. L' • ..:,c.,,

____ __

c:;.ted
......_
approval in the
the Southern District of
s
counsel because an award would "be
channeled into the coffers of the Ford Foundation which enjoys its own reward at public
expense by its tax exemption status. 11 Civ. A. No. 2205 (S.D. Miss.
Feb. 20, 1973). The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating:

127/

"This Court has indicated on several occasions that
allowable fees and expenses may not be reduced because appellants' attorney was employed or funded
by a civil rights organization and/or tax exempt
foundation or because the attorney does not exact a
fee. • • •
"Whether the attorney charges a fee or has an agreement that the organization that employs him will
receive any awarded attorneys' fees are not bases on
which to deny or limit attorneys' fees or expenses."
493 F.2d 598, 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1974).

-129-
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Of the three cases

to support awarding
Footnote Continued]

13

- 51on the same basis as an award to a private counsel.

The courts

have also noted that a system which reduced fees to employees of

[Footnote Continued)

•

fees to privately and publicly funded organizational counsel, ~
note 121, supra, only one, Incarcerated Nen of Allen County v. Fair,
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 19711), dealt with entitlement alone. Another, Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974), ~note
127, supra, dealt with both entitlement and computation. The third,
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976), dealt with computation
alone. In Torres, the district court awarded salari2d public interest counsel fees of $75 and $50 per hour, which it found to be the
"going rate" in Hew York at the time for counsel with similar experience. The defendants appealed, contesting not the award to a
publicly funded group, but the amount awarded, urging the court to
reduce the amounts to reflect public support of plaintiffs' counsel. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the a1nounts, stating:
"Application of the provision to furnish full
recompense for the value of services in successful litigation helps assure the continued availability of the services to those most in need of
assistance in translating the promise of the
[Voting Rights) Act into actually functioning
voting rights •.••• " 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.
1976)(emphasis added).
In none of the three cases cited by Congress was 'the fee to a salaried attorney reduced, and Congress' reliance on Torres, which dealt
not with entitlement at all, but with computation alone, indicates a
a Congressional desire that fees to salaried public interest counsel
be computed on the same basis as fees to private counsel.
131/

~. ~·...S·,

Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.
2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568
(1979); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978);
Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Palmigiano
v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir. 1930); Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Lund v. Affleck, 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d
75 (1st Cir. 1978); Meisel v. Kremens, 80 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Unemployed Workers Organizing Committee v. Batterton, 477 F. Supp.
509 (D. Md. 1979); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 19fl0);
Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980).
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public interest groups
tlement negotiations
of escaping a full assessment of fees

upon the identity

of plaintiffs' counsel.
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law enforce-

cJLtrces available ior public intvrest liti-

the full consequences of the violation.

No rational reason justi-

fies such a result.

E.

This is another factor which
questions of entitlement.

not considered relevant to

Should the fact that the taxpayers would

ult.imatcly pay a fcc preclude the assessment, Section 1021.5 certinaly would not have been written to permit an assessment against

v.
133/

, 468 F.

• 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979).

v. Affleck 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I. 1977),
5
Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy,
. . I.
, aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.

466 F.
, 611 F. 2d
1980); Dennis v.
Ehrlich, 617 .2d 163
Cir.

130~

-132-

(9th Cir.

; Oldham v.

- 53 public entities, nor would the 1976 Act have included 42 U.S.C. §
134/

1983 within the statutes covered.
In fact, when public entities are the defendants in publie interest litigation, it is more, not less, vital that fees be
granted.

First, when litigation is against a public entity, most

often the only "public" counsel who could bring suit to remedy the
situation is representing the defendant, so that in these cases
135/
"only private citizens can be expected to 'guard the guardians."'--

Second, "the ability of a private individual to enforce the civil
136/
rights statutes is impaired by the opposing resources of the State,,--

or of any public entity.

Even if defendant governmental units are

impoverished or underfunded, the plaintiff is moreso, and less
137/
Congress was well aware of this
able to pursue litigation.

Although the 1976 Act permits fees in suits against private
parties as well, more than 92 percent of the reported fees
have been assessed against governmental bodies.
134/

135/

La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 9ll (N.D. Cnl. 1972).

136/

Johnson v. Summer, MH3 F. Supp. 83, Bl (N.ll. Hiss. 1980).
"
[T]he private citizen's inability to vindicate his rights adequately calls for a broad exercise of this court's • • • powers in effectuating
the purposes of § 1988. This is particularly true
where, as in this action, the individual is faced
with opposition from a State, with the entire resources of the State government supporting the litigation." ld.
"As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress intended defendant state governmental bo(lies, rather
than prevailing parties, to bear the burden of civil rights litigation, even when budgets are small.
If indeed the defendants have modest means, they
[Footnote Continued]
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- 55 of a defendant to reduce a fee award below that wh.i ch would provide an incentive to bring public interest lawsuits, lest the pur141/
pose of the 1976 Act be frustrated.
Public interest attorneys' fees are, after all, awarded to
those who have managed to see that the law is properly enforced.
The result ·of the litigation is of benefit to the taxpayer, and
thus it is the taxpayer who pays.

If the cost of public interest

litigation must be reduced, there would be greater equity in lowering the salaries of those found guilty of violating the law than
in reducing the fees paid those who have proved the violations, as
the taxpayer pays both amounts.

lllhile the taxpayers themselves

have not been found guilty of violating the law when a public in.terest fee is assessed, those whose salad es they pay have been.
It ill behooves the County of Los Angelcr;, which paid

$1,023,292.50 of the taxpayers' money to outside counsel in

an

at-

tempt to avoid desegregating its schools, and $167,067.00 to those
.
142/
attorneys who successfully sued to integrate those schools,
to
argue that public interest attorneys are bilking the public.

See, !:.·.8.·• Sharrock v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); McPherson v. School District No. 136, Springfield,
Illinois, 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Sargeant v. Sharp,
579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978); Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d 251
(lOth Cir. 1980); Custom v. Quern, L182 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill.
1980).

141/

142/

See Appendix A.
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- 57 and the effectiveness of those

While the desire of the

County of Los Angeles to reduce the amount of money it must spend
in litigation is understandable, that desire should in no way be
permitted to result in legislation cutt

back on the promise of

California Civil Code Section 1021.5 -- the enforcement of important human rights.
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EXHIBIT F

ic Interest

ature in
Jl.ugust

8,

, to

s

award

success

The purpose

it f

amend

for
C.C.P.
the

the

and

sent
does
courts

awards,
same well-

established procedures used in making attorneys'

fee awards

pursuant to other statutes and equitable doctrines.

The

method now universally used by all federal courts and the
California Supreme Court, and expressly endorsed and approved
by Congress, is the "weighted hourly computation," or "lodestar"
method.

Under this approach, a court computes a reasonable

attorneys' fee, first, by multiplying the number of hours
worked by a reasonable hourly rate based on the going rate
for similar services in that area to reach a "lodestar"
amount.

Second, the court may either increase or decrease

the "lodestar," depending on the presence of a number of
additional pertinent factors such as the quality of attorneys'
work and results obtained and the contingencies of success.
All of this is designed to obtain a figure as the reasonable
fee which approximates the reasonable market value of the
legal services provided in successfully litigating the case.
AB 3172 would replace this system of fee computation
with a system focusing on tre costs of providing the legal
services, rather than on the value of the services.

This

system would require that attorneys' fee awards under C.C.P.
§ 1021.5 "be based upon the reasonable cost of providing the

legal services, including, where appropriate, a reasonable
and controllable margin for profit."

Such a costs-based

system has not been adopted by any federal or state court,
has been rejected by virtually every state and federal court
considering the matter, and has recently been resoundingly
rejected again in a lengthy en bane decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
-2-
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and ironically
the win'dfall

of having been sued by a public interest law firm, rather
than a traditional law firm with higher overhead and higher
salaries.
Moreover, such a system requires an intrusive
and complex preliminary step of determining exactly what
an attorney's costs were.

The financial investigation

necessary for this system to operate is a powerful disincentive

•

for private attorneys to take on public interest litigation,
knowing that their finances are thereby'placed under the
scrutiny of their opposing counsel and on the public record.
Additionally, the "costs-plus" system, unless it
took into account the costs of litigating cases where no fee
award was obtained, would not provide adequate compensation
for litigating public interest cases.
all such cases will be won.

This is because not

Success on the merits and

success in obtaining a fee are highly contingent.

If no

overhead factor for the lost cases is included as a part of
an attorney's "costs," his or her firm will rapidly be
running at a deficit.

The firm will either stop taking on

such cases or will ultimately go out of business.

This

obviously would undercut the purpose of C.C.P. § 1021.5'by
failing to provide an incentive for private parties to bring
suits in the public interest.

Conversely, however, if the

"costs" were to take lost cases into account as a portion of
the firm's overall overhead, then the amount of compensation
an attorney would receive would vary in inverse proportion
to that attorney's success record, again an anomalous result.
-4-
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Finally, the illogic of AB 3172's "costs-plus"
system is shown

the fact that the
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all, but actually reflect

the services at

if anything, the value of the

services provided.

(b) Other AB 3172

sions are also il

al.

AB 3172 would also prohibit courts the discretion
to award any fees for lit
to and
just as lit

ing the issues of entjtlement

ion of the fee.

Ye

ting the merits of the case does.

the "costs-plus" mode of calculat
AB 3172 were to becor.e law,
spent li

such issues take time

these

Precluding any

s

fee awards proposed by

is safe to say that the time
s

escalate.)

11

for fees for that

lowers the ef

him or her sufficient compen-

sation to rejmburse the fu 1 costs of 1
Simil

necessarily

received by an

rate of compensat

attorney, thus further

interest case.

(Indeed, if

a publ
grant of authority

, the

to courts to

between adverse parties would

mean that on

who prevailed on 100% of the

issues on eve

rest case would be able to obtain
or her for all time

adequate fee awards
spent liti

rest cases.

-5-

-142-

AB 3172 would require a court to consider five
factors in determining the
award.

These factors are:

a~propriateness

(1) the

faith 2na cooperation

of the party against whom a fee is awardee;
granted;

and size of the

(2) the relief

(3) the extent to which a party has prevailed;

(4) the public or private funding of the person or organization
to whom fees are awarded; and (5) whether an award will
ultimately be paid by public funds.
The first factor, the good faith of the losing
party, is relevant only insofar as it lowers the fee by
decreasing the number of hours the prevailing party hcd to
spend litigating the case.

party's

Since it was the los

violation of the law that precipitated the need for the lawsuit
in the first place, the prevailing party should not be
penalized for the loser's subsequent cooperation.
third factor,

Only the

extent to which a party has prevailed, has

any relevance in determining whether a party is entitled to a
fee award under C.C.P. § 1021.5.

The last four factors would,

to varying extents, have a bearing on the size of a fee
award, but it makes no sense to consider them in the contest
of the "costs-plus" method of fee computation.

Under that

method, the attorney for the prevailing party would already
be receiving less than adequate compensation to act as an
incentive to bring public interest litigation.

To the extent

that consideration of any of these factors would further
lower fee awards, the purposes of C.C.P. § 1021.5 would be
vitiated and private parties could not afford to bring public
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interest suits.
The

i

AB

notice is unnecess

s.

court may allow
statutory

of the regular

ce

icient.

AB 3172's requ

that

fees be made upon

time records

to discovery, and

be made

issues of fact
what

A

si

s alre

44~

mot

for attorneys'
t be subject
al
re

restate

I.

INTRODUCTION
AB 3172 proposes a number of changes in the procedures

for calculating and awarding attorneys'
C.C.P. § 1021.5.

fees

to

These comments submitted to the Assembly

Committee on the Judiciary by the Center for Law in the
Public Interest!/ will address each of the provisions of AB
3172 in turn.

•

Before analyzing the proposed amendments, it is
important to note that C.C.P. § 1021.5 has operated extremely
effectively over the nearly three years since it was codified.
It has provided a significant incentive to private parties
to bring suit to enforce important rights by allowing courts
to award them a reasonable amount of compensation when they
prevail in their claims.

As with other statutes and equitable

doctrines authorizing court-awarded attorneys' fees
public interest cases, such as the federal Civil Rights
Attorney's Fee Awards

1/ The Center for Law in the Public Interest is a nonprofit corporation which provides legal services without
charge to individuals and citizens groups
the Southern
California area. When the Center first began full-time legal
operations in December, 1971, its chief funding source was
the Ford Foundation.
Since its Ford Foundation support terminated in 1978, the Center
has been funded primarily by court-awarded attorneys' fees, with
the remainder of its funding coming from relatively small local
foundations, donations, direct mail solicitations, and other
miscellaneous sources. The Center has litigated a wide variety
of precedent-setting cases in a variety of substantive areas,
including employment discrimination, environmental protection,
land use and criminal justice reform.
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Act of 1976, the amount

f fee

not been excessive.

under C C.P. § 1021.5 has

, the amoun

o

tailored clos ly to
benefits

s rendered and the

in the 1
The

s

s

AB 3

2 would des

ability to base fee awards on their
the prevail

poss

necessary

of a fee award.

fee award for
to and amount

tabli

Addi

f

operated fair

, effect

citizens of

i

1021.5.
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method

1

sonable

ected
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ls

recent
bane dec sion

the

f

r

----------~---------

v. Harshall

cite] .
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, \vhere

for profit."

con
fee

whe

I

based upon the

o

a

ng

. p.

that

Such a "cos

f._

calcul

s

It would

'

which has until now
of all the

and to

72 propose

reasonable cos

AB 3172 would serve

CALCULATION

the amount of a
§

s

ADOPTION OF
AB

purpose of C.C.P.

1

further to vitiate this

II.

the a

AB 3172 would further undercut

litigat

t of the value of
them to set the

of the cost

1021.5 by prec

§

s

the courts

tvork,

fee on the arbi
vo1ved.

the awards has been

overthe u.s.
2/
t,
has

been uniformly rejected by Congress, all eleven federal circuit
Court.

courts, and the California

The many compelling

reasons for rejection of the "cost-plus" meth6d of fee computation in favor of the traditional "lodestar" approach are set
forth belm;.

tion l1ethod.

or "Lodestar" Fee

A.

Court-awarded attorneys' fees are allowed under a wide
variety of federal and state laws as well as various equitable

3/
fee award doctrines.-

4/
Over 120 federal statutes-

such fee awards, as do numerous California statutes,
C~C.P.

§

authorize
~I

including

1021.5.

3/
The equitable doctrines authorizing court-awarded attorneys'
fees include (1) the "coffil'lon fund" doctrine whereby the suit filed
by a party acting on behalf of others in a similar position
results in the creation of a "cornr.1on fund" out of
ch an
attorneys' fee awzrd can be rnade; (2) the "substantial benefit"
doctrine whereby a party acting in a representative capacity
bestows a substantial benefit of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary
nature on menbers of an ascertainable class and a fee award will
spread costs proportionately among those benefitted by the litigation; (3} the "private attorney general" doctrine (codified in
C.C.P. § 1021.5) whereby the litigation has resulted in the
vindication of an important public policy, a substantial number
of people will benefit frow the decision, and the costs of
securing the decision transcend the individual plaintiffs'
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization; and
{4) the "bad faith" or "obdurate behavior" doctrine whereby a
party has wilfully disobeved a court order or acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or-for oppressive reasons.
4/
For a complete listing of the statutes, see Federal Attorney
Fee Awards Reporter, October 1979, Vol. 2, No-::---6, pp. 2, 28.
5/
Appendix A attached hereto, listing 41 such statutes, is a
partial listing of them.
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Historically, when the

basis for court-awarded

fees was the "common fund" doctrine, the courts typically
determined the amount of the fee by a somewhat arbitrary standard:

simply computing a

of the overall fund which

would constitute the fee award.
108 Cal. 369 (1895)

(~,

Fox v. Hale and Norcross,

(fee set at 25% of recovery totalling over
53 Cal.App.2d 740 (1942)

(20% of first $2 mill

recovery; 15% of next $2 million; 10% of

remainder, for fee tota11

over $1.1 million).)

This per-

centage could be varied up or down, but where the fund established
by the litigation was very large
percentage could result

use of even a relatively low

an extremely

fee.

The resulting

fee often bore little relationship to the nature and aMount of
the attorneys' efforts, the skill demonstrated, and the overall
value of the services rendered.
In order to

greater

li

to

lor the size

of the fee award to the individual circumstances of the case and
to avoid large "windfall" fee awards, the courts began to develop
new techniques for determining the
reasonable fee award.

amount of a

These efforts were accelerated by adoption

of the newer equitable bases for fee awards where calculation of
the pecuniary benefits achieved
diff cult, if not
The newer

ssib1e.
to ca1cul

attorneys' fee now used universal
alike, is as follows:

the litigation was far more

As a first s
-ll-
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the amount of the
federal and state courts
the court examines the

number of hours spent by the attorneys, and develops a figure for
hours which qualify for a fee award.

The court may (and often

does) discount hours not productively spent (e.g., in legal and
6/
factual issues where the opposing party prevailed),- hours
spent on relatively mundane matters (e.g., preparing written
7/
interrogatories),- hours where there may have been duplication
of effort {e.g., where t\-10 attorneys from one side attended a
8/
deposition),- hours where there was a "learning curve" which
should not be paid for by the opposing side (e.g., library
research on a basic procedural issue), or hours which the court
9/
just finds excessive.~/
See, e.g., Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th
Cir. 1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978);
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3rd Cir. 1978}; Barrett v.
Kal~nowski, 458 F.Supp. 689 (H.D. Pa. 1978)
(requested fees of
$49,364.06 reduced to $6,820 on basis of time spent on unsuccessful claims and other factors).

7/

See, e.g., Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484
n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

F.Supp:-76~72

8/

See, e.g., Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., supra,
fees awarded because of dupl~ca
tion of time and effort and limited public benefits); In re
Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (number of hours disallowed because of duplication);
Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., [1979] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 97,136 (S.D. N.Y.) (one-third reduction in
hours because of duplication).
at,77~one-third reduct~on ~n

9/
See, e.g., Rose Pass Hines, Inc. v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088
(5th Cir. 1980) (court found excessive hours spent preparing fee
application); Crowe v. Lucas, 479 F.Supp. 1258 (N.D. Miss. 1979)
(court found only 200 hours reasonable where attorneys spent over
300 hours on case); McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F.Supp. 295 (N.D.
La. 1979) (court found only 300 hours reasonable where attorneys
sought compensation for nearly 600 hours); Hughes v. Repko,
supra (court found only 36.4 hours reasonable where attorney
spent 65.2 hours on case); Brown v. Stackler, 460 F.Supp. 446
(N.D. Ill. E.D. 1978} (finding the 834.25 hours claimed to be
"grossly excessive," court denied fees altogether).
-12-149-

Second, the court determines an appropriate hourly rate
for each attorney in the case depending on the experience and
expertise of the individual attorney, and the general level· of
fees charged by lawyers in the local community who have a similar
level of experience and expertise.
Third, the court arrives at a basic "lodestar" amount
by multiplying the number of hours allowed by the appropriate
hourly rate for each attorney.
Finally, the court adjusts the "lodestar" amount up or
down, depending on a host of criteria tailored to the facts of
the individual case, such as the importance of the litigation,
the extent of the victory and the benefits bestowed, the skill of
the attorneys and the efficiency (or inefficiency) demonstrated,
the contingent nature of success on the merits and of the fee
award, and other relevant considerations.
The final amount chosen is largely within the trial
court's discretion, and, on appeal, will not be reconsidered or
recalculated in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
This method of calculating fees is now utilized in
every federal circuit (Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st
Cir. 1977): City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2nd
Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1974); Walston v. School Board of Suffolk, 566
F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Exp., Inc:,
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.,
508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974); Waters v. \lise. Steel Works, 502
-13-
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F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th
Cir. 1977); Kerr v. Screen Actors

ld, 526 F.2d 67

1975); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778

(lOth

Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C

(9th Cir.

r. 1979); Evans v.
. 1974)).

It was

expressly approved by the California Supreme Court for the
California courts in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 {1977).
Indeed, the "lodestar" approach has been applied to all kinds of
litigation ranging from antitrust cases to shareholder derivative
suits to employment discrimination cases.

Further

when the

United States Congress recently enacted the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988), it expressly
approved this mode of fee calculation for all civil rights
"public interest" cases where fees were awarded under that
statute.

(S. Rep. No. 94-1011 and H. Rep. No. 94-1558.)

And,

exactly the same factors considered in this approach are set out
in the American Bar Association canons of ethics and disciplinary
rules as the factors which must be utilized by all attorneys in
determining what is a reasonable and appropriate fee

(ABA Code of

Professional Responsibility, Canon 2 and DR-2-160(3)).
The obvious advantage to this universal approach is
that it allows the trial court judge, who is in the best position
to determine the quali

and nature of the attorneys' efforts, to

appraise the value of his services on a case-by-case basis,
considering all of the individual and unique elements which
inevitably arise in any litigation.

It utilizes a sensible

starting point (the compensation the attorneys would have
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received if they had paying clients) and

usts that figure up

or down depending on the value of the services rendered by the
particular attorneys

the particular facts of each case.

awarding fees in these cases is generally to encourage their
being litigated and resolved in the courts, historically, the
amount of the fees awarded has hardly been designed to do that.
To the contrary, the amounts have tended to be so low as to
discourage such cases from being litigated.

Lawyers bringing

successful public interest cases have not obtained "windfalls" at
, the amounts have

taxpayer or corporate expenses -- if

been so low that frequently even the attorneys' "overhead" costs
have not been reimbursed.
In fact, a recent survey of 140 federal district court
fee awards showed that there has been a tendency by most courts
to devalue "public

, Court Awarded

t" cases.

What Is Reasonable?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 310
(1977}.)

This survey showed the following mean hourly rates:
antitrust suits . . . . . . . . .
all commerc 1 cases
employment discrimination cases
all c
1
s cases . . . .

The experience

the Cal forn

• $ 181
93
40
38

courts is comparable.

For

example, in
Court, in a matter of original jurisdiction,

California
awarded fees to the
(California Rural
hour.

In No

Assistance
ton v. Davis

No. L.A.
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at the rate of only $15 per
30731 (19 __ ), aff'd,

23 Cal. 3d 955 (1979), the trial court awarded fees to the Hestern
Center on Law and

B.

at the rate of $40 per hour.

AB 3172's "Cost-Plus" Hethod of Fee Computation.
There are many good reasons that Congress and the

courts have not adopted the "cost-plus" method of computing fees.
I~st

fundamentally, under this method, the amount of fee awards

would bear no relation to the value of the services rendered, as
indicated by the quality and importance of the results obtained
in the lawsuit, the expertise of the attorneys involved, and the
other factors which are usually considered in setting fees.
amount would, instead, depend primarily upon such irrelevant and
wholly arbitrary factors as the extravagance of the lawyer's
accommodations and the size of the law firm (smaller firms and
sole practitioners tend to have higher costs).

Indeed, this

system would compensate attorneys in reverse proportion to need
and efficiency.

The more economical and proficient the attorney,

the less he or she would be awarded.

There would be an obvious

incentive to increase operating costs and overhead unnecessarily
and extravagantly to raise the amount of court-awarded fees.
Second, the "cost-plus" approach would be extremely
difficult to apply because it would require a detailed and
complex inquiry into the financial affairs of the law firms
involved.

The court would have to ascertain not only what the

costs were and which ones are allowable, a difficult enough
process, but it would have to evaluate what a reasonable level of
-16-
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costs should have been.

Horeover, the fact that internal

financial information would almost certainly become a matter of
public record would be a powerful
attorneys to take on
c.c.P.

s

s

for

interest 1

tion

ect to

1021.5.
would,

reali

the

(both

where fees are

te and

ic

upon success on the merits, discourage

all public interest litigation, thereby undermining the intent
of the legislature
practices

passing

c.c.P.

upon contingent

§

1021.5

In all law

, the successful cases

where fees are awarded must pay for all the law firm's expenses,
including expenses attributable to time spent on unsuccessful
cases.

Because the "cost-plus" method fails to take such costs

into account, it fails to provide adequate compensation or
incentive for public interest litigation of the
§

1021.5 was meant to encourage.

that C.C.P.
lude

Even if costs were to

the costs of lost cases, the method would still make no sense
to its

because a firm's costs would vary in
success in li
costs would be.

the more cases

lost, the higher its

In fact, the costs might well

the value

of the services rendered.
Finally

it would be extremely difficult to

which cases would
reasonable va
established doctr

an actual
There are
that have
-17-

l
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sts rule rather than a
statutes and courtthe basis for court fee

ties for many years.
Yet, fee awards pursuant
calculated under the

are all

these sta

It would

tional

t cases in one

make no sense to calculate fees

fferent manner.

manner, and for all other cases in a
a fee were appropriate under both C.C.P

And, if

§ 1021.5 and another

statute, which method would be used?

III. PRECLUSION OF FEES FOR LITIGATING ISSUES OF ENTITLEMENT
TO AND COHPUTATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AB 3172 would

on to award

courts the di

attorneys' fees for the

the issues of

litiga

entitlement to and computation of a reasonable attorneys' fee
award.

This proposal also has been

ected consistently, and

courts have found that the prevail

is

tled to fees

for the time

preparing the fee application where fee awards
10/
are based on a statutory
sion such as C . . P. § 1021.5-- or
its federal counterpart
11/
Act of 1976.-To

the

's Fee Awards

1

fees for

an attorney's effec

s time

decreasing

rate for all hours expended

on the case, contradict the purpose of the 1

slature in passing

C.C.P. § 1021.5, that is, encouragement of attorneys to act as

10/

See Rich v. Citv of Benicia, 99 Cal.App.3d 536d (1979).

11/ §_ee, ~, Ga_~ v. Haher, 5 4 F. 2d 336 (2nd Cir. 1979) i
\Jeisenberger v. IIuecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th
r. 1979); Lund v.
Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978).
-18-
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private attorneys

in vind

slative policies.

l1oreover, such a provision would encourage lo
contest and drag out fee matters to
thereby increasing the
themselves.

st extent

par

1

's costs at no

Such tactics would be cer

parties from taking on
ing fees for time

parties to
pos~ible,

sk to

n to discourage private

ic interest li

gation.

on the fee issue bene

Thus, allowthe public

because such allowance is essential to ensure that the purposes
of C.C.P. § 1021.5 will be effectuated.

APPORTIONHENT AND CONSIDERATION OF

IV.

THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN FEE AWARD AND CDrll.PUTATION
a court to apportion

The provision of AB 3172 a1

ies on the same or adverse sides" at

a fee award "between

best adds unnecessary confusion to the
computation and, at v1orst
C.C.P. § 1021.5.

method of fee
the fundamental purposes of
to apportion

Courts already have the

frequently appor-

fees among parties on the same side, and
parties

tion fees between both
receiving the fee.
Supreme Court
the two publ
parties.

And

the fee and the parties

e, in Serrano v. Priest, supra, the

For

of the fee award between

the

the prevailing

interest law firms
Sundance v.

Ct. No. CA 000 257

Los Angeles Super.

(Order After

Re: Attorneys' Fees and

Costs, January 17, 1979), the court allocated the liability for a
fee awarded pursuant to C C.P. § 1021.
-19-

-156-

equal

between the two

and County o

defendants, the

Los

les.

s

entirely different matter.

success of the parties

lar to the

is s

s

the degree of

requirement of AB 3172 that a court cons

of a fee award.

es is an

of fee awards between adverse

Allocat

ateness or size

de

The presence of these

s

in AB 3172

points out the absurdity of the "cost-plus" method of fee computation proposed in this
computation, these

11.

Under the "lodestar" method of fee

sions would be redundant and confusing.

The degree of success of the

is

taken

in determining the appropriateness of an award
§

s

to account
C.C.P.

1021.5 only authorizes awards to "successful" parties, that is,

parties who prevail on the

ts of

lawsuit

The degree of

success of the parties and the nature of the benefits bestowed on
the public by the prevailing
the court

are also taken into account by

determining the size of the award.

the court's primary considerations in deci

are among
to what extent to

raise or lower the "lodestar" amount to

the amount of

the final fee award.
Under the "cos

us" method, however,

provisions (the requirement that a court take

two
account the

parties' degree of success in determining the

teness and

size of a fee award, and the authorization of fee apportionment
between adverse parties) are a futile attempt to
wholly arbitrary system of fee computation some rela
quality of work performed

the prevailing par
-20-
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that
to the
As discussed

above, the proposed "cos

" system suffers from two funda-

mental defects:

arbitrariness and inadequacy of compensation.

These provis

a

to address the first problem of arbi-

trariness at the expense of exacerbating the second problem of
inadequacy.

In fact, the concept of apportionment of fees is

incompatible with the "cost-plus" cone

because it means that

a party would have to be 100% successful to get reimbursed for
all of his or her costs of 1
costs of litigation

(not even counting the

ch was not successful enough to result in

any fee award at all).

Such a fee award system would provide no

incentive whatsoever for private parties to bring litigation in
the public interest s

they would almost never be fully

compensated for their efforts.

V.

OTHER FACTORS \'JHICH HUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN
SIZE OF A FEE

In addit

that a court consider

to its

the extent to which a pa

A~vARD

iled, AB 3172 notes four

has

other factors that a court must cons
appropriateness or size of a fee award.

de

ng the

These factors are

(1) the good faith and cooperation of the party against whom a
fee is awar

(2

the relief

funding of the person or

(3) the public or private
zation to whom fees are awarded;

and (4) whether an award will u
Some of these factors are irrelevant, o
cons

be paid by public funds.
s are appropriate

s within the context of the "lodestar" system, but
-21-
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with the "cost-plus"

none of them make any sense in conjunc
tion.

method of fee

The second of these factors

the relief granted, is

indeed a relevant factor which is already a

consideration

for courts awarding fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5.

A court cannot

award a fee without considering this factor, as it must determine
that the action "has resulted in the enforcement of an important
right affecting the public interest" and that "a si
benefit . . . has

ficant

conferred on the general public or a large

class of persons."

Moreover, the nature of the relief granted is

considered by the court in
the "lodestar" amount.

n

whether to raise or lower

Again, this

sion may be an attempt

to render the "cost-plus" system less arbitrary

but to the

extent that it could be used to lower fees that already fail to
prevailing party, it would further

adequately

undercut the purpose of C.C.P. § 1021.5.
The

rd and fourth factors listed for the court's

consideration, the

of counsel for the

are awarded and whether the fee

11 be

totally irrelevant to the court's dete
an award.

to whom fees
ic funds, are

d

nation of

tlement to

No court has found the former relevant to entitlement.

Indeed, the California Supreme Court specifically noted in
Serrano v. Priest, supra, that it was an irrelevant consideration.
§

And, with respect to the latter consideration,

c.c.P.

1021.5 as presently in effect specifically contemplates that

fees will be awarded against public enti
-22-
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es.

Though these two

factors may at

be found to be relevant considerations in

the size of

fee award, again it would be unreason-

able to make any reductions

a fee

under the "cost-

plus" method.
nal

, the

and cooperation of the party

fa

against whom a fee is awarded is irrelevant to either the appropriateness or the s ze of a fee award
affected the nature of the bene
and the necessi
rights affec

and f

t

by the litigation,

ial burden of private enforcement of

the

party had

insofar as it has

st.

Presumably, if the losing

with the law in the first place, there would

have been no need for the litigation and no need for the party to
pay any attorneys' fee at all.
losing

And, to the extent that the

realized the mistakes it made and made good faith

efforts to arrive at a
, less

party s c
li

of the prevailing

reso
would have been

red for the

to a minimum in any case.

and the fee would be

the amount of the fee awarded would

Any further

t

constitute an unwarranted pena

the prevailing party.

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
Notice.

A.

reason for this
for attorneys'
motion;
insuf

f

A motion

awards should be treated just like any other

court

ient for

rement.

inds that the s
ny

, it may a
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notice period is
appropriate continuances.

In that manner,
pa

s

a

will be prejudiced.

ther par
fers

of performing work with no

rd

assurance of compensa

and not even a possibility of compensa-

tion until after prevailing in the suit.
that party to an addi

It is unfair to subject

delay in receiving compensation

unless a court

B.

The prevailing

cause for such delay.

Requirements That Hotion for Attorneys' Fees Be 11ade
Upon Adequate Time Records, That They Be Subject to
Di

and That Find

Be Made on All Material

Issues of Fact.
All of these

sions are unnecessary s

merely restate what is al

established law.
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they
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Conservatorship and liquidation proceedings, Bus & P 10239.23
Restraint of trade, action to recover damages, Bus & P 16750
Revenue Bond I.aw of 1941, action to enforce, Gov 54356
cts, bond action, Pub U 29292

San Francisco Bay area transit dis
Security

c~ne:s

prcte~tion,

civil liability, Corp 27200

Separate maintenance, CC 137.3
Sewers and sewer systems,
Delinqucmt payments, col
Small claims court, appe

I

c

on, Health

&

S 5053

CCP 117j

Subdivision maps, installation of improvements, rcsciss
proceedings, Bus & P 11612.5
Transfer of causes, motions for allowance, CCP 39Gb
Unfair

tr~dc

practices, ac

on for damages, Bus & P 17082
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serve

addition some

penalize

plaintiffs for

t

a court

A.B. 3172

deny fee awards
impossible,
public interest
First,

a

11

no fees should

of its ''

cooperation."

for litigation in

success

that

a statute was uncons
that it cannot be
faith a previous

fees

to
lid statute.

1021.5,

1
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Fourth, A.B. 3172 requires that
upon adequate time
lawyers, who

"

not

Legal aid

interest

their clients, are

maintain records as
~

motions "be made

to

ly as private attorneys.

When

confronted with less than perfect records or a lack of
records, courts carefully determine whether the hours estiwork done in the case and most

mated were reasonable

always lower the amount of fees awarded.

This provision,

however, would require a court to disallow
on the conclus

merely

records were not "adequate,"

that

whatever that means.

Effect of the Bill on Amounts Awarded.
to survive

The rare public interest attorney who

is

the pitfalls discussed above and receives a

for another unpleasant surprise: the fee award under A.B.
3172 will be ridiculously low

The bill

court

to undertake a complicated cost-accounting formula in determining
the size of an award, rather
simply awarding

, as

done presently,

on number of hours

times

the reasonable hourly market rate for those services in the
legal community.

The formula suggested by the bill is based

on an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia which has s
same court.

been vacated

that

No other courts have ever adopted that formula,

for good reason.

The formula sets up an unjus

fiable

triple standard for determining fee payments in civil rights
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cases.
At the top of the hierarchy is the private law firm
which defends civil rights cases.

That firm is assured of

market rate payments, win, lose or draw.
In the middle is the private firm which agrees to
prosecute a civil rights case on a pro bono basis.

In order

to receive fees the firm will have to undergo an extensive
and humiliating examination of its private financial records
in orGer to compute its fee.

Given that prospect and the

probability that its fee will be much less than its usual
rate, the firm, given the choice, undoubtedly will choose to
defend civil rights suits rather than to prosecute them.
At the bottom of the heap, of course, will be legal aid
and public interest lawyers.

Public interest law firms will

be penalized for paying lower salaries and having lower
overhead than private
standard can be seen

The absurdity of such a
supposing that a pub

c interest

firm decides one year to triple the salaries of its attorneys
and move to much costlier offices, whi

up the

deficit by reducing services to its clients.

By the "logic'*

of the cost-accounting approach, the fees that a court may
award the firm would triple, even though the firm would be
performing less of a public service.
formula thus awards both greed
The formula

The cost-accounting

inefficiency.

particularly perni

a time of

declining government and foundation support for legal services
and public.interest programs.

Not only
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11 the formula

p'revent those programs from compensating for reduced grants,
but it will make them suffer because of those grant reductions.
A program whose grant is reduced may have to lower salaries
and overhead, which in turn, under A.B. 3172, will lead to
.. even lower attorneys' fees.
Two other portions of the bill will lower the amount of
money awarded.

One provision of the bill specifies that no

part of the fee award can be based on time spent litigating
the entitlement to fees.

This will effectively reduce the.

amount of the award to every litigant, in direct defiance
of the purposes behind the original legislation.

It will also

encourage losing governmental defendants to undertake frivolous
"free" appeals of fee awards in order to forestall payment of
a fee award and discourage attorneys from taking on public
interest cases.
Also, the bill appears to foster conflicts between
attorneys and clients.

Presently, section 1021.5 allows a

court to determine that a fee award "should not in the interest
of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any."

A.B. 3172

deletes this portion and directs courts to determine "the
ext.e:1t t<> which attorneys' fees can be paid from the recovery,
if any."

Apparently, the court is instructed to order a

civil rights plaintiff winning a damage recovery to pay his
or her attorney from that recovery, even if it would be
patentedly u:1just to require the plaintiff to do so.
A.3. 3172's Penalties for Public Interest Litigation.
It's bad enough that A.B. 3172 will strip away every

-5-
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incentive in existing legislation for attorneys to take
important public interest cases.

Even worse, the bill attempts

to discourage the clients themselves from suing.

The present

legislation specifies that fee awards may be made against
~public

entities, but no fees may be awarded to public entities.

This bill deletes that proviso, allowing public entities to
recover fees from civil rights plaintiffs.

Every attorney

will have to advise his or her client considering a suit to
~nforce

broad public rights that if the

s·~it

is unsuccessful

the client may have to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party.

Few indigent or even middle class clients would

risk litigation under these circumstances.

A.B. 3172 would

keep out of the judicial system the very people Section 1021.5
was designed to bring in.

-6-

-174-

